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Abstract 
 The current doctoral thesis sought to develop an IRAP that could assess obese 
and normal-weight individuals’ attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods. Three 
empirical studies directly compared the ability of IRAP and explicit measures to 
assess obese and normal-weight individuals’ food biases in a two-hour and 
unrestricted food deprivation state. An additional objective of the research programme 
was to determine if it was possible to detect reliable differences in neurophysiological 
activity while participants completed a food-attitude IRAP. Finally, the research 
aimed to examine the malleability of implicit attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods. 
All studies presented participants with an IRAP and explicit measures. The IRAP 
presented “pro-unhealthy” and “pro-healthy” trials. The difference in mean-response-
latency between “pro-healthy” and “pro-unhealthy” trials indicated participants’ bias 
towards healthy or unhealthy foods. The advantages of the IRAP were highlighted 
across the empirical investigations: (a) unlike any other implicit measure, it 
differentiated between the implicit responses of obese and normal-weight individuals 
to healthy and unhealthy foods, accounting for variance beyond that provided by a 
range of explicit measures; (b) the IRAP effects were relatively robust across studies; 
(c) a measure of neurological processing (EEGs) was successfully obtained while 
participants completed the IRAP, and the findings yielded some patterns that appear 
consistent with previous research; and (d) it revealed the malleability of implicit 
responses using an acceptance-based intervention, an effect that has not yet been 
reported in the literature on psychological acceptance or implicit attitudes. Overall, 
therefore the pattern of results in these studies highlighted the utility of the IRAP for 
future investigations of implicit food attitudes among obese and normal-weight 
individuals. Finally, the current research programme adds to previously published 
 vi
IRAP studies showing the efficacy of the IRAP as a measure of implicit bias across a 
range of domains. 
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Chapter 1: Explicit and Implicit Attitudes to Food among Obese and Normal-
Weight Individuals: A Review 
 
1.1 Obesity 
 The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines obesity as a Body Mass Index 
(BMI) over 30 (kg/m2). In 2005, the WHO indicated that 1.6 million adults over the 
age of fifteen were overweight with at least 400 million adults being obese. Once 
considered a problem only in high-income countries, excessive weight and obesity are 
now dramatically on the rise in low- and middle-income countries, particularly in 
urban settings. The WHO projects that there will be more that 700 million obese 
adults in the world by 2015 (WHO, 2005).  
 Studies have shown that the intake of high-fat foods is a salient contributing 
factor in global obesity (Lissner & Heitmann, 1995). Furthermore, obese individuals 
are found to have a higher percentage of fat in-take in their diets relative to normal-
weight individuals (e.g., Calpaldi, 1996; Drewnowski, 1996). Furthermore, many 
studies have shown that obese individuals demonstrate a taste preference for high-fat 
foods compared to normal-weight controls (e.g., Capaldi, 1996; Drewnowski, 1991; 
Drewnowski, Brunzell, Sande, Iverius, & Greenwood, 1985; Drewnowski & 
Greenwood, 1983; Drewnowski, Kurth, Holden-Wiltse, & Saari, 1992; Reed, 
Bachmanov, Beauchamp, Tordoff, & Price, 1997).  
1.2 Explicit Attitudes 
 When individuals are asked to report their attitudes to food, these explicit 
reports have been found to account for a considerable amount of eating behaviour in 
normal-weight individuals (Dennison, & Shepherd, 1995; Woodward, Boon, 
Cumming, Ball, Williams, & Hornby, 1996). Attitudes to food have also been put 
forward as a crucial factor in the development and maintenance of obesity (Brug, 
Lechner & De Vries, 1995; De Bourdeaudhuij, Lefevere, Deforche, Wijndaele, 
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Matton, & Philippaerts, 2005; Dennison, & Shepherd, 1995). On this basis, one might 
predict that obese individuals’ would show more positive attitudes to unhealthy high-
fat foods on self-report explicit measures than normal-weight individuals. However, 
the very limited research available on this issue found evidence contrary to this 
prediction. For example, obese youngsters reported less positive attitudes towards 
unhealthy foods relative to normal-weight controls (Perl, Mandic, Primorac, Klapec, 
& Perl, 1998). On balance, this finding could well be as a result of responding in a 
socially desirable manner based on the current Western idealization of the slim body 
type (Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999). In other words, the 
stigmatization associated with being obese might make it difficult for obese 
individuals to admit to liking or eating large amounts of unhealthy high-fat foods 
(Puhl & Brownell, 2003; Teachmann & Brownell, 2001). As such, explicit self-report 
questionnaires alone may not allow psychologists to fully analyse and explain the 
relationship between food attitudes and behaviour among obese individuals.  
1.3 Implicit Attitudes 
 One possible conclusion arising from the inconsistent findings in the area of 
attitudes to food is that the instruments used to measure those attitudes are lacking in 
some respects. Self-report measures (i.e. simply asking what foods you like etc.) may 
seem like an intuitively sensible way to assess attitudes to food among obese 
individuals. However, psychologists have recently become aware that that the 
reliability and predictive validity of self-repost measures can be unreliable. For 
example, responses on questionnaires can be affected by the phrasing of a question, 
the order of the questions or the context in which the questions are asked (Roefs, 
Werrij, Smulders & Jansen, 2006). Furthermore, some researchers have argued that 
self-report measures are also influenced by self-presentation biases as well as the fact 
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that individuals may have limited introspective knowledge of the processes involved 
in their behaviour (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellot, 2002).  
 Those processes to which individuals have limited access have been labelled 
implicit attitudes. Although the precise definition of such attitudes remains a topic of 
intense debate (e.g., De Houwer, 2006), a reasonable working definition was provided 
by Greenwald and Banaji (1995). Specifically, they defined implicit attitudes as 
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that 
mediate favourable or unfavourable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” 
(p.8). The basic idea in this rapidly growing area of research is that there are two 
broad types of attitudes, explicit and implicit, which may influence how we behave in 
various contexts. Numerous models of implicit and explicit attitudes have been 
proposed (e.g., the Elaboration Likelihood Model [ELM] Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model [HSM] Chaiken, 1987; the Motivation and Opportunity 
as Determinants [MODE]; Fazio, 1990; the Associative-Propositional Evaluation 
Model [APE] Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007), but in general explicit attitudes are 
seen as involving conscious and thoughtful deliberation, whereas implicit attitudes are 
non-deliberative and automatic. In other words, explicit attitudes reflect an 
individual’s carefully thought out evaluation, whereas implicit attitudes reflect an 
individual’s immediate “gut” reaction to a stimulus. Traditional self-report measures 
are typically used to assess explicit attitudes, because respondents have time to reflect 
on their views as they complete a questionnaire. In contrast, implicit attitudes are 
often assessed using a response-time paradigm in which rapid responses are required. 
The most widely used response-time test of implicit attitudes is the implicit 
association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). 
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 The central postulate underlying the IAT is that it should be easier to map a 
target-concept and its attribute-category onto the same response when those target-
concepts and attribute-category are associated in memory than when they are not 
associated (De Houwer, 2002). For illustrative purposes, consider the seminal IAT 
study reported by Greenwald et al. (1998). In one experiment, participants were 
presented with two target-concepts, names of flowers (e.g., rose), and names of 
insects (e.g., wasp), and two attribute-categories, positive words (e.g., caress) and 
negative words (e.g., abuse). The researchers predicted that positive attitudes to 
flowers over insects would be reflected in faster response latencies when flower and 
positive words were allocated to the same response and insects and negative words 
were allocated to another response, than when the reverse was true (i.e., flower and 
negative words to the same response, and insects and positive words to the other 
response). The results of the experiment were consistent with this prediction. Since 
this study, IAT effects have been replicated across a wide range of domains (see 
Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji, 2007, for a recent review), but most notably in socially 
sensitive areas such as racism (e.g., Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003). 
Furthermore, the IAT has been used to study a range of clinically relevant issues (e.g., 
Haeffel, Abramson, Brazy, Shah, Teachman, & Nosek, 2007; Green, Carney, Pallin, 
Ngo, Raymond, Iezzoni & Banaji, 2007; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001), and 
most relevant to the current research it has been employed in the assessment of 
implicit food preferences (Masion Greenwald & Bruin, 2001; Karpinski & Hilton, 
2001; Olzon & Fazio, 2004; Maison, Greenwald & Bruin, 2004; Perugini & Pretwich, 
2007; Hofmann, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Hofmann & Friese, 
2008). 
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 At the time of writing, thirty-two studies had been published that had 
employed implicit measures of attitudes to food. Given the focus of the research 
reported in the current thesis, the next section will focus only on those studies that 
employed obese versus normal-weight individuals and/or have manipulated food 
deprivation as part of the study of implicit attitudes to food (A complete list of studies 
of implicit attitudes to food is presented in Appendix A). 
1.4 IAT Obesity Studies 
2.4.1 Obese and Normal-weight Participants show a Negative Bias to High-fat Foods  
 The first study of implicit attitudes to food that employed both obese and 
normal-weight participants was reported by Reofs and Jansen (2002). Specifically, the 
study aimed to assess implicit and explicit attitudes to high- and low-fat foods. The 
IAT presented six high-fat food words (French fries, chocolate etc.) and six low-fat 
words (popcorn, strawberries etc.) with six positive words (love) and six negative 
words (war). Thus, participants were required on some blocks of trials to categorise 
high-fat foods with positive words and low-fat foods with negative words, but on 
other trials to perform the opposite categorisation (i.e., high-fat with negative words 
and low-fat with positive words). Explicit food preferences for high and low fat foods 
were measured via a 9-point Likert scale anchored with (very palatable and very 
unpalatable at either ends).  Explicit attitudes and habits concerning high-fat foods 
(tastiness, healthiness, I should not eat it etc.) were measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale. The Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire EDE-Q; Fairburn and Beglin, 
1994) was used a screen for abnormal eating behaviours and attitudes. The Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlow, 1964) was used an explicit measure of 
desirable responding.  
 6 
 It was predicted that obese individuals would show a strong positive implicit 
bias towards high-fat foods but the normal-weight individuals would not. That is, 
participants should respond more quickly when categorising high-fat foods with 
positive words and low-fat foods with negative words than vice versa. Contrary to the 
researchers’ predictions, both obese and normal-weight individuals produced 
significant negative implicit biases to high-fat foods. There was also a significant 
interaction effect, with no difference between the groups when categorising high-fat 
foods with negative words, but with the obese group responding significantly more 
slowly than the normal weight-group when categorising high-fat with positive words. 
Thus, if anything, the obese group showed an even stronger negative implicit bias to 
high-fat foods than the normal-weight group. 
 For the explicit measure, both obese and normal-weight groups showed a 
significant bias towards low-fat relative to high-fat foods on the explicit measures, 
with no significant difference between the groups, and no correlation with the IAT. 
Interestingly, the obese group produced a stronger effect for the statement “I do not 
want to eat high-fat-foods” than the normal-weight group and responses to this 
statement correlated with the IAT measure. The obese group scored significantly 
higher on the global EDE-Q than the normal-weight group. Furthermore, the global 
EDE-Q score, and the subscale scores for Restraint, Weight Concern, and Shape 
Concern all correlated significantly with the IAT measure, but the Eating Concern 
scores did not. The reported number of dieting attempts also correlated with the IAT 
effects. 
 This early study by Reofs and Jansen (2002) on implicit attitudes to food 
appeared to contradict the intuitively obvious prediction that obese individuals would 
show a relatively strong positive bias towards high-fat foods. Interestingly, around the 
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time this study was published, another implicit attitude researcher (De Houwer, 2001) 
had argued that the IAT effect does not reflect an attitude towards the individual 
target items (i.e., the individual high- versus low-fat foods), but rather an attitude to 
the target category itself (i.e., high-fat versus low-fat). Insofar as this is the case, it is 
possible that the IAT effects reflected the general belief in Western culture that high-
fat foods are unhealthy and bad for you, rather than participants’ actual preference for 
those foods. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the IAT measure did not 
correlate with the explicit food preference measure, but did correlate with the EDE-Q 
scores, responses to the explicit statement “I do not want to eat high-fat foods”, and 
the number of dieting attempts. In other words, the IAT employed by Reofs and 
Jansen was sensitive to socially influenced health-related attitudes to high- and low-
fat foods rather than to actual food preferences.  
1.4.2 Obese and Normal-weight Individuals Respond Differently on a Self-concept 
IAT 
 In order to minimise the impact of cultural attitudes or norms on individual 
implicit attitudes a self-concept IAT was developed. The self-concept IAT is based on 
assumption that the self-concept involves the association of the concept of self with 
one or more (non-valenced) attribute concepts, and thus such an IAT may highlight 
the degree of identification an individual has toward those attribute concepts 
(Greenwald Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, and Mellot, 2002,  p.5). This approach 
to the study of implicit attitudes towards food among obese and non-obese individuals 
was adopted by Craeynest, Crombez, De Houwer, Deforche, and De Bourdeaudhui 
(2006). Specifically, these researchers used the self-concept variant of the IAT to 
examine whether implicit self-concept and self-report attitudes to food were related to 
fat versus non-fat foods among obese and normal-weight children. The self-concept 
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IAT presented six attribute words related to self (me, my, etc.) versus others (their, 
his, etc.) and six pictures of high-fat foods (French fries, chocolate etc.) and non-fat 
foods (fruit, yoghurt etc.). Explicit liking (“how much do you like or dislike”) of each 
individual food picture was measured separately. It was predicted that both obese and 
normal-weight children and adolescents would produce positive explicit attitudes 
towards non-fat over fat foods, but only the obese individuals would show a positive 
implicit bias towards identifying themselves with fat-foods.  
 The results, however, were not entirely consistent with these predictions. 
Although the normal-weight participants showed an implicit association between self 
and non-fat foods on the IAT, the obese participants showed no evidence of a strong 
association between self and either food type. Consistent with the prediction for the 
explicit measure, there were no significant differences between the two groups, with 
both showing a slightly positive explicit attitude towards fat-food and a neutral bias 
towards non-fat food. Although the results did not accord precisely with the 
researchers’ predictions, the implicit association between self and food-type did 
differentiate the obese from normal-weight individuals in a manner not observed 
when attitudes towards high and low fat foods were targeted in the Roefs and Jansen 
(2002) study. 
1.4.3 Overweight and Normal-weight Individuals Produce Similar Effects on a 
Personalised IAT  
 Another variation on the IAT was employed in a recent study to examine 
overweight and normal-weight youngsters’ attitudes to personally chosen palatable 
healthy foods versus palatable unhealthy foods (Craeynest, Crombez, Haerens, & De 
Bourdeaudhuil, 2007). This modified version, known as the personalised IAT (Olsen 
and Fazio, 2004), differed from the standard version used by Reofs and Jansen (2002) 
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in that the attribute labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ were replaced with personal labels 
“I like” and “I don’t like”. These two category labels were presented with words of 
six individually chosen palatable healthy and six palatable unhealthy foods. Explicit 
self-report questionnaires measured participant’s attitudes towards the target 
categories used in the IAT (i.e., palatable unhealthy and palatable healthy foods) on 7-
point Likert scales ranging from “totally agree” to “totally disagree”. The researchers 
predicted that the overweight individuals would produce an implicit bias towards 
unhealthy over healthy foods relative to the normal-weight youngsters. The results 
revealed that both normal-weight and overweight groups produced significantly 
positive implicit and explicit attitudes towards healthy over unhealthy foods with no 
difference between the weight groups or interaction effects. Correlations between the 
IAT effects and explicit measures were non-significant.  
1.5 Summary  
 In sum, all three obese versus normal-weight IAT studies listed above 
produced results counter to their researchers’ predictions. None of the studies found 
that obese individuals had a positive implicit bias toward high-fat unhealthy foods 
relative to the normal-weight individuals. Based on these findings, therefore, it 
appears that overweight individuals do not have a positive attitude to unhealthy and/or 
high-fat foods. Obviously, this conclusion offers a challenge to the argument that 
attitudes play some causal role in eating behaviour. On balance, the foregoing 
research was all conducted using the IAT, or some variant, and thus it seems 
important to determine if similar effects are obtained using other measures of implicit 
attitudes. 
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1.6 Possible Alternatives to the IAT 
 There is wide support for the reliability and validity of the IAT across 
numerous domains (e.g., see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald, 2002 
for a review). Nevertheless, a number of limitations of the measure have been raised 
(see Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & 
Christie, 2006; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; De Houwer, 2002; Fiedler, 
Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Nosek & Sriram, 2007). Two particular limitations will 
be discussed here. The first is that the IAT provides a measure of relative associative 
strength among concepts and not a measure of the valence of individual concepts (De 
Houwer, 2002; Nosek et al., 2005). The second limitation concerns the fact that the 
IAT provides a relatively indirect measure of implicit attitudes (discussed later).  
 The IAT is a relativistic measure because each IAT trial involves presenting 
both of the categories under investigation simultaneously (e.g., Healthy and 
Unhealthy foods). As such, IAT effects are based on responses that occur in the 
context of both categories, rather than each individually. Hence, it is possible, for 
example, that a pro-healthy-food/anti-unhealthy-food IAT bias indicates that a 
participant has a positive attitude to “healthy foods” and a neutral attitude to 
“unhealthy foods”, or possibly a neutral attitude to “healthy food” and a negative 
attitude to “unhealthy foods”. In short, the IAT can indicate that the concept x is 
preferred to the concept y, but it cannot indicate to what extent x and y are preferred, 
or not preferred, independently. Fortunately, two non-relative measures of implicit 
attitudes have been used to investigate attitudes to food among obese and normal-
weight individuals, and it is to these studies we now turn. 
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1.7 Extrinsic Affective Simon Task Obesity Studies 
 One alternative to the IAT is known as the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 
(EAST; De Houwer, 2003a). The original EAST presented white, green and blue 
coloured words. When the words appeared in white on the computer screen, 
participants were required to press the left key when the stimuli were negatively 
valenced (e.g., “hate”, “war”, and “disease”) and to press the right key when they 
were positively valenced (e.g., “love”, “peace, and “health”). When the words were 
presented in blue and green, participants were simply required to respond to the 
colour of the words rather than their valence (e.g., press left for green and right for 
blue). Given this learning history, it was predicted that green would become 
extrinsically associated with the negatively valenced words and blue would become 
associated with the positively valenced words. The critical test trials involved 
presenting positively and negatively valenced words in both blue and green colours. 
The assumption here was that participants would find it easier to respond to blue 
words when they are positively valenced and green words when they were negatively 
valenced than vice versa (blue as negative and green as positive). The EAST effect is 
thus defined as the difference in mean response latency and/or error percentages 
between congruent trials (i.e., blue-positive and green-negative) versus incongruent 
trials (i.e., blue-negative and green-positive). The study by De Houwer (2003a) and 
numerous subsequent studies provided evidence for the predicted EAST effect (for 
example, De Houwer, Crombez, Koster & De Beul, 2004; Ellwart, Becker, & Rinck, 
2005; De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). 
 1.7.1 Obese youngsters reveal a positive bias, but normal-weight youngsters 
reveal a neutral bias, to healthy and unhealthy foods. In one study, the EAST was 
used to measure obese and normal-weight youngsters’ attitudes to healthy and 
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unhealthy foods (Craeynest, Crombez, De Houwer, Deforche, Tanghe, and De 
Bourdeaudhuij, 2005). Participants were first asked to provide lists of personally liked 
and disliked food words. The EAST presented participants with these food words in 
white and they were required to respond left for the liked foods and right for the 
disliked foods. Thus liked foods were extrinsically associated with a left response and 
disliked foods were extrinsically associated with a right response. An additional six 
healthy foods (e.g., apple) and six unhealthy foods (e.g., crisps) that were pre-selected 
by the researchers were also employed (none of these 12 foods were presented in 
white). Healthy and unhealthy food words were presented in both blue and green, and 
participants were required to respond left for blue and right for green words. In this 
case, therefore, a healthy food bias was indicated when participants responded more 
quickly when healthy foods appeared in blue requiring a left response (the liked 
response) rather than when they appeared in green requiring a right response 
(disliked), and unhealthy foods required a right response rather than a left response. 
The opposite pattern indicated an unhealthy food bias. Response latencies for pro-
healthy trials were subtracted from pro-unhealthy trials, and thus positive difference 
scores indicated a healthy bias and negative difference scores indicated an unhealthy 
bias. Participants’ explicit food liking attitudes for the same pre-selected food words 
were measured using 7-point Likert scales with “dislike” and “like” at either end. The 
researchers predicted that the EAST would reveal an unhealthy food bias only for the 
obese youngsters. On the explicit measure it was expected that both groups would 
demonstrate a preference of healthy over unhealthy foods. 
 Contrary to the researchers’ prediction, the obese youngsters produced 
positive difference scores on the healthy food trials (responding more rapidly to 
healthy-liked than healthy-disliked) and negative difference scores on the unhealthy 
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food trials (responding more rapidly to unhealthy-liked than to unhealthy-disliked). In 
contrast, the normal-weight youngsters produced near zero difference scores for both 
healthy and unhealthy foods (i.e., a neutral bias). Thus, the EAST indicated that the 
obese youngsters simply liked all foods and did not have a specific bias for unhealthy 
foods only. The results from the explicit food liking measure were also contrary to 
their predications with both weight groups showing a positive preference for both 
healthy and unhealthy foods. In sum, the EAST was successful in discriminating 
between obese and normal-weight youngsters, but the explicit attitude measure was 
not. Once again, however, the research did not indicate a specific pro-unhealthy food 
bias for obese individuals. It is also worth noting that a follow-up study using half of 
the obese participants involved a six month residential treatment programme 
(Creaynest, Crombez, Deforche, Tanghe, & De Bourdeaudhuil, 2008). Participants’ 
implicit biases toward both healthy and unhealthy foods present at baseline 
disappeared during the course of the treatment, but the explicit measures remained 
stable. 
 In short, the results of two EAST studies revealed positive implicit biases to 
both unhealthy and healthy foods for obese individuals rather than a bias towards only 
unhealthy foods. These findings are in-line with the results from the IAT food studies 
described previously. Once again, these conclusions offer a challenge to the argument 
that attitudes are related to eating behaviour. We now turn to the second non-relative 
measure of implicit attitudes that has been used to index attitudes to foods among 
obese and normal-weight individuals. 
1.8 Affective Priming Paradigm Obesity Studies 
 The Affective Priming Paradigm (APP; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, Kardess, 
1986) is a reaction-time measure that presents individuals with positively and 
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negatively valenced primes (i.e., words or pictures) followed by positively or 
negatively valenced target stimuli (i.e., words or pictures) in quick succession. 
Participants are required to ignore the prime and to categorize the target stimuli as 
either positive or negative by pressing the left and right response keys (e.g., left-
positive, right-negative).  The affective valence of the prime and target stimuli are 
manipulated such that the valence of the prime and target is either congruent (i.e., of 
the same valence, positive prime + positive target and negative prime + negative 
target) or incongruent (i.e., of opposite valence, positive prime + negative target and 
negative prime + positive target). The APP effect results from faster and/or more 
accurate responding to the target stimuli on congruent compared to incongruent trials. 
At the time of writing, three studies of implicit bias to food using the APP had been 
reported, and each of these will now be summarised. 
 1.8.1 Obese and normal-weight participants demonstrate a bias towards low-
fat palatable foods. The first APP study was conducted in a hospital setting and 
employed obese and normal-weight female controls (Roefs, Stapert, Isabella, Wolters, 
Wojciechowski, Jansen, 2005, Experiment 2). The APP presented six high-fat 
palatable food word primes (i.e., fries); six low-fat palatable food word primes (i.e., 
chicken); six high-fat unpalatable food word primes (i.e., herrings); and six low-fat 
unpalatable food word primes (i.e., radish). Target stimuli were twenty-four generally 
positive words (i.e., peace) and twenty-four generally negative words (i.e., war). The 
researchers predicted that the obese group would show stronger priming effects for 
palatable relative to unpalatable foods than the normal-weight controls (e.g., palatable 
foods would produce more rapid responses to positive words for obese relative to 
normal-weight individuals). The researchers also predicted that the obese group would 
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show a stronger bias for high-fat palatable foods compared to the normal-weight 
group.   
 Contrary to their predictions, no priming effects were observed for 
palatability, fat content or group. However, both groups showed a marginally 
significant bias for low-fat palatable over high-fat palatable foods. If anything, 
therefore, a bias towards healthy foods was observed for both groups. The researchers 
suggested that these effects may have resulted from conducting the study in a hospital 
environment, which emphasises health and weight concerns. Nevertheless, yet another 
study had failed to find a specific pro-high-fat/unhealthy food bias for obese 
individuals. 
 1.8.2 Both obese and normal-weight participants produce a bias for palatable 
over unpalatable foods in a restaurant context but produce a marginal bias towards 
low-fat foods a health context. This APP study investigated obese and normal-weight 
females’ implicit attitudes to food in different contexts (Roefs, Quaedackers, Werrij, 
Wolters, Havermans, Nederkoorn, van Breukelen & Jansen, 2006, Experiment 1), 
thus aiming to address some of the issues raised in the previous study. Prior to 
completing an APP, the participants were exposed to either a restaurant manipulation 
or a health manipulation. In the first condition, participants were instructed to imagine 
that they were a chef and had to prepare a meal for a wedding in a fancy restaurant. 
Participants were provided with a number of menus containing two food choices and 
asked to specify which food items they liked best from each menu (all menu-items 
were high-fat palatable foods). In the second condition, participants were given an 
information sheet about healthy eating habits which emphasized that high-fat foods 
are fattening and unhealthy. Then they were presented with sets of two menu-items. 
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Each set consisted of a clearly healthy and a clearly unhealthy (high-fat) menu-item. 
Participants were asked to indicate which menu-item they thought was the healthiest. 
 The APP used the prime stimuli employed by Roefs et al. (2005), but the 
positive and negative target words were chosen personally by each participant. An 
explicit measure assessed participants’ healthiness ratings of the primes on a 7-point 
Likert scale (from “very unhealthy” to “very healthy”). The authors predicted that in 
the restaurant condition all participants would display a bias for palatable over 
unpalatable foods, with the obese showing a larger bias for palatable high-fat foods. 
For the health condition, the researchers predicted that participants would display a 
bias for low- over high-fat foods. No specific predictions were made about palatability 
or for weight category in the health condition. 
 The latency and error data from the APP were analysed separately. The 
latency effects were somewhat contrary to the researchers’ predictions, in that no 
significant differences were reported between the obese and normal-weight 
participants in the restaurant condition based on palatability or fat content. However, 
in line with the researchers’ predictions, both obese and normal-weight participants in 
the health condition produced a marginally significant bias for low-fat foods (the bias 
in the restaurant condition for both groups was in an unhealthy direction). Thus, no 
significant differences in weight category where observed. The error data were also 
partly in-line with the researchers predictions, in that both normal-weight and obese 
participants showed a significant bias for palatable over unpalatable foods in the 
restaurant condition with a marginally significant bias for unpalatable over palatable 
foods in the health condition. Once again, however, no differences between the weight 
categories were observed. On the explicit attitude measures both groups’ rated 
unpalatable foods as healthier than palatable foods and low-fat foods as healthier than 
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high-fat foods, irrespective of context (restaurant or health). In short, the context 
manipulation impacted on the priming effects of foods in the restaurant, with only 
marginal effects in the health condition, with no evidence for any differential effects 
between the obese and normal-weight individuals. Yet again, obese individuals did 
not produce a specific implicit high-fat/unhealthy food bias. 
 1.8.3 Obese individuals have a positive implicit bias for high-fat-savoury 
foods and a negative bias for high-fat-sweet foods, whereas overweight and normal-
weight participants have a positive bias for high-fat-sweet but not high-fat-savoury 
food; all weight groups have a negative implicit bias for low-fat foods. In this final 
study, the APP was used to compare implicit attitudes to different foods varying in 
calorific content and taste (i.e., high-calorie non-sweet HCNS, high-calorie sweet 
HCS, and low-calorie LC) among females with differing BMI scores (normal-weight, 
overweight and obese) (Czyzewska, & Graham, 2008).  
 The APP presented individuals with pictures of HCNS food primes (i.e., pizza 
etc.); HCS food primes; (i.e., ice-cream etc.); LC food primes (i.e., salad); and food 
related (FR) primes (i.e., utensils) respectively. The target stimuli were positively 
(i.e., joy) and negatively (i.e., rage) valenced words also divided into high arousal 
(e.g., scared) and low arousal (e.g., bored) words. Participants’ explicit pleasantness 
ratings for the food items were measured via 7-point Likert scales. The researchers 
had three predictions; firstly, that higher BMI participants (obese and overweight) 
would produce a stronger pro-high-calorie over low-calorie food bias than the normal-
weight participants, and that this effect would be moderated by food taste (sweet 
versus savoury); secondly, the explicit attitude measures would not differ across BMI 
groups with all groups expressing a pro-low-fat over high-fat food preference; finally, 
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there would be a larger dissociation between implicit and explicit measures for the 
higher BMI participants.  
 The results revealed a significant effect for high arousal words but not for low 
arousal words. For the high arousal words there was a significant interaction between 
the BMI groups and food category. In line with the researchers’ first prediction, the 
obese group had a significant positive bias towards high-calorie-savoury foods and a 
negative bias toward high-calorie-sweet foods, whereas the over-weight and normal-
weight individuals had the opposite pattern (i.e., a positive bias towards high-fat-
sweet foods but a negative bias towards high-fat-savoury foods). There were no 
significant differences between the BMI groups for high-calorie foods combined 
(HCNS plus HCS). Interestingly, all BMI groups had a negative implicit attitude 
towards low-calorie foods, but only the normal-weight and overweight groups’ biases 
were significant. Consistent will the researchers’ second prediction, there were no 
differences among the BMI groups on the explicit food attitude measure. However, 
contrary to their second prediction, all BMI groups had positive preferences for all 
food categories. Furthermore, participants had a significantly higher preference for 
low-calorie and high-calorie sweet foods than for high-calorie-savoury foods. 
Contrary to the researchers’ third prediction, all groups showed a large divergence 
between their implicit and explicit attitudes. That is, all participants, regardless of 
BMI status, showed a negative bias towards low-calorie food on the implicit measure 
and a positive bias on the explicit measure. In conclusion, the study showed that the 
APP successfully discriminated food attitudes among obese, overweight and normal-
weight individuals, but an analogue explicit self-report measure did not. Importantly, 
the study revealed a significant difference between the obese group and the over-
weight and normal-weight groups. However, the difference was relatively subtle in 
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that all groups showed a bias for high-fat foods, but with the obese showing a specific 
bias for savoury and the other two groups showing a bias for sweet foods. 
1.9 Summary 
 Only one out of the seven studies reviewed above revealed any clear 
differences between weight categories in their preferences for unhealthy foods 
(Czyzewska, & Graham, 2008). However, the difference was not between healthy and 
unhealthy foods, but between two different types of unhealthy foods (savoury and 
sweet). Given all of the findings reviewed thus far it would seem that 
overweight/obese individuals do not possess a universally positive implicit attitude to 
unhealthy and/or high-fat foods. Obviously, this conclusion offers a serious challenge 
to the argument that food attitudes are related to actual eating behaviour. At this point, 
however, it is important to note that none of these studies controlled for the influence 
of the participants’ state of food deprivation. Perhaps, obese individuals’ high-
fat/unhealthy food biases only become evident when they experience food craving or 
food deprivation. Only two studies to date have investigated the effects of food-
deprivation/craving-induction on overweight/obese and normal-weight individuals’ 
implicit attitudes to food, and it is to these studies that we now turn. 
1.10 Food Deprivation Studies 
1.10.1 Food Deprivation Increased Overweight Individuals’ Implicit Attitudes to 
Food versus Furniture on the IAT 
 The IAT was the first implicit measure to be used to examine the effects of 
food deprivation on the evaluation of food stimuli among normal-weight and slightly 
overweight individuals (Stafford & Scheffler, 2008). Participants were randomly 
assigned to a pre-lunch condition (i.e., they ate food no later than 8.30am, and the 
study was conducted between 12.30 and 14.30pm) or to a post-lunch condition (i.e., 
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they ate lunch no longer than one hour before conducting the study). Upon arrival 
participants completed a food diary (to check compliance) and an IAT. The IAT 
required participants to categorize word stimuli from four categories; food (i.e., 
sandwich, banana, etc.), furniture (i.e., curtains, table, etc.), pleasant, and unpleasant 
words. The researchers predicted that hungry individuals in the pre-lunch condition 
would demonstrate a more positive implicit bias towards food over furniture than the 
post-lunch condition.  
 As predicted, both groups showed a significant preference for food over 
furniture on the IAT, with the pre-lunch group providing a significantly stronger pro-
food bias compared to the post-lunch group. The pre-lunch group also had 
significantly higher explicit hunger ratings compared to the post-lunch group. In short, 
food deprivation increased participants’ implicit food biases. 
1.10.2 Both Obese and Normal-weight Groups Show a Bias toward Low-fat Foods on 
the APP after a Food-deprivation/craving-induction Exercise.  
 The APP was used to determine the effects of a food-deprivation/craving-
induction procedure on female obese and normal-weight controls’ attitudes to food 
(Roefs, Quaedackers, Werrij, Wolters, Havermans, Nederkoorn, van Breukelen & 
Jansen, 2006). Participants were told to abstain from eating any foods two hours prior 
to the study, and the research was conducted in a hospital setting. 
 Participants’ pre-test (baseline) cravings were recorded using a 100mm visual 
analogue scale prior to the craving induction procedure. The subsequent craving 
induction procedure involved presenting participants with a bowl of high-fat foods 
(chocolate, croissant, and potato chips), and getting them to smell intensely and nibble 
the food they liked best. After a five minute craving induction, their craving level was 
measured again; if it achieved the threshold criteria of seventy or above, participants 
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completed the APP. The APP in the current study used the same prime and target 
stimuli (personally chosen positive and negative words) as Roef et al. (2006, 
Experiment 1). Craving induction and measurement were repeated before blocks two 
and three of the APP with the restriction that craving levels of over seventy were 
required to proceed. The researchers predicted that craving induction would increase 
the priming effect for palatable over unpalatable foods, with obese individuals 
demonstrating specifically stronger effects for high-fat over low-fat palatable foods 
relative to the normal-weight individuals. 
 Contrary to the researchers’ predictions, no significant priming effects for 
palatable versus unpalatable or high- versus low-fat foods were reported, nor were 
there any significant differences between the weight categories. However, a 
marginally significant interaction between targets, prime palatability, and prime-fat 
content indicated that both groups suggested a bias for low-fat palatable foods over 
high-fat palatable foods. Interestingly, a significant positive correlation was found 
between initial craving (after the 5 min craving induction task) and the APP 
palatability priming effect score for the obese participants only. All other craving 
correlation scores (i.e., pre-test, task onset, or average craving score across test blocks 
two and three) were non-significant with the APP scores.  
 In conclusion, the food-deprivation/craving-induction procedure did not 
achieve its goal of focusing obese more than normal-weight participants on the 
palatability of food. Instead, the results were in line with Roefs et al. (2005, 
Experiment 2), in that both obese and normal-weight individuals suggested a bias for 
low-fat over high-fat palatable foods. Once again, however, the health emphasizing 
aspects of the hospital setting may have influenced the outcome of the study. 
Critically, once again no differences between the obese and normal-weight 
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participants were observed. At the present time, therefore, there appears to be little 
evidence that obese individuals’ implicit attitudes to food are more or less sensitive to 
food deprivation than those of normal-weight individuals. 
1.11 Summary and Conclusion 
 To date, the IAT, EAST and the APP have been employed in the investigation 
of implicit food attitudes among obese and normal-weight individuals. Only one study 
out of eight found a difference in implicit attitudes towards unhealthy foods among 
these two groups, but the difference was between two types of unhealthy food rather 
than between unhealthy and healthy foods. At this point, therefore, it appears that 
there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that implicit attitudes are related in 
any meaningful way to eating behaviour, at least in terms of differentiating between 
normal-weight and obese individuals. In drawing this conclusion, however, it is 
important to note that the implicit measures that have been used in this area of 
research are all associative in nature. That is, the measures were designed to target 
mental or cognitive associations between concepts in memory. Recently, an 
alternative measure of implicit attitudes, known as the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP), has been offered. In contrast to the IAT, the EAST and the APP, 
which evolved from mainstream social-cognitive psychology, the IRAP was designed 
to target the relative strengths of relational responding, rather than mental 
associations. To fully appreciate the difference between the IRAP and associative 
measures it is necessary to examine the research tradition from which the IRAP 
emerged, and it is to this topic that we now turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: A Behaviour-Analytic Approach to the Study of Implicit Attitudes:  
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the Relational 
Elaboration and Coherence (REC) Model 
 
2.1 Behaviour Analysis 
 Behaviour analysis is a scientific approach to studying the behaviour of 
organisms (Leslie & O’Reilly, 1999), and it began as a discipline with the seminal 
work of B.F. Skinner during 1930s with the publication of The Behavior of 
Organisms (Skinner, 1938). Skinner rejected the mainstream concept of mentalism, 
the idea that the unobservable mind causes behaviour and proposed instead a 
formulation of behaviour based on the functional relationship between behaviour 
(dependent variable) and environmental parameters (independent variables). It has 
been argued that Skinner’s greatest contribution to psychology was his specification 
that the social and physical conditions of our environment are critically important in 
determining behaviour (Blackman, 1995; Nye, 1975). 
 According to Skinner’s philosophy of science, the goal of the scientist is to 
predict and influence behaviour, defined as any and all activities that an organism can 
engage in, including both overt (i.e., observable by other people) and covert (i.e., 
observable only to the behaving organism; e.g., thinking, feeling). In order to be able 
to predict and influence behaviour, the scientist must uncover manipulable 
(independent) variables of which behaviour (the dependent variable [DV]) is a 
function). These variables are never in the unobservable and inaccessible realm of the 
mind. Furthermore, the independent variables must always be outside of the 
behavioural system, because the scientist cannot directly manipulate the DV of 
behaviour itself; manipulable variables are thus always in the environment. 
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 In mainstream psychology, feelings, thoughts and other covert behaviours are 
seen as causing overt actions. However, from a behaviour-analytic perspective they 
are functionally similar to overt behaviours (i.e., responses to be targeted for 
prediction and influence). The task of the scientist is to uncover manipulable variables 
in the environment that allow prediction and control of both overt and covert 
behaviours. Thus, the nomenclature of behaviour analysis produces a scientific 
description of behaviour, without the need to rely on internal mental events or 
hypothetical constructs (Baum, 1994). In short, behaviour analysis allows for the 
application of the same experimental analyses to both overt and covert behaviours and 
avoids, what from a behavioural perspective, might be referred to as the “explanatory 
fictions” of the mind and mental states (Nye, 1975). 
2.2 Relational Frame Theory 
 Within the last two decades, a contemporary behaviour-analytic approach to 
human language and cognition (verbal behaviour) has been developed known as 
Relational Frame Theory (RTF; Hayes, Barnes, & Roche, 2001). The core units of 
this theory are derived relations (Hayes et al. 2001). The phenomenon of derived 
(untrained) relational responding was first shown by Sidman in 1971. He trained 
individuals with minimal verbal repertoires across a number of related conditional 
matching tasks and found participants emitted a number of regular untrained effects 
(i.e., known as stimulus equivalence). Specifically, Sidman found that teaching 
participants the conditional response of choosing the arbitrary stimulus B in the 
presence of arbitrary stimulus A, and choosing the arbitrary stimulus C in the 
presence of arbitrary stimulus B, resulted in the following derived phenomena; 
choosing A given B, and B given C (i.e., the reserve of the taught relations known as 
symmetry); and choosing C given A (i.e., transitivity) and A given C (i.e., combined 
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symmetry and transitivity). Collectively, these effects were known as stimulus 
equivalence, because it appeared that participants acted on the stimuli as if they were 
equivalent to each other.   
 The effects of stimulus equivalence were interesting from a behaviour-analytic 
perspective because they were not readily predicted using traditional behavioural 
principles. Stimulus equivalence was thus a catalyst for a new wave of research 
activity in behaviour analysis, and some of this work indicated that there were strong 
links between the phenomenon and human language (Cowley, Green, & Braunling-
Mc Morrow, 1992; Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986; Kendall, 1983; Wulfert & 
Hayes, 1989). In 1994 Barnes argued that five areas of research bolster the link 
between stimulus equivalence and human language. First, only verbally able humans, 
but not nonhumans or humans who are not verbally-able can demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence (Barnes, McCullagh, Keenan, 1991; Devany et al., 1986; Dugdale & 
Lowe, 2000; Hayes, 1989; Sidman & Tailby, 1982). Second, learning to name stimuli 
may facilitate equivalence responding in young children (Dugdale & Lowe, 2000). 
Third, it is possible to treat language deficiencies in verbally disabled individuals 
through the equivalence paradigm (Cowley, Green, & Braunling-McMorrow, 1992). 
Fourth, symbolic meaning and the generative nature of grammar can be interpreted 
behaviour-analytically via stimulus equivalence (Barnes & Holmes, 1991; Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000; Hayes & Hayes, 1989; Wulfert & Hayes, 
1988). Fifth, human behaviours such as social categorisation have been explained 
through stimulus equivalence (e.g., Roche & Barnes, 1996; Watt, Keenan, Barnes, & 
Cairns, 1991) as well as logical reasoning (Barnes & Hampson, 1993). Furthermore, 
recent neuroscience evidence indicated that brain activation patterns during the 
formation of equivalence relations are similar to the semantic processing underlying 
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language (e.g., Dickins, Singh, Roberts, Burns, Downes, Jimmieson et al., 2001). 
Overall, therefore, there is substantive evidence that the control exerted over 
behaviour by stimuli participating in equivalence classes parallels the control that 
verbal stimuli exert over human behaviour (Hayes & Hayes, 1989).  
 The link between stimulus equivalence and human language allowed RFT 
researchers to use equivalence as a springboard for launching a modern behavioural 
account of human language and cognition. According to RFT, equivalence class 
formation was simply one example of a pattern of behaviour that was defined by the 
theory as arbitrarily applicable relational responding. According to RFT, all 
organisms (from insects to primates) can learn to behave based on the non-arbitrary or 
formal relations between and among stimuli [e.g., bigger than, smaller than; etc. see 
Reese, 1968], but critically the evolution of human language or verbal behaviour 
involved the development of another type of relational responding. Specifically, RFT 
posits that much of verbal behaviour involves learning from multiple exemplars to 
respond to arbitrarily applicable stimulus relations. These relations are not defined by 
the formal or physical properties of the stimuli, but by non-formal or conventional 
contextual cues. 
 For example, imagine I show a normally developing child a picture of a cow 
(stimulus A) and say “This is a cow” (stimulus B), and then point to the written word 
“cow” (stimulus C) and say this says “cow”. According to RFT, the spoken word “is” 
may function as a contextual cue, which brings a history of arbitrarily applicable 
relational responding to bear on the stimuli, such that the child may then respond to 
the three stimuli as “going together” without direct training. For example, if I later 
show the child a picture of a cow and different words and ask her “which word” goes 
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with the picture, she might readily point out the word “cow”, even though this 
response had not be directly trained or instructed (i.e., novel or generative response). 
 According to RFT the contextual cue “is” acquires its controlling function 
through a history of multiple exemplars of reinforced relational responding to words, 
pictures, objects and events. In this case, the word “is” appears to control the pattern 
of relational responding known as equivalence. According to RFT, however, stimulus 
equivalence is only one class of such relational responding. The theory states that 
there are many other possible forms of relational responding, known as relational 
frames. For example, the frames of opposition, distinction, comparison, hierarchy, 
perspective, and so on have all been identified and subject to experimental analysis 
(see Rehfeldt & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). The frame of opposition, for instance, has the 
property that an opposite of an opposite is the same, an opposite of an opposite of an 
opposite is an opposite, and so on (Hayes et al., 2001). Hence, the scope of RFT is 
broader than the study of equivalence classes per se. Despite the diversity of patterns 
of relational framing possible, however, all are characterized by three fundamental 
attributes (i.e., mutual entailment, combinatorial entailment and transformation of 
function). 
 The bi-directionality of relational responding is accounted for by the term 
mutual entailment (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, if X is related to Y in a 
particular context, then a relationship between X and Y is entailed. This relationship 
between the stimuli can be symmetrical (i.e., as in the case of equivalence or 
coordination), but this may not always be the case. For example, if X were smaller 
than Y, the relationship is not symmetrical but is mutually entailed. Therefore, two 
relations would exist, “X is smaller than Y” and “Y is bigger than X” (Hayes et al.). 
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 Derived stimulus relations involving two or more sets of relations is know as 
combinatorial entailment. Without combinatorial entailment it would not be possible 
to define the relevant forms of relational frames (Hayes et al., 2001). If in a given 
context X is related to Y and Y is related to Z, then a relation is entailed between X 
and Z and conversely, Z and X. For relations that are mutually entailed, the specified 
relationship between X and Y always entails a relationship between Y and X at the 
same level of specificity. However, with combinatorial entailment, the derived 
relationship may be less specific than the original relationship. For example, if X is 
different to Y and Y is different to Z, the relationship between X and Z and Z and X is 
unknown. Note, however, that the unspecified nature of the relationship, in and of 
itself, is a stimulus relation. 
 The final salient feature of RFT is transformation of stimulus function. When 
stimuli are involved in a relational frame, any psychological function attached to one 
of those stimuli may transform, given appropriate contextual cues, the functions of the 
other stimuli in accordance with the relations involved (Barnes, 1994; Hayes et al., 
2001; Hayes & Wilson, 1993). For example, in a frame of comparison stimulus X 
may be defined as “more than” stimulus Y, and if stimulus Y is known to have a 
mildly aversive function, then stimulus X may acquire a relatively stronger aversive 
function than Y (see Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994 for 
empirical evidence). 
 The three defining properties of relational framing are viewed as the key 
process underlying both stimulus equivalence and human language (Hayes & Wilson, 
1993). By specifying this process as the core of language, RFT thus provides a way of 
approaching and studying language, and similarly complex human behaviour, in 
purely functional terms. From an RFT perspective, then, verbal behaviour is the action 
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of framing events relationally (Hayes et al., 2001, p.43). From this perspective both 
the speaker and the listener engage in this process (Hayes & Hayes, 1989). When the 
speaker does so they are speaking with meaning, and when a listener does so, they are 
listening with understanding (Hayes & Wilson). Critically, it is the framing of events 
that indicates the behaviour is verbal for the speaker and listener. Therefore, verbal 
meaning is not a mental event; it is a highly specified behavioural process (Hayes & 
Barnes- Holmes, 2004). In the same vein, a verbal stimulus is a stimulus that has its 
functions, in part, because it participates in relational frames. 
 In sum, RFT provides a behaviour-analytic approach to language or verbal 
behaviour that is theoretically consistent, is built on existing principles that utilise the 
latest empirical evidence, and is true to the behaviour-analysis philosophy of 
prediction and control (Hayes and Wilson, 1993). This behavioural account of 
language and verbal behaviour may be extended to the investigation of a range of 
verbal behaviours, such as those involved in so called socially sensitive attitudes. The 
next section will now discuss this empirical work. 
2.2.1 Relational Frame Theory and Socially Sensitive Attitudes 
 Attitudinal behaviour from an RFT perspective is verbal responding with 
respect to an attitude object that involves transformation of “evaluative functions” of 
that object. An example of a real life prejudicial attitude formed in this way could be 
as follows: Imagine that the media blame a recent terrorist attack on members of a 
particular foreign country (e.g., country X). Given a normal verbal learning history, 
the word “terrorist” probably already operates in an equivalence relation with “bad” 
and “dangerous”. If I have little knowledge about country X, then an important part of 
my verbal knowledge towards that country may operate in an equivalence (or 
hierarchical) relation between “country X” and “terrorist”. As a result, upon reading 
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about, hearing about, or coming into contact with someone from country X, it is 
highly possible the negative functions of “bad” and “dangerous” may transfer to that 
individual via equivalence (or hierarchy), thus causing me to view this person as 
suspicious. 
 The first behaviour-analytic study to examine socially sensitive attitudes (i.e., 
religious categorization) utilizing derived relational responding was carried out by 
Watt, Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns (1991). Individuals living in Northern Ireland and 
English participants not living in Northern Ireland were exposed to a matching-to-
sample training procedure. This involved matching Catholic family names to 
nonsense syllables and matching those nonsense syllables to Protestant symbols. 
During the equivalence test, participants were required to match Protestant symbols 
directly to Catholic family names. The verbal learning history of individuals living in 
Northern Ireland typically establishes a strong relation of difference between Catholic 
and Protestant stimuli, but this history is largely absent in England. Thus for the 
Northern Irish participants the predicted equivalence relations (Catholic equivalent to 
Protestant) were in opposition to their socially established relations (Catholic different 
to Protestant); no such competition between stimulus relations was present for the 
English participants, however. The researchers thus predicted that the English 
participants would readily demonstrate the Catholic-Protestant equivalence relations, 
but the Northern Irish participants would not, and indeed this is what emerged. As 
such, the socially sensitive verbal relations developed as a result of living in a 
Northern Irish community seemed to prevent the formation of novel laboratory 
induced equivalence relations. 
 Similar stimulus equivalence-based approaches have been used to discriminate 
anxious from non-anxious patients (Leslie, Tierney, Robinson, Keenan, Watt, & 
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Barnes, 1993) and have been developed as a diagnostic tool to identify children who 
have been sexually abused (McGlinchey, Keenan, & Dillenburger, 2000). 
Participants’ attitudes towards themselves have been assessed via the equivalence 
paradigm (Barnes, Lawlor, Smeets, & Roche, 1996) and attitudes of North Americans 
to Middle Easterners have been assessed using this general approach (Dixon, 
Dymond, Rehfeldt, Roche, & Zlomke, 2003). 
2.2.2 Relational Frame Theory and the IAT 
  Interestingly, the abovementioned equivalence-based approach to 
investigating social phenomena appears to be functionally similar to the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT: described earlier). The basic argument is that the overall IAT 
effect results because participants are asked to categorize functionally similar 
equivalence classes as functionally equivalent during the consistent tasks (e.g., by 
pressing the same key for flowers and positive words), but to categorize functionally 
non-equivalent classes as functionally equivalent during the inconsistent task (e.g., by 
pressing the same key for flowers and negative words). As a result, responses are 
slower for the inconsistent task because they involve responding against previously 
established derived or verbal relations (O’Toole, Barnes-Holmes, & Smyth, 2007). 
 Effectively, this is the same behavioural explanation that was provided for the 
disruption of equivalence class formation of the mutually exclusive verbal categories 
Catholic and Protestant. On the IAT, and within the stimulus equivalence models, the 
differential performance among the various classes’ results from the different learning 
histories attached to the stimuli within each of the classes. This behavioural 
interpretation is based on a comprehensive, bottom-up, account of language that is 
ultimately rooted in a philosophically and theoretically unified pragmatic RFT 
approach. This approach readily lends itself to the continued development, extension 
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and re-conceptualisation of potentially useful methodologies such as the IAT. Indeed, 
it is this flexibility that has provided the basis for the development of a new 
behaviour-analytic methodology, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP), to which we now turn. 
2.3 The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
 The behavioural explanation for the IAT effect, combined with the empirical 
behavioural research on derived relations, provided the catalyst for the development 
of the IRAP. For example, the development of the IRAP was based in part on an 
earlier RFT program of research for training novel stimulus relations, the Relational 
Evaluation Procedure (REP; Barnes-Holmes, Healy, & Hayes, 2000). The REP 
requires participants to confirm or deny the applicability of particular stimulus 
relations to sets of stimuli (Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2004). For example, 
two identical shapes might be presented with the relational terms “Same” and 
“Opposite”, and participants are required to indicate that the relation is “Same”. Thus, 
the REP has been used to train novel stimulus relations as a model of human language 
learning.  
 The IRAP is a combination of the IAT and the REP. Similar to the REP, it 
involves presenting specific relational terms (e.g., “Similar”, “Opposite”, “Better”, 
“Worse”) so that the properties of the relations among the stimuli can be ascertained. 
Similar to the IAT, the IRAP involves asking participants to respond both quickly and 
accurately to the relations between the presented stimuli in a manner that is both 
consistent and inconsistent with their pre-experimentally established verbal relations. 
 At the same time, the IRAP also differs from these two methodologies. The 
IRAP is different from the REP in that: (a) rather than focusing on the establishment 
of novel stimulus relations it was designed to assess previously established verbal 
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relations; and (b) the relations that it assesses are implicit in nature. Regarding the 
IAT (and related associative measures), the IRAP is different in that on each trial it 
asks participants to confirm or deny a specific attitude directly by responding to the 
relation between a label and target stimulus (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010). 
 Furthermore, it is important to underscore the fact that the IRAP was designed 
to overcome a serious limitation identified with the IAT. As explained earlier, the IAT 
provides a measure of relative associative strength, which can conceal the exact nature 
of the attitudes under study. For example, in the context of attitudes towards flowers 
and insects, the IAT can indicate that flowers are preferred to insects, but it cannot 
reveal how much either stimulus is liked or disliked in isolation. Perhaps, the key 
advantage of the IRAP over the IAT is that it permits the non-relative assessment of 
socially sensitive attitudes.  The IRAP overcomes this weakness by permitting the 
assessment of separate relational responses and thereby allowing an independent 
measure of attitudes toward target categories. 
 The basic IRAP assumption is that if a measure requires participants to 
alternate between response patterns that are consistent and inconsistent with 
previously established natural verbal relations under time pressure, an effect similar to 
the IAT should be observed. That is, average latencies for a group of participants 
should be slower for response patterns that are inconsistent rather than consistent with 
existing verbal relations. Furthermore, this effect should be observed even if the 
verbal relations involved are of a socially or a psychologically sensitive nature. 
 The IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) is a computer-based task that involves 
the presentation of specific relational terms in a manner that facilitates the properties 
of the relations between relevant stimuli to be assessed. For example, on each IRAP 
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trial, participants are presented with one of two label stimuli (e.g., “Pleasant” or 
“Unpleasant”) at the top of the computer screen. Presented in the centre of the screen 
is a target stimulus (e.g., “Love”, “Accident”). Participants are required to respond to 
the relation between the label and the target by choosing one of two relational terms 
(e.g., “Same” or “Opposite”), presented at the bottom left and right of the screen. 
Progression to the next trial is contingent on either selecting a consistent relational 
response (i.e., in the presence of “Pleasant” and “Love”, selecting the relational term 
“Same”), or an inconsistent relational response (i.e., in the presence of “Pleasant” and 
“Love”, select the relational term “Opposite”). The critical index is the difference in 
response latencies across successive presentations of consistent and inconsistent trials. 
 The IRAP typically presents four different trial-types that are established by 
presenting each of two relational cues (e.g., SAME and OPPOSITE) with each of two 
target objects (e.g., Flowers and Insects) and each of two label categories (e.g., 
Pleasant and Unpleasant). For example, if examining attitudes towards flowers and 
insects, two types of blocks would be presented with one type requiring responses 
deemed pro-flowers and anti-insects (i.e., Flowers-Pleasant-Same; Flowers-
Unpleasant-Opposite; Insects-Pleasant-Opposite; Insects-Unpleasant-Same), and the 
other requiring a pro-insect/anti-flower response pattern (e.g., Flowers-Pleasant-
Opposite, Flowers-Unpleasant-Same, etc.). If participants respond faster when 
emitting the former response pattern relative to the latter, this is taken to indicate a 
preference for flowers over insects. 
 Over the past five years, a growing number of studies using the IRAP have 
been reported in the literature. Early research indicated that the IRAP effect was 
difficult to fake (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007). The 
IRAP has also been successfully employed as a measure of implicit preferences for 
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social groups (Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 2009) and as a 
measure of implicit ageism (Cullen, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 
2009), implicit self-esteem (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 
2009), implicit homonegativity (Cullen & Barnes- Holmes, 2008), implicit racial 
stereotyping (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Murphy et al., 2010), and implicit body-size bias 
(Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010). In addition, data indicates that the IRAP 
could be developed into a forensic assessment tool (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, 
Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009), and it has been effective in measuring attitudes 
towards work and leisure (Chan, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), 
and attitudes to country versus city living (Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Stewart, 2009). Additionally, the procedure has been found to possess good internal 
consistency (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2009; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2009) and test-
retest reliability (Cullen et al., 2009). 
 To date, only one study has employed the IRAP in the study of food 
preferences (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010). 
Specifically, this study tested the validity of the IRAP by comparing it directly to the 
IAT using a “known-groups” approach. That is, the study sought to determine if the 
two measures successfully discriminated between vegetarians and meat-eaters (see De 
Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). Both implicit measures involved asking participants 
to respond to meat and vegetable stimuli as either positive or negative. Both the IAT 
and IRAP discriminated at a statistically significant level between the vegetarians and 
meat eaters, and both measures correlated with the explicit self-report measures that 
were employed in the study. Both measures also provided similarly small but 
statistically significant increases in predictive validity over the explicit measures. In 
short, growing evidence indicates that the IRAP appears to function as an implicit 
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measure and compares well with the most widely used and well-established measure, 
the IAT. 
2.3.1 Relational Frame Theory Explanation of the IRAP Effect. 
 In calling the IRAP an implicit measure, however, it is important to clearly 
define exactly what this means from a behaviour-analytic perspective. Recently, 
developers of the IRAP have proposed the relational elaboration and coherence (REC; 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010) model as an RFT 
interpretation of the typical effects demonstrated on the IRAP. This final section of 
the chapter will outline the REC model.  
 According to the REC model each IRAP trial typically produces an immediate 
and relatively brief relational response before the participant initiates their response 
selection. Imagine, for example, an IRAP trial that presents the words “Good” and 
“Flowers” with the two response options “True” and “False”. RFT being an operant 
theory of human language assumes that the probability of the initial response on this 
trial will be determined by the verbal and non-verbal history of the participant and the 
current context. Given a typical English speaking learning history, the most probable 
response to this trial will thus be “True” (because flowers are generally defined as 
good by the wider verbal community). If the IRAP contingencies require the 
participant to emit this response (i.e., pressing “True” in the presence of “Flowers” 
and “Good”) it will be emitted more quickly than a key press that is inconsistent with 
the immediate relational response (in this example, pressing “False”). Thus, across 
multiple trials, the average latency for consistent blocks is more likely to be shorter 
than for inconsistent blocks. In effect, the IRAP effect is the result of immediate and 
relatively brief relational (automatic) responding that occurs on most trials when 
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participants are required to relate stimuli under time pressure (Barnes-Holmes, 
Murphy et al., 2010; Vahey et al., 2009). 
 The IRAP effect thus provides a way of measuring particular response biases 
or tendencies that a participant may have based on their socio-verbal learning history. 
Of course, this applies not simply to inoffensive attitudes such as “Flowers are good” 
but also to more socially sensitive or controversial attitudes in respect of gender, 
appearance, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and, most relevant here, food attitudes. 
 According to the REC model, responses on the IRAP reflect initial relational 
responding, whereas responses on self-report measures, in contrast, reflect relatively 
elaborate and coherent relational responding. In other words, when an individual is 
asked to express an attitude on a particular issue using a standard self-report measure, 
it is likely that the person will produce a relational response that coheres with one or 
more other relational responses in his or her behavioural repertoire. If these relational 
responses also cohere with the initial relational response then implicit attitudes (as 
detected by the IRAP for example) and explicit attitudes will correlate; however, if 
there is a lack of coherence in this respect then there will be divergence between 
them. 
 Such divergence in attitudes measures is particularly relevant and has 
frequently been seen with respect to socially sensitive attitudes. Imagine, for example 
that a white participant is asked to rate pictures of white and a black men (differing 
with respect to race only) as “neutral” or “threatening”, and the two pictures are rated 
equally on these rating scales. A participant’s initial ratings of these pictures might 
indicate that the white man is higher on the “neutral” dimension and the black man is 
higher on the “threatening” dimension. However, other relevant information in 
relational networks, such as “it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of skin colour” 
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would not cohere with these initial responses to the pictures. Explicit measures are 
typically not completed under time pressure, and thus participants have sufficient time 
to engage in the extended relational responding that is needed to produce a response 
that coheres with one or more other relational responses. Thus, in the context of a 
questionnaire, the person’s initial relational responses may be “rejected” and he or she 
may thus report evaluations of the pictures that are consistent with additional 
elaborated relational responding. In contrast, when completing a time-pressured IRAP 
the influence of a participant’s elaborated relational responding would be absent or 
significantly reduced, because there is insufficient time, per trial, to engage in the 
elaborate relational activity that can serve to generate a relationally coherent response. 
Hence, there would be a divergence between responding as measured by the IRAP 
and the elaborated responding provided in the context of a questionnaire. 
 The first study to report a divergence between IRAP responses and explicit 
self-reports was Power et al. (2009). Since then, other IRAP studies have found 
similar results (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 2009). 
Furthermore, the REC model predicts that the divergence between the IRAP and 
explicit measures of socially sensitive attitudes should increase as a function of 
increasing time pressure criteria on the implicit measure and this has also been shown 
(e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Murphy et al., 2010). As noted above, this results from the fact 
that participants have less time to engage in extended and elaborate relational 
responding.  
 It is worth noting that the REC model has similarities with the social-cognitive 
Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; 2007; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). The APE model posits that implicit 
and explicit attitudes are dissociated because they result from two different underlying 
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processes. Specifically, implicit attitudes are seen to be the result of evaluative 
tendencies that reside in associative processes, whereas explicit attitudes are the 
outcomes of evaluative tendencies that reside in propositional processes. Therefore, 
according to this model, evidence for the existence of attitude dissociation is 
misleading; these attitudes simply reflect different processes. Both the APE and REC 
models appear to explain a wide range of findings from implicit attitude research. 
Specifically, both models assume that brief immediate relational responses or 
automatic evaluations: (a) may be discriminated; (b) are sensitive to current 
contextual factors and thus may be influenced by socially desirable responses, self-
presentation, and other such motivational effects; and (c) do not involve stable and 
enduring responses (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). However, the REC 
differs from the APE model in that it does not appeal to dual processes (associative 
and propositional), but to the single process of arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding, as described by RFT. In effect, the REC model views dissociation as 
depending on the extent to which relational responses are elaborated and cohere with 
each other. Furthermore, the REC model specifies that brief and immediate relational 
responding (automatic evaluations) is not restricted to simple associations, but may 
emerge based on a variety of stimulus relations (e.g., Power et al., 2009). 
 To conclude, the IRAP is a recently developed methodology grounded in RFT. 
Substantive empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of this procedure as a 
measure of socially sensitive attitudes or verbal relations. More, recently, the REC 
model has been proposed to explain the IRAP effect itself as well as the relationship 
between the IRAP and explicit measures. 
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2.4 Summary and Overall Conclusions 
 The discovery of the phenomenon of stimulus equivalence through the 
scientific framework of behaviour-analysis led to the development of Relational 
Frame Theory, which is a modern behaviour-analytic approach to understanding 
language and complex human behaviour, including attitudes. The IRAP methodology 
appears to facilitate a relational-frame theory approach to analyzing attitudes as verbal 
behaviour. According to the REC model, the patterns of brief and immediate 
relational responding registered on the IRAP are analogous to implicit attitudes, as 
defined by mainstream psychology. Furthermore, substantive empirical research has 
demonstrated the efficacy of the IRAP as a measure of socially sensitive verbal 
relations. In addition, one study has shown that the IRAP produces effects similar to 
the IAT in the context of food attitudes. 
2.5 The Current Research Programme 
 The main purpose of the research presented in the current thesis was to 
develop an IRAP that could be used to assess implicit attitudes to healthy and 
unhealthy food in obese and normal-weight participants. To this end, across three 
empirical studies the IRAP and explicit measures were directly compared in terms of 
their ability to detect obese and normal-weight individuals’ biases for healthy and 
unhealthy food in various food deprivation states. In addition, measures of 
neurological responding were recorded from normal-weight participants while they 
completed a food-attitude IRAP. Finally, a food-IRAP was used to examine the 
malleability of implicit attitudes to healthy and unhealthy food.  
 Chapter 3 presents the first empirical study of the thesis. This initial study 
directly compared an IRAP that aimed to measure “wanting” healthy versus unhealthy 
food with an explicit wanting-scale measure among obese and normal-weight 
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individuals in a 2 hour and in unrestricted food deprivation state. The results of the 
study showed no significant differences among the variables. Thus in Chapter 4 the 
second study employed an IRAP that aimed to target “hunger” (rather than “wanting”) 
for healthy versus unhealthy food and compared this to an explicit hunger-scale, again 
among obese and normal-weight individuals in a 2 hour and in an unrestricted food 
deprivation state. The hunger-IRAP discriminated between the weight categories in 
the 2-hr food deprivation condition (i.e., the obese participants demonstrated a pro-
unhealthy food bias and the normal-weight groups provided a pro-healthy food bias). 
In the No-Restriction condition, however, both groups produced weak healthy food 
biases. Similar to Study 1, the explicit measure (hunger-scale) did not differentiate 
among the groups with all four groups producing a healthy food bias. Logistic 
regression analyses found that the IRAP measure increased the predictive ability of 
the hunger-scale and a range of other explicit measures for the 2-hr food deprivation 
participants, but not for the No-Restriction condition. 
 The third study, reported in Chapter 5, aimed to increase the ecological 
validity by replicating Study 2, but changed the IRAP such that it targeted the 
dimension of “very-versus-slightly” hungry, rather than Hungry versus Not Hungry. 
This change was introduced based on the assumption that pictures of food would 
typically elicit at least some hunger response from participants. The findings from 
Study 2 were replicated, but in addition the introduction of the “very-versus-slightly” 
dimension produced a significant difference between the obese and normal-weight 
participants, and also yielded increased predictive validity over some explicit 
measures, in the No-Restriction condition. 
 In Chapter 5, the forth study explored the relationship between the normal-
weight participants responses on the “very-versus-slightly” hunger-IRAP in a 2-hr 
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food deprivation state and neurological activity as measured by 
electroencephalograms EEGs. Study 4 replicated the IRAP pattern found in Study 3 
(i.e., a pro-healthy-food bias in the 2-hr food deprivation condition), and significant 
effects consistent with the IRAP performances were obtained with the EEG measures. 
 The fifth study, reported in Chapter 7, examined the malleability of implicit 
hunger attitudes recorded by the IRAP after participants completed an Acceptance 
versus Indulgence of Food Urges intervention. The findings revealed that the 
participants exposed to the acceptance intervention showed an increased bias on the 
IRAP towards unhealthy food but the indulgence group showed no bias in either 
direction. The explicit measures indicated that hunger and cravings decreased, and 
resistance increased, for the acceptance group. In contrast, the indulge group reported 
relatively high levels of hunger and craving and low resistance. The lack of bias 
produced by the indulge group on the IRAP was taken to indicate a relatively high 
level of hunger in which participants fail to discriminate between the two food types 
(because they would eat anything). 
The final study, reported in Chapter 8, sought to test the foregoing conclusion 
(i.e., would hungry participants fail to show any significant bias on the food-IRAP?). 
The study utilized a 4-hr-Plus versus sated food deprivation state manipulation. The 
basic prediction was that both conditions would fail to yield any significant bias for 
healthy versus unhealthy food. In effect, participants who are food-deprived or food-
sated will not discriminate implicitly between food-types because in the former 
condition all food is appetitive and in the latter all food is neutral. The results of this 
final study upheld this prediction. 
In the ninth and final chapter a summary of the research is provided and a 
range of empirical and conceptual issues are discussed.  
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 Chapter 3: Food Deprivation and Implicit Wanting Attitudes to Food 
among Obese and Normal-Weight Individuals Using the IRAP 
 As described in the first Chapter of the current thesis, implicit measures have 
begun to be employed in the assessment of attitudes to food among obese and normal-
weight individuals (i.e., the IAT, the EAST, and the APP). Only one study (using the 
APP) found a difference in the implicit attitudes to food between these two groups 
(Czyzewska, & Graham, 2008; See Chapter 1). Furthermore, deprivation studies 
failed to find significant differences in their implicit attitudes to food. In sum, it 
appears that there is little empirical evidence to support the claim that implicit 
attitudes are related in any meaningful way to eating behaviour, at least in terms of 
differentiating between normal-weight and obese individuals. Critically, however, all 
of the studies of implicit attitudes to food have been conducted using measures that 
were designed to target (implicit) associations. 
 One criticism of associative measures is that they may be sensitive to wider 
social or cultural associations and it is these that are reflected in the measures 
(Wittenbrink, & Schwarz, 2007). For example, Karpinski and Hilton (2001) noted that 
the IAT might measure “the extent to which various attitudinal objects are associated 
in the person's environment.” (p. 783). In a modern western culture unhealthy foods 
are frequently paired or associated with health warnings and information pertaining to 
heart-disease, and other illnesses. Perhaps, therefore, an IAT performance pertaining 
to healthy and unhealthy foods reflects, in part, this type of social “conditioning” 
rather than the individual’s actual food preferences. One way in which it might be 
possible to target food preferences per se (rather than the effects of social 
information) would be to employ a non-associative measure, such as the IRAP. As 
noted previously, the IRAP was designed to assess relations rather than “raw” or 
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simple associations, and thus it could be used to specify relations pertaining to 
wanting food or to feeling hungry. Indeed, it has been argued that overeating in the 
obese is related less to “liking” attitudes to food (i.e., valence) and more to “wanting” 
attitudes (i.e., arousal). Indeed, this is the core argument of the Incentive-Sensitization 
theory of addictive behaviours (see Berridge, 1996; Robinson & Berridge, 1993 for a 
review). Insofar as this is the case, then perhaps an IRAP that aims to target “wanting” 
food would produce effects that better predict eating behaviour than typical 
associative measures. 
 In attempting to assess implicit wanting (arousal) without regard to food it 
would seem important to control for participants’ food deprivation state. That is, one 
would expect that increasing levels of food deprivation would increase the arousal 
properties of food for obese and normal-weight individuals (i.e., increasing their food-
wanting attitudes). To date, only one study has investigated the effects of food 
deprivation state on implicit and explicit food-wanting attitudes, and this was 
conducted with normal-weight individuals (Finlayson, King, & Blundell, 2008). 
Participants completed a computer task that assessed their explicit and implicit food 
attitudes when hungry (i.e., in a 3-hour food deprivation state) and when sated (i.e., 
immediately after eating a meal until full). The implicit wanting measure presented 
individuals with a picture from one of the four food categories: high-fat-savoury, (i.e., 
French fries); low-fat-savoury, (i.e., bread roll); high-fat-sweet, (i.e., jam doughnut); 
low-fat-sweet, (i.e., fruit salad). In addition, a second picture was presented from one 
of the other three food groups. Participants were instructed to choose one of the 
pictures based on “which one you most want to eat now?” The participants’ reaction 
times to each food-choice response were measured along with the frequency of 
selections made for each food category (i.e. a measure of relative preference). Explicit 
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wanting and liking attitudes to the same foods were assessed using the respective 
questions “How much do you want some of this food now?” and “How pleasant 
would it be to experience a mouthful of this food now?” Responses were recorded 
using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) anchored with “not at all” and “extremely” at 
either ends.  
 The latency data revealed a neutral bias for savoury and sweet food, regardless 
of fat category, when food-deprived. When sated, however, a positive bias towards 
both high- and low-fat sweet foods was observed, with neutral bias for savoury foods. 
No significant effects were recorded for the behavioural choice data. Both the explicit 
wanting and liking measures revealed that wanting and liking for all food categories 
decreased significantly when participants were sated relative to food deprived. In 
addition, a greater reduction in wanting and liking was observed for savoury 
compared to sweet foods. There were no significant correlations between the implicit 
and explicit measures. However, the implicit latency measure significantly correlated 
with the participants’ relative food preferences’ (i.e., food choices). Thus, when a 
food category was chosen more frequently an implicit bias was also observed for that 
food, independent of any change in explicit evaluation. In sum, when deprived, 
explicit wanting and liking increased for all foods, but implicit wanting showed the 
opposite effect for sweet foods only (i.e., bias increased when sated). 
 At the time of writing, no published study had attempted to assess implicit 
wanting for food among obese and normal-weight individuals, while also 
manipulating deprivation state. The first study reported in the current thesis aimed to 
investigate the effects of food deprivation on implicit wanting for healthy and 
unhealthy foods among obese and normal-weight individuals using the IRAP. The 
study presented obese and normal-weight individuals with an IRAP that was designed 
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to target wanting. Participants completed the study in a two-hour food deprivation 
state or in a condition in which food was not restricted prior to participation. The 
primary purpose of this first study was to determine simply if the wanting-IRAP was 
sensitive to individual differences in body-weight and deprivation state, and thus no 
specific predictions were made. Indeed, predictions were particularly difficult because 
no previous study had employed the IRAP in the context of food deprivation with 
obese and normal-weight individuals. As such, the study was almost purely 
exploratory, and should be seen as providing the first empirical step in the current 
research programme.  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
 Normal-weight individuals. Six screening criteria were employed. 
Specifically, participants (a) were required to be within a normal-weight BMI (18.5-
24.9 kg/m²); (b) were required to report no gastrointestinal problems within 24hrs 
prior to the study; (c) to report that they ate both red and white meat; (d) to score 
within the normal range on the Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5; 
Fairburn & Beglin, 1994); (e) to indicate that they were fluent English speakers, and 
(f) to meet the practice criteria on the IRAP (described below). Twenty-four 
participants met these criteria and completed the study. The sample consisted of 11 
females and 13 males (age M = 21 years, range, 18-24; weight, BMI, M = 21.7 kg/m²) 
recruited from undergraduate students attending the National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth. The BMI of each participant was obtained by the researcher who took 
measurements of height and weight at the end of the experimental session. No 
financial enticements were offered to the participants and all were naïve to the IRAP. 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of two groups, counterbalancing for 
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gender. The reader should note that although male-female differences may be 
expected on some of the measures employed in the studies reported in the current 
thesis, such differences were deemed tangential to the research and thus 
counterbalancing for gender was applied throughout the present work. 
 Obese individuals. Fifteen females and eight males (age M = 42 years; weight 
M = 50 kg/m²; all participants were in excess of 30 BMI kg/m²) attending the Diabetes 
and Weight Management Clinic, St., Columcilles Hospital, Loughlinstown, County 
Dublin volunteered to participate. The screening criteria described above were applied 
in recruiting the sample of obese participants except for criteria “a” and “d”. The BMI 
for the obese participants was obtained from the hospital records, which were always 
up-dated every day a participant attended the clinic. Once again, participants had no 
previous experience with the IRAP and completed the study without financial 
incentives. The participants were allocated randomly to one of two groups, controlling 
for gender. 
3.1.2 Setting 
  The non-obese individuals completed the study alone at a table in front of a 
personal computer in a quiet experimental cubicle in the Department of Psychology, 
at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth between 12.00pm and 4.00pm. The 
experimenter remained seated outside the cubicle except during the instruction phase. 
The obese participants conducted the study seated alone at a table in front of a 
personal computer, in a quiet room in the Diabetes and Weight Management Clinic 
between 12.00pm and 4.00pm. Except for the instruction phase the experimenter 
remained outside the test environment.  
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3.1.3 Apparatus/Materials 
 Food stimuli. Pictorial stimuli were selected based on descriptions of food 
stimuli used in previous studies of implicit attitudes to food (Roefs and Jansen, 2002; 
Finlayson, King, & Blundell, 2007). Specifically, six pictures of food deemed to be 
healthy (chicken salad, fruit, soup, green salad, nuts and a grilled fish dinner) and six 
pictures of food deemed to be unhealthy (hamburger and chips, donuts, chocolate, 
crisps, ice-cream, steak) were employed (see Figure 3.1). The pictures were culled 
from the internet stock photography website www.fotosearch.ie and were used for 
both implicit and explicit measures.  
 IRAP. The IRAP was presented on standard Pentium 4 personal computers 
running Windows XP (software available for download from 
http://psychology.nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAP_1.shtml). The IRAP software controlled the 
presentation of instructions and stimuli, and recorded participants’ responses. All 
IRAP trials presented one of two label stimuli “I want to eat it NOW” and “I want to 
eat it LATER” with one food picture (either healthy or unhealthy) presented as a 
target stimulus. The response options “True” and “False” were also presented on each 
trial (see Figure, 3.2, for an example of an IRAP trial). 
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 Figure 3.1. The six pictures of unhealthy and healthy foods used in the IRAP and explicit measures.
  
 
Figure 3.2. An example of an IRAP Trial-Type.  
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 Hunger-state questionnaire. Participants completed the Hunger-State self-
report questionnaire to determine the time since their last meal, their present hunger 
state and if they had suffered from any gastrointestinal problems in the last 48 hours 
(See Appendix B)?  
 Wanting-scale. Participants completed the wanting-scale self-report measure 
to assess wanting-food preferences for the same 12 food target pictures used on the 
IRAP. The measure comprised of a 12-item questionnaire that presented 9-point 
Likert scales (i.e., “On the scale below, -4 to 4, rate how much you want to eat “the 12 
food items” “NOW or LATER?”, “-4 (LATER),” “0 (NEUTRAL),” and “4 (NOW)” 
(See Appendix C).  
 Eating Disorder Examination -- Questionnaire. Each participant completed 
the Eating Disorder Examination – Questionnaire (EDE-Q5; Fairburn & Beglin, 
1994), which was designed to assess for the presence of any abnormal attitudes to 
food or disordered eating behaviours. The questionnaire consisted of 28 items; 22 
items comprising four food attitudinal subscales; restraint, weight concern, shape 
concern, and eating concern. The six remaining items measured frequency data on key 
behavioural features of eating disorders in terms of number of episodes (i.e., times or 
days) on which the specific behaviours occurred; objective over-eating, subjective 
bulimic episodes, objective and subjective bulimic episodes, purging, laxative misuse 
and compulsive exercise (See Appendix D for full questionnaire). Respondents rated 
each of the 22 attitudinal items on a 7-point rating scale indicating the number of days 
out of 28 on which the specific attitudes or feelings occurred (scored 0–6, with scores 
of four or higher considered to lie in the clinical range). Items 1 to 5, assessed 
Restraint, 7, 9, 19, 20 and 21 assessed Eating Concern, 6, 8, 10, 11, 23, 26, and 27 
assessed Shape Concern, and 8, 12, 22, 24, 25 and 28 assessed Weight Concern. 
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Participants rated the key behavioural items (13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18) for how many 
times over the last 28 days they engaged in the particular behaviour. Only participants 
not possessing disordered food attitudes or abnormal eating behaviours, based on the 
norms of Fairburn and Beglin (1994), were included in the normal-weight groups. 
 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. Participants completed the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1988) self-report 
measure (See Appendix E for full questionnaire). The BIDR measured participant’s 
propensity to respond in a socially desirable manner. It is a 40 item scale with items 0 
to 20 measuring Self-Deception (even numbers reversed scored) and items 21 to 40 
assessing Impression Management (odd numbers reversed scored). Participants rated 
each item on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored “1 (NOT True),” “0 (SOMEWHAT 
True),” and “7 (VERY True)”. The primary reason for including this scale was to 
determine if socially desirable responding and impression management correlated 
with the implicit and/or explicit measures (see Roefs & Jansen, 2002). 
 Power of Food Scale. The 21-item Power of Food scale (PFS; Lowe et al., 
2009) was used to assess the psychological influence of the mere presence or 
availability of food in the environment on participants. It measured appetite for foods 
at three levels, food available, food present and food tasted.  Participants rated the 
extent to which they agreed that the 21-items described them on a 5-point scale “1 (I 
don’t agree at all),” “2 (I agree a little),” “3 (I agree somewhat),” “4 (I agree),” “5 (I 
strongly agree),” (See Appendix F for full questionnaire). Scores above 60 were 
deemed to lie in the clinical range (Lowe et al., 2009). 
3.1.4 Procedure 
 Experimental sequence and participant assignment. The procedure consisted 
of three phases. In Phase 1, participants were asked to complete the Hunger-State 
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questionnaire. In Phase 2, the IRAP was presented. In Phase 3, participants completed 
four self-report measures; the wanting-food questionnaire; the Eating Disorder 
Examination – Questionnaire (EDE-Q5; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994); and the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1988), and  The Power of Food 
Scale (PFS; Lowe et al., 2009), respectively. 
 Normal-weight participants were randomly assigned (counterbalancing for 
gender) to either the No-Restriction or 2-hr group. Similarly, the obese individuals 
were randomly assigned (again counterbalancing for gender) to either the No-
Restriction or the 2-hr group. Participants in the normal-weight No-Restriction and 
obese No-Restriction groups were not instructed to control their food intake prior to 
commencing the study. Both the normal-weight and obese 2-hr groups were instructed 
upon recruitment, and reminded via SMS message 24 hours before the study, to eat a 
large meal until full, finishing it exactly two hours before commencing the 
experiment.  
 At the start of each experimental session the researcher thanked the 
participants for coming and informed them of the brief nature of the study. 
Participants were told that participation was voluntary, that they were completely free 
to with-draw at any stage, and all information they provided during the study was 
fully confidential. All individuals completed a written consent form (See Appendix G) 
followed by the Hunger-State questionnaire sitting alone at a table in the experimental 
booth/room. 
 Subsequently, each participant sat in front of the computer, which presented a 
short description of the procedure, an electronic consent form, instructions for 
completing the IRAP, as well as the IRAP task. Participants were instructed to read 
the IRAP instructions carefully, and contact the experimenter when finished, prior to 
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starting the IRAP trials. The description of the research area, consent form, and 
instructions for the IRAP tasks are presented subsequently. 
 INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Our research investigates cognitive processes that are used in decisions that 
involve memory. We are seeking to develop and test theories of cognitive 
processes that occur inside and outside of awareness in the routine use of 
memory.  
 
Stimuli will be presented on this display screen, and your responses will be 
entered on the keyboard. 
 
The research assumes that you can read English fluently, and that your vision 
is normal or corrected to normal. If you do not consider yourself fluent in 
English, or if your vision is not normal or corrected to normal, and 
ESPECIALLY IF YOU ARE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY READING 
THIS DESCRIPTION, PLEASE ask the experimenter now whether or not 
you should continue.  
 
Your identity as a subject is confidential. Further, you are free to discontinue 
participation at any time, without penalty.  
 
In keeping with standard practice, your data may be retained for 5 years or so, 
during which time only the investigators on this or successor projects will 
have access to them.  
 
PLEASE NOW READ THE STATEMENT BELOW, WHERE YOU WILL 
BE ASKED TO RESPOND TO A STANDARD INFORMED CONSENT 
QUESTION.  
 
 
CONSENT STATEMENT 
 
I have read the description of the procedure. I understand that the questions I 
may have about this research will be answered by Professor Barnes-Holmes 
or one of the other researchers working on this project.  
 
If you consent to participate in the research that has been described on the 
preceding display pages you should now read the Instructions for the sorting 
tasks below. 
 
[INSTRUCTION: If you wish to ask any questions first, alert the 
experimenter now. IF YOU WISH NOT TO PROCEED, you should inform 
the experimenter]. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Shown below are illustrations of the four different types of task that 
will be presented repeatedly in this part of the experiment. To help you 
understand the tasks each of the four illustrations is explained 
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immediately underneath. Please examine each illustration and then 
read carefully the explanation attached to it. Please make sure that you 
understand each task before continuing with the experiment.  
 
IMPORTANT: From trial to trial the positioning of the response 
options (True and False) will vary randomly between left and 
right. 
 
 
Illustration 1 
________________________________ 
I want to eat it NOW 
 
 
Picture of Unhealthy Food 
 
 
Select ‘d’ for                        Select ‘k’ for 
 True                     False 
________________________________ 
 
Explanation for Illustration 1 
 
If you select “True” by pressing the ‘D’ key, you are stating that “I 
want to eat the picture of Unhealthy food NOW.” 
 
If you select “False” by pressing the ‘K’ key, you are stating that “I 
want to eat the picture of Unhealthy food LATER.” 
 
 
Illustration 2 
________________________________ 
I want to eat it LATER 
 
 
Picture of Healthy Food 
 
Select ‘d’ for                        Select ‘k’ for 
 True                     False 
________________________________ 
 
Explanation for Illustration 2 
 
If you select “True” by pressing the ‘D’ key, you are stating that “I want to 
eat the picture of Healthy food LATER.” 
 
If you select “False” by pressing the ‘K’ key, you are stating that “I want to 
eat the picture of Healthy food NOW.” 
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Illustration 3 
________________________________ 
I want to eat it NOW 
 
 
Picture of Healthy Food 
 
 
Select ‘d’ for                        Select ‘k’ for 
 True                     False 
________________________________ 
 
Explanation for Illustration 3 
 
If you select “True” by pressing the ‘D’ key, you are stating that “I want to 
eat the picture of Healthy food NOW.” 
 
If you select “False” by pressing the ‘K’ key, you are stating that “I want to 
eat the picture of Healthy food LATER.” 
 
 
Illustration 4 
________________________________ 
I want to eat it LATER 
 
 
Picture of Unhealthy Food 
 
 
Select ‘d’ for                        Select ‘k’ for 
 True                     False 
________________________________ 
 
Explanation for Illustration 4 
 
If you select “True” by pressing the ‘D’ key, you are stating that “I want to 
eat the picture of Unhealthy food LATER.” 
 
If you select “False” by pressing the ‘K’ key, you are stating that “I want to 
eat the picture of Unhealthy food NOW.” 
 
 
 
NOTE: During the experiment a range of different images of “Healthy 
Foods” and “Unhealthy Foods” will be presented. 
 
REMEMBER: From trial to trial the positioning of the response 
options (True and False) will vary randomly between left and 
right. 
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FINAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
During the experiment you will be asked to respond as quickly and 
accurately as you can across all trials.  
 
The relating tasks will be presented in short sessions that are separated 
by the appearance of instructions on the computer screen. You can take 
a short break if you like while the instructions are on on-screen.  
 
 
During each short session the relating task follows one general rule. An 
incorrect response on any trial is signalled by the appearance of a red 
‘X’ in the centre of the screen.  To remove the red ‘X’ and move on to 
the next trial please press the correct response key quickly.  
 
After each session, further instructions will appear and they will tell 
you that the general rule that applied in the previous session is now 
completely reversed. Please pay close attention to these instructions 
and do your best to follow them. 
 
So, just to clarify, there will be only two general relating rules, and so 
the first thing you should do at the beginning of each session is to 
discover the rule by using the feedback you get in the form of the red 
‘X’.  
 
It is very important to understand that sometimes you will be required 
to respond to the tasks in a way that agrees with what you believe and 
at other times you will be required to respond in a way that disagrees 
with what you believe. This is part of the experiment. 
 
The first two sessions are for practice only and these are repeated until 
you respond accurately on at least 80% of the relating trials, and 
respond faster, on average, than 3000 milliseconds (i.e., 3 seconds). 
When you complete the practice phase, the test-phase will then start. 
Remember, you should try to make your responses as accurately and 
quickly as possible.  
 
Good Luck 
 
If you do not understand something about the 
foregoing instructions or have any further 
questions please talk to the researcher before 
clicking on the blue button. 
 
 After reading the IRAP instructions participants contacted the experimenter 
outside the experimental room. The experimenter asked the participant to explain 
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what each response option indicated for the four IRAP trial-types described in the 
instructions (see Figure 3.3 for four trial-types). If the participant appeared not to 
understand the trial-types, the experimenter spent some time explaining them to the 
participant (e.g., that responding “True” to “I want to eat it NOW” and a picture of 
“Unhealthy food” means that I want to eat that unhealthy food now). At no point did 
the experimenter state or indicate that differences in speed of responding were 
expected across different blocks of trials (i.e., participants were simply instructed to 
respond as fast and as accurately as possible across all trials). When participants fully 
understood the instructions for the task they proceeded with the IRAP, alone in the 
experimental room.   
 The IRAP program displayed the following instructions before each block of 
24 practice trials: 
IF YOU MAKE AN ERROR YOU WILL SEE A RED “X” 
BELOW THE STIMULUS – WHEN THIS HAPPENS 
YOU HAVE TO MAKE THE CORRECT RESPONSE TO 
PROCEED 
 
THIS IS PRACTICE - ERRORS ARE EXPECTED 
PRESS THE SPACE BARE TO START 
 
PRESS ‘d’ FOR     PRESS ‘k’ FOR 
 
For each IRAP trial four stimuli were presented on the computer screen 
simultaneously. The sample stimulus, either ‘I want to eat it NOW’ or ’ I want to eat 
it LATER ’, appeared at the top, the food target stimulus picture appeared in the 
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centre, and the two response options, ‘True’ and ‘False’ appeared at the bottom left 
and right corners (see Figure 3.3). All four stimuli remained on screen until the 
participant chose one of the two options at the bottom by pressing one of the two 
response keys. Participants chose the term on the left by pressing the ‘d’ key with 
their left index finger or the term on the right by pressing the ‘k’ key with their right 
index finger. Participants were instructed to rest their right and left index fingers on 
the ‘d’ and ‘k’ keys respectively, for the duration of each block of trials. The left-right 
position of the response options (“True” and “False”) alternated randomly across 
trials. 
If participants emitted a correct response for a particular trial, all four stimuli 
were removed from the screen for a 400 ms inter-trial interval before the next trial 
was displayed. If participants emitted an incorrect response (or pressed any other key 
apart from ‘d’ and ‘k’) a red ‘X’ was presented directly under the target word. The X 
remained on screen until the correct response was emitted. Only when a participant 
emitted the correct response was the X and all other stimuli removed. After 400ms, 
the next trial was presented. 
The IRAP consisted of a minimum of two and a maximum of eight practice 
blocks and a fixed set of six test blocks, each containing 24 trials (see Table 3.1). 
During each block, the 12 food target pictures were displayed in a quasi-random 
sequence, with each picture presented twice, once with each sample (see Figure 3.3).  
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    Want it NOW – Unhealthy Tasks 
 
I want to eat it NOW 
Unhealthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Unhealthy  Pro-Healthy 
K D 
I want to eat it NOW 
 
Healthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Healthy  Pro-Unhealthy 
K D 
I want to eat it LATER 
Unhealthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Healthy Pro-Unhealthy 
K D 
I want to eat it LATER 
Healthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Unhealthy  Pro-Healthy 
K D 
     Want it NOW – Healthy Tasks 
 
Want it LATER – Unhealthy Tasks   
 
Want it LATER – Healthy Tasks                  
 
Figure 3.3.The four IRAP trial-types.The samples (I want to eat it NOW or I want to eat it LATER), target food pictures (Hamburger and chips, 
Chocolate, Grilled Fish Dinner, Fruit, etc., and response options (True and False) were presented on the screen at the same time. Note the 
superimposed arrows and Pro-Unhealthy and Pro-Healthy text boxes used to illustrate which responses were deemed Pro-Unhealthy or Pro-
Healthy did not appear on the screen during the sorting tasks. IRAP sorting tasks were presented on two different test blocks. One block 
reinforced Pro-Unhealthy / Anti-Healthy responses. The other block reinforced Pro-Healthy – Anti-Unhealthy responses. Responses were 
reinforced by clearing the screen for 400ms before the next sorting task was presented. A response deemed incorrect for a particular block 
resulted in the presentation of a red X on screen until the participant emitting the alternative response. The IRAP consisted of a minimum of two 
practice blocks and only six test blocks, each containing 24 trials. During each block, the 12 food target pictures were displayed in a quasi-
random sequence, with each food target picture presented twice, once with each sample ‘I want to eat it NOW’ and ‘I want to eat it LATER). 
The ‘True’ and ‘False’ response options varied randomly across the screen from left to right on each sorting task.     
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Table 3.1. IRAP Practice and Test block Sequence 
 
Consistent-First Sequence   Inconsistent-First Sequence 
Pro-Unhealthy/Anti-Healthy Tasks First Pro-Healthy/Anti-Unhealthy Tasks First 
Practice 1 = Pro-Unhealthy    Practice 1 = Pro-Healthy 
Practice 2 = Pro-Healthy    Practice 2 = Pro-Unhealthy 
Block 1 = Pro-Unhealthy    Block 1 = Pro-Healthy 
Block 2 = Pro-Healthy    Block 2 = Pro-Unhealthy 
Block 3 = Pro-Unhealthy   Block 2 = Pro-Unhealthy 
Block 4 = Pro-Healthy    Block 2 = Pro-Unhealthy 
Block 5 = Pro-Unhealthy    Block 5 = Pro-Healthy 
Block 6 = Pro-Healthy    Block 6 = Pro-Unhealthy 
 
The first block of 24 practice trials required participants to emit responses that 
were predicted to be relationally consistent with a pro-unhealthy food bias. For 
example, if the sample stimulus ‘I want to eat it NOW’ and any of the unhealthy food 
target pictures appeared on screen, a correct response was defined as choosing the 
response option ‘True’. Choosing the other term, ‘False,’ on this trial was defined as 
incorrect. Alternatively, if the sample stimulus was ‘I want to eat it NOW’ and a 
healthy food target was presented, ‘False’ was ‘correct’ and ‘True’ incorrect. After 
participants completed the 24 trials they were presented with feedback indicating the 
percentage of correct responses and the median response time (calculated across the 
24 trials). After participants pressed the space-bar to move on to the second practice 
block of trials the IRAP program presented the following instructions: 
IMPORTANT: DURING THE NEXT PHASE THE PREVIOUSLY 
CORRECT AND WRONG ANSWERS ARE REVERSED. THIS IS 
PART OF THE EXPERIMENT. PLEASE TRY TO MAKE AS FEW 
ERRORS AS POSSIBLE -- IN OTHER WORDS, AVOID THE RED 
X 
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IF YOU MAKE AN ERROR YOU WILL SEE A RED ‘X’ BELOW 
THE STIMULUS – WHEN THIS HAPPENS, YOU HAVE TO 
MAKE THE CORRECT RESPONSE TO PROCEED. 
 
THIS IS PRACTICE -- ERRORS ARE EXPECTED 
  
  PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO START 
 
 The second block of 24 trials required participants to emit responses that were 
predicted to be relationally consistent with a pro-healthy food bias. For example, 
given the sample ‘I want to eat it NOW’ and a healthy food picture ‘True’ was correct 
and ‘False’ incorrect; but if the food picture was unhealthy ‘False’ was correct and 
‘True’ incorrect. After completing all 24 trials, the feedback indicating the percentage 
of correct responses and the median response time was presented.  
 If participants failed to achieve >=80% correct responses and a median 
response latency <=3000ms for each of the two practice blocks they were re-exposed 
to another pair of practice blocks, in the same sequence as above. Before re-exposure 
the accuracy and latency criteria were presented on screen with the participant’s 
accuracy and latency scores obtained for each of the two previous practice blocks. 
Participants were exposed to a maximum of four pairs of practice blocks with 
performance feedback presented after each of the first three pairs. If after the fourth 
pair of practice blocks a participant failed to achieve the accuracy and latency criteria, 
a message appeared on screen asking the participant to report to the experimenter. On 
the rare occasion this occurred, the participant was allowed a brief break before being 
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re-exposed to the IRAP program (no participant failed to achieve the practice criteria 
during a second exposure). 
 Having met the practice criteria, the computer proceeded to the six IRAP test 
blocks. The following instructions were presented to the participants before 
commencing the blocks: 
IMPORTANT: DURING THE NEXT PHASE THE PREVIOUSLY 
CORRECT AND WRONG ANSWERS ARE REVERSED. THIS IS 
PART OF THE EXPERIMENT. PLEASE TRY TO MAKE AS FEW 
ERRORS AS POSSIBLE -- IN OTHER WORDS, AVOID THE RED 
X 
 
IF YOU MAKE AN ERROR YOU WILL SEE A RED ‘X’ BELOW 
THE STIMULUS – WHEN THIS HAPPENS, YOU HAVE TO 
MAKE THE CORRECT RESPONSE TO PROCEED. 
 
THIS IS A TEST – GO FAST, MAKING A FEW ERROR IS OK 
 
  PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO START 
 
The first, third, and fifth test blocks required participants to emit responses 
that were predicted to be relationally consistent with a pro-unhealthy food bias; the 
second, fourth, and sixth test blocks required the opposite response pattern. Between 
each of the test blocks participants were informed of the percentage of correct 
responses and the median response time for that test block; they were also informed 
before each test block that the previously correct and incorrect answers would be 
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reversed in the next block. After completing the sixth and final test block, the screen 
cleared and the following message appeared on screen: 
The sorting tasks are complete – Thank you. 
Press the space-bar to proceed. 
Pressing the space-bar displayed the final instructions: 
 Thank you. 
 This is the End of the experiment. 
 Please report to the Experimenter.  
After the IRAP, participants completed the self-report measures; wanting-
food, the EDE-Q5, BIDR and PFS alone in their booths. Having completed the 
questionnaires the participants were informed it was the end of the experiment, they 
were thanked, debriefed and any questions they had were answered by the 
experimenter. 
3.2 RESULTS AND DICUSSION 
Pre-Analysis Checks 
 Initial screening checks were used to determine if there were significant 
differences on the explicit measures (Age, BMI, EDE-Q5, BIDR, and PFS) between 
the deprivation states (2-hr versus No-Restriction) within each weight category 
(normal-weight and obese). If no differences were found, any subsequent differences 
on the implicit measure between the deprivation states (within each weight category) 
were unlikely due to individual differences. A series of independent t-tests performed 
on each explicit measure with deprivation state as the between group variable for each 
weight category all proved non-significant (all ps > .08). 
 
 
 64 
3.2.1 Implicit Measures 
Data Preparation   
 The primary datum from the IRAP was response latency defined as the time in 
milliseconds (ms) that elapsed between the onset of the trial and a correct response 
made by the participant. Errors were reflected in the response latency data because 
incorrect responses were followed by a correct response. In the current study, the 
latency data were transformed into D-IRAP scores (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh et al., 
2010; Barnes-Holmes, Waldron et al. 2009; Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Vahey et 
al. 2009) using an adapted version of Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji’s (2003) IAT D-
algorithm. The principle behind the D transformation is to minimize the impact of 
factors such as age, motor skills, and/or cognitive ability on latency data, allowing 
researchers to measure differences between groups using a response-latency paradigm 
with reduced contamination by individual differences associated with extraneous 
factors (Greenwald et al., 2003). 
 The raw latency data for each participant were transformed using the 
following steps: (1) only response-latency data from the six test-blocks were used; (2) 
latencies above 10,000 ms were eliminated from the dataset; (3) the data from 
participants for whom more than 10% of test-block trials had latencies less than 300 
ms were removed (no data were excluded on this basis); (4) twelve standard 
deviations for the four trial-types were computed: four for the response-latencies from 
test-blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from test-blocks 3 and 4, and a four from 
test-blocks 5 and 6; (5) twenty-four mean latencies for the four trial types in each test-
block were computed; (6) difference scores for each of the four trial types for each 
pair of test blocks were calculated by subtracting the mean latency of the pro-
unhealthy test-block from the mean latency of the corresponding pro-healthy test 
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block; (7) each difference score was divided by its corresponding standard deviation 
from step 4, yielding 12 D-IRAP scores; one score for each trial-type for each pair of 
test blocks; (8) finally, an overall D-IRAP score was calculated by averaging the 
twelve D-IRAP scores. The data for all 47 participants were included in the final 
analyses (12 normal-weight 2-hr participants, 12 normal-weight No-Restriction 
participants, 11 obese 2-hr participants and 12 obese No-Restriction participants). 
 Given the foregoing transformation, a larger D-IRAP score indicates a greater 
difference in response latencies between pro-unhealthy and pro-healthy trials. Positive 
scores indicate responding in accordance with pre-experimentally defined biases (i.e., 
within the current study, pro-unhealthy/anti-healthy food bias) and negative scores 
indicate the opposite (i.e., pro-healthy/anti-unhealthy food bias). Scores that approach 
zero indicate no discrimination between unhealthy or healthy foods.  
 Due to the age difference between the normal-weight (M = 21 years, SE = .63) 
and obese groups (M = 42 years, SE = 1.84) it was necessary to determine if there was 
an age by deprivation state and/or weight category interaction. If non-significant 
interaction effects were found, then subsequent IRAP analyses could ignore age. Due 
to the stark difference in age distribution between normal-weight and obese groups it 
was not possible to perform a single ANCOVA including both groups. For the 
normal-weight groups an ANCOVA was conducted on the D-IRAP scores with 
deprivation state (2-hr versus No-Restriction) as the between group variable and age 
as the covariate. The age by deprivation state interaction was non-significant (p = 
.39). After adjusting for age the main effect for deprivation condition was also non-
significant (p = .41). Using the same strategy an ANCOVA was conducted on the D-
IRAP scores for the obese groups yielding a non-significant age by deprivation state 
interaction (p = .68). The main effect for deprivation condition was also non-
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significant after adjusting for age (p = .95). Given the absence of any significant 
effects for age, this variable was removed from all subsequent IRAP analyses. 
IRAP Analyses  
Figure 3.4 presents the overall mean D-IRAP scores divided by weight 
category and deprivation state. For the normal weight participants, the D-IRAP scores 
indicated a weak healthy bias in the No-Restriction condition and with a somewhat 
stronger healthy bias in the 2-hr deprivation state. The obese groups demonstrated 
similar healthy bias effects in both conditions. A 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was performed on the D-IRAP data with weight category (normal-weight versus 
obese) and deprivation state (2-hr versus No-Restriction) as between groups variables. 
All main and interaction effects were non-significant (all ps > .53).  
Four one-sample t-tests were used to determine if the D-IRAP effects for each 
of the deprivation states for both weight-categories differed significantly from zero. 
All effects were non-significant (all ps > .08). Overall, therefore, the normal-weight 
and obese individuals showed similarly weak non-significant healthy food biases 
irrespective of food deprivation state. 
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Figure 3.4. Overall mean D-IRAP scores, with standard errors, for the normal-weight and obese 
groups in the 2-hr and No-Restriction food deprivation conditions.  
 
Split-half correlations. The split-half correlation, with a Spearman-Brown 
correction, was weak to moderate and marginally-significant, r = .4, n = 47, p = .054. 
These data thus provide a moderate indicator of internal consistency for the IRAP, 
particularly for a response-time measure (see Nosek et al., 2006). 
3.2.2 Explicit Measures 
3.2.3 Wanting-scale  
Two mean wanting-food scores were first calculated from the 9-point Likert 
scales, one across the six unhealthy food pictures and the second across the six 
healthy food pictures; a relative wanting-food score was calculated by subtracting the 
mean food-wanting score for healthy food pictures from the mean score for unhealthy 
food pictures. Thus, a positive score indicated an unhealthy-food/anti-healthy-food 
bias and a negative score indicated the opposite (healthy/anti-unhealthy bias)1. All 
                                                 
1
 Given the age difference between the normal-weight and obese groups, separate analyses for the two 
weight categories were again conducted. An ANCOVA for the normal-weight groups found a non-
 68 
fours groups produced healthy food biases (normal-weight 2-hr group, M = -.76, SE = 
.48; normal-weight No-Restriction, M = -2.35, SE = .75; obese 2-hr, M = -1.30, SE = 
.75; obese No-Restriction, M = -.88, SE = .75). A 2x2 ANOVA with weight category 
and deprivation state as between-participant variables yielded no significant main 
effects or interactions (all ps >.15). Thus, like the IRAP, the wanting-scale failed to 
differentiate among the four different groups using the same pictorial stimuli. 
3.2.4 Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) 
Respondents rated each of the 22 attitudinal items on a 7-point rating scale, 
indicating the number of days out of 28 for which the specific attitudes or feelings 
occurred. Participants rated the key behavioural items for how many times over the 
last 28 days they engaged in the particular behaviour; these items do not contribute to 
the attitude subscale scores2. To obtain a particular subscale score, the ratings for the 
relevant items were summed together and divided by the total number of items in the 
subscale. An overall global score was obtained by adding the scores for the four 
subscales together and dividing the result by four. The means and standard deviations 
for the global EDE-Q score and the subscale scores are reported in Table 3.2. 
Attitude items. In general, the pattern of differences between the normal-
weight and obese groups on the EDE-Q was broadly similar to the norms reported in 
                                                                                                                                            
significant age by deprivations effect   (p = 89.). After adjusting for age, there was a non-significant 
main effect for deprivation condition (p = .07). The ANCOVA for the obese groups indicated that the 
age by deprivation state interaction was also non-significant (p = .92), as was main effect for 
deprivation condition after adjusting for age (p = .47). Thus, age was removed from further wanting-
scale analyses. 
2
 The ANCOVA analyses conducted for the wanting-scale were also applied to the Global EDE-Q and 
EDE-Q subscales, behavioural items, Global BIDR and BIDR subscales and to the PFS data for the 
normal-weight and obese participants (presented subsequently). Only Shape Concern produced a 
significant age by deprivation state interaction F (1, 20) = 8.99, p = .007, η2 = .31 for the normal-weight 
participants, all others effects and interactions were non-significant (ps > .11). For the obese, all effects 
and interactions were non-significant (ps > .35). Given that only one significant effect arose from 22 
statistical tests and that subsequent studies would replicate (partially) the current study it was decided 
simply to note the current finding for the normal-weight participants and to remove age from the 
analysis of Shape Concern. 
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two previous studies (Fairburn & Beglin, 1994; Mond, Hay, Rodgers, Owen, & 
Beumont 2004), although the scores for both normal-weight groups tended to be 
lower while both obese groups were slightly higher, except for Restraint. The mean 
scores for each of the attitude subscales for each of the normal-weight groups were 
lower than for their corresponding obese groups. Within weight category, the scores 
for the normal-weight 2-hr deprivation state were lower than the No-Restriction 
condition for Restraint, Shape Concern and Global EDE-Q but higher for Eating 
Concern and Weight Concern. For the obese participants scores were all lower in the 
No-Restriction condition for each subscale. Five 2x2 ANOVAs were used to analyze 
the data for each subscale and for the Global EDE-Q, with weight category and 
deprivation state as between group variables. The results of the ANOVAs are 
presented in Table 3.3. In each case, significant main effects were obtained for weight 
category, but all other effects and interactions were non-significant (all ps > .28). 
Thus, overall, the obese groups reported higher levels of pathological attitudes to food 
on each of the EDE-Q subscales and Global EDE-Q relative to the normal-weight 
individuals.  
Behavioural items. Participants rated the 6 behavioural items for how many 
times or days in the last 28 days they engaged in a specific pathological behaviour. A 
total behavioural score was calculated for each participant by summing the number of 
reported pathological behaviors. A mean score for each of the four groups was 
calculated by summing the total behavioural scores and dividing the result by the 
number of participants in the group. The scores for the normal-weight groups (2-hr, M 
= 1.5, SE = .54, No-Restriction M = 2.41, SE = 1.37) were considerably lower than for 
the obese  
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groups (2-hr, M = 21.81, SE = 6.09, No-Restriction, M = 25.75, SE = 10.03). 
Within groups, the normal-weight No-Restriction group had a slightly higher score 
than the 2-hr group; the same effect was observed for the obese groups. A 2x2 
ANOVA, with weight category and deprivation state as the between group variables, 
yielded a significant main effect for weight category F (1, 43) = 13.61, p = .0006, η2 = 
.24 (remaining ps > .68). Consistent with the attitudinal subscales, both obese groups 
reported significantly higher levels of pathological eating behaviours than the normal-
weight groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subscale 
 
Normal- 
Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Normal- 
Weight 
No- 
Restriction 
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
No-
Restriction 
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Fairburn  
and Beglin 
(1994) 
Community 
Based 
Norms 
Mean (SD) 
Elder, 
Grilo,  
Masheb,  
Rothschild,  
Burke- 
Martindale,  
and Brody  
(2006) 
Obese 
Scores 
Mean (SD) 
Restraint  1.05 (.99) 1.28 (1.04) 2.69 (1.04) 2.15 (1.30) 1.25 (1.32) 2.8 (1.30) 
Eating  
Concern 
.450 (.57) .20 (.33) 2.44 (1.17) 2.28 (2.05) .62 (0.86) 1.7 (1.30) 
Shape  
Concern 
1.04 (.71) 1.28 (.86) 4.42 (1.15) 4.17 (1.16) 2.15 (1.60) 4.1 (1.30) 
Weight  
Concern 
1.05 (.81) .92 (.68) 3.82 (1.47) 3.48 (1.05) 1.59 (1.37) 3.3 (1.00) 
Global  
EDE-Q 
.90 (.61) .92 (.62) 3.34 (.73) 3.02 (1.12) .1.55 (1.21) 3.0 (0.90) 
Table 3.2. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire  
(EDE-Q5) subscale items (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern), and the 
Global EDE-Q score). 
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*P < .001 
 
3.2.5 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
 Participants responded to each of the Self-Deception (SDE) and Impression 
Management (IM) items on a 7-point Likert scale. After reversing the negatively 
scored items, each item was scored as either 0 (for responses from 1 to 5) or 1 (for 
responses 6 or 7), with the latter indicating exaggerated or extreme desirable 
responding. A total SDE score was calculated by summing the number of extreme 
responses across the first 20 items. Similarly, a total IM score was produced by 
adding the number of extreme responses across items 21 to 40. A global BIDR score 
was calculated by summing the SDE and IM scores. The means and standard 
deviations for each weight category and deprivation state are presented in Table 3.4. 
A 2x2 ANOVA with weight category and deprivation state were conducted and each 
produced non-significant main and interaction effects for Self-Deception, Impression 
Management, and Global BIDR (all ps >.05). Thus the normal-weight and obese 
groups reported similar levels of Self-Deception, Impression Management and Global 
BIDR. 
 
Subscale Effect df F p η2 
Restraint Weight 
Category 
1, 43 12.79 .00* .23 
Eating 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 43 32.22 .00* .28 
Shape 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 43 118.46 .00* .73 
Weight 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 43 78.11 .00* .64 
Global 
EDE-Q 
Weight 
Category 
1, 43 95.01 .00* .69 
Table 3.3. Results for the Five 2x2 ANOVAs for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-
Q5) subscales (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern) and for the Global EDE-
Q, with weight category (normal-weight, and obese), deprivation state (2-hr, and No-Restriction) as 
between  
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3.2.6 Power of Food Scale 
The Power of Food score was derived by summing the responses for the 
twenty-one items completed by participants on 5-point Likert scales. The scores for 
the normal-weight groups (2-hr, M = 37.58, SE = 3.45, No-Restriction M = 32.00, SE 
= 3.92) were noticeably lower than for the obese groups (2-hr, M = 68.82, SE = 5.48, 
No-Restriction, M = 63.58, SE = 7.92). The 2-hr deprivation states were slightly 
higher than the No-Restriction conditions for both weight categories. A 2x2 ANOVA, 
with weight category and deprivation state produced a significant main effect for 
weight category F (1, 43) = 32.76, p = .0001, η2 = .43, but all other effects and 
interactions were non-significant (ps > .32). Thus, the obese groups reported 
significantly higher levels of Power of Food compared to the normal-weight groups.  
3.2.7 Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
A correlation matrix of implicit and explicit measures is presented in Table 
3.5, which explores the relationships between the 11 explicit measures with the D-
IRAP measure. Non-significant correlations were obtained in all cases except between 
the D-IRAP score and Global BIDR (r = -.367, p = .01). Thus the lower the D-IRAP 
score (i.e., the stronger the healthy bias) the more participants engaged in Self-
Deception and Impression Management. 
 
Subscale Normal-Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Normal-Weight 
No-Restriction 
Group  
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
No-Restriction  
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Self-Deception  5.00 (2.45) 4.42 (3.54) 4.36 (2.87) 4.00 (3.59) 
Impression 
Management 
6.25 (2.42) 4.41 (4.30) 5.36 (2.77) 7.41 (3.42) 
Global BIDR 11.25 (3.88) 8.83 (6.90) 9.73 (4.32) 11.58 (6.59) 
 
Table 3.4. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR) subscales items (Self-Deception and Impression Management) and the Overall BIDR score. 
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3.2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 The IRAP performances in the current study failed to differentiate between the 
four groups (i.e., all four groups produced relatively weak and non-significant healthy 
food biases). The pattern of results for the explicit wanting-food measure were similar 
to the IRAP (i.e., all four groups produced healthy food biases). However, the EDE-Q 
and PFS measures both discriminated between the two weight categories, but no 
effects for deprivation state were observed. Correlations between the implicit and 
explicit measures yielded only one significant effect. Given that the IRAP effects did 
not differentiate between the groups, logistic regression analyses were not conducted 
to determine if the IRAP measures increased prediction of group status over the 
explicit measures. In short, the Eat it Now versus Eat it Later IRAP employed in the 
current study appeared to be largely unaffected by either the weight or deprivation 
states of the participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P < .05 
 
 
 Overall D-IRAP Score 
Food-Hunger .04 
Global EDE-Q  -.02 
EDE-Q - Restraint -.11 
EDE-Q - Eating Concern -.07 
EDE-Q - Shape Concern .06 
EDE-Q - Weight Concern .01 
Total Behaviours -.03 
BIDR -.37* 
BIDR - SDE -.26 
BIDR - IM -.05 
PFS .00 
Table 3.5. Correlations between the Overall Mean D-IRAP score and the Wanting-scale, the Eating 
Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) and its subscales, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR) and its subscales, and the Power of Food, 47 observations in total. 
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3.3 DISCUSSION 
 The current study was the first to investigate the effects of food deprivation 
state on implicit wanting attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods among obese and 
normal-weight individuals. Obese and normal-weight participants produced similar 
implicit biases toward both healthy and unhealthy foods on the IRAP (i.e. all four 
groups demonstrated weak healthy food biases). The pattern of results for the explicit 
wanting-scale measure was similar to the IRAP (i.e., it did not discriminate among the 
groups, with all four producing weak healthy food biases). The IRAP findings 
reported here are consistent with most of the previous IAT, EAST and APP food 
attitude research, in that six out of seven studies using these measures found no 
differences in implicit food attitudes among obese and normal-weight individuals 
(Reofs & Jansen, 2002; Craeynest et al. 2006; Craeynest et al. 2005; Craeynest et al. 
2007; Roefs et al. 2005, Experiment 2; Roefs et al. 2006 Experiment 1; Czyzewska, & 
Graham, 2008). In fact, the weak healthy food biases produced in the current study are 
similar to the marginally significant biases for healthy foods demonstrated by both 
obese and normal-weight individuals on the APP after a food-deprivation/craving-
induction exercise (Roefs et al. 2006). 
 In contrast, the EDE-Q and PFS measures both discriminated between the two 
weight categories, but no effects for deprivation state were observed. The obese 
groups had higher levels of abnormal eating attitudes and behaviours to food on the 
EDE-Q compared to the normal-weight individuals. The obese had higher 
susceptibility to food cues in the environment compared to the normal-weight 
individuals as measured by the PFS scale. There were no correlations between the 
IRAP and explicit wanting-scale. However, one explicit measure, the BIDR, had a 
negative correlation with the IRAP, indicating that participants who engaged in more 
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Self-Deception and Impression Management showed lower unhealthy or stronger 
healthy implicit bias. 
 The present results indicate that the label stimuli I want to eat it NOW versus 
LATER utilized in the current IRAP failed to differentiate obese and normal-weight 
individuals’ unhealthy and healthy food attitudes. In contrast, some of the explicit 
measures did discriminate between the weight categories. One possible reason for the 
IRAP’s lack of discrimination is that the label terms targeted the “cognitive” or 
temporal aspects of eating attitudes rather than the “arousal” properties of food. In 
other words, responding to questions about wanting to eat a food item “now” versus 
“later” may serve to elicit reactions that are controlled, at least in part, by contextual 
variables unrelated to hunger. For example, the IRAP is a demanding task, which 
would be largely incompatible with eating anything while completing it. Furthermore, 
the study was conducted in small experimental cubicles in a laboratory in which food 
and drink were not permitted. Thus there were at least two contextual variables that 
may have caused participants to show a response bias towards all foods with “I want 
to eat it later” (i.e., after I have completed the study). Insofar as this was the case, this 
would explain why relatively neutral biases, with regard to healthy versus unhealthy 
foods, were observed on the IRAP. 
 If the foregoing interpretation of the neutral IRAP effects is correct, then 
perhaps changing the labels, so that they target hunger, would be more effective in 
discriminating between the conditions. In other words, a state of hunger may occur 
independently of wanting to eat at a particular time. Thus, participants could 
experience hunger while completing a task, without wanting to eat immediately. The 
study reported in the next chapter sought to determine if targeting hunger, rather than 
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wanting, with the IRAP was effective in discriminating between obese and normal-
weight participants implicit responses to healthy and unhealthy foods. 
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Chapter 4: Food Deprivation and Implicit Hunger Attitudes to Food among 
Obese and Normal-Weight Individuals Using the IRAP 
 The second study described in the current thesis sought to differentiate the 
implicit attitudes of obese from normal-weight individuals to food by employing label 
stimuli that targeted hunger rather than wanting. To this end, the following two label 
stimuli were employed; Makes Me Feel Hungry Now and Does Not Make Me Feel 
Hungry Now. Apart from this change in the label stimuli, the current study was 
similar to the previous study. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
 Normal-weight individuals. The same six screening criteria that were 
employed in Study 1 for the normal-weight participants were employed in Study 2. 
Thirty-two participants met these criteria and completed the study. The sample 
consisted of 16 females and 16 males (age M = 21 years, range, 18-23; weight, BMI, 
M = 22.5 kg/m²) recruited from undergraduate students attending the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth. No financial enticements were offered to the 
participants and all were naïve to the IRAP. Participants were assigned randomly to 
one of two groups, counterbalancing for gender. 
 Obese individuals. The same screening criteria described in Study 1 for 
recruiting obese participants were applied. Fifteen females and ten males (age M = 41 
years; range, 25-56, weight, BMI, M = 47.7 kg/m²) attending the Diabetes and Weight 
Management Clinic, St., Columcilles Hospital, Loughlinstown, County Dublin 
volunteered to participate. Once again, participants had no previous experience with 
the IRAP and completed the study without financial incentives. The participants were 
allocated randomly to one of two groups, counterbalancing for gender. 
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4.1.2 Setting 
 The settings were identical to Study 1. 
4.1.3 Apparatus/Materials 
 The apparatus and materials were the same as those employed in Study 1 
except that the two label stimuli on the IRAP were changed to “Makes Me Feel 
Hungry Now” and “Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now”. Furthermore, the 
wanting-scale was replaced by a hunger-scale. The self-report hunger-scale measured 
participant’s food-hunger evaluations for the same 12 food target pictures used in the 
IRAP. The measure comprised of a 12-item questionnaire presented on 9-point Likert 
scales (i.e., “On the scale below -4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry the 12 food 
items make you feel now? “-4 (NOT HUNGRY),” “0 (NEUTRAL),” and “4 
(HUNGRY)”? (See Appendix H). 
 The final difference was the inclusion of the Mindful Attention Awareness 
Scale (MAAS: Brown and Ryan, 2003). This Scale is a 15-item measure used to 
assess participant’s mindfulness for moment to moment experience. Participants were 
instructed to rate how frequently or infrequently they had the experiences listed in the 
15-items on a 6-point Likert scale; 1 (Almost Always),” “2 (Very Frequently),” “3 
(Somewhat Frequently),” “4 (Somewhat Infrequently),” “5 (Very Infrequently),” “5 
(Almost Never),” (See Appendix I for full questionnaire). Higher scores reflect higher 
levels of dispositional mindfulness (MAAS: Brown and Ryan, 2003). 
4.1.4 Procedure 
 The experimental sequence was identical to that used in Study 1, except, as 
noted above, the participants completed a hunger-scale and the MASS after 
completing the IRAP. The IRAP procedure was similar to that utilised in Study 1, 
except that different label stimuli were used ““Makes Me Feel Hungry Now” versus 
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“Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now”; see Figure 4.1). The IRAP instructions 
paralleled those used previously but were amended to accommodate the different label 
stimuli. Consistent with the previous study, the IRAP involved alternating between 
two different blocks of trials. All participants commenced the IRAP with a pro-
unhealthy/anti-healthy block of trials, which involved the following four trial-types: 
“Makes Me Feel Hungry Now – Unhealthy Food – True”; “Does Not Make Me Feel 
Hungry Now – Unhealthy Food – False”; “Makes Me Feel Hungry Now – Healthy 
Food – False”; “Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now – Healthy – True”. The next 
block of trials was defined as pro-healthy/anti-unhealthy and involved the following 
four trial-types; “Makes me feel hungry now – Unhealthy Food – False”; “Does Not 
Make Me Feel Hungry Now – Unhealthy Food – True”; “Makes Me Feel Hungry 
Now – Healthy Food – True”; “Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now – Healthy Food 
– False”. Thus all odd numbered blocks of IRAP trials were pro-unhealthy/anti-
healthy whereas all even numbered blocks of trials were pro-healthy/anti-unhealthy.  
After the IRAP, participants completed the self-report measures; hunger-scale, 
EDE-Q5; the PFS; MAAS, and the BIDR alone in their booths. Having completed the 
questionnaires the participants were informed it was the end of the experiment, they 
were thanked, debriefed and any questions they had were answered by the 
experimenter. 
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4.2 RESULTS 
Pre-Analysis Checks 
 Similar to Study 1, initial screening checks were used to determine if there 
were significant differences on the explicit measures (Age, BMI, EDE-Q5, BIDR, 
PFS, and MAAS) between the deprivation states for each weight category. The twelve 
        HUNGRY – Unhealthy Tasks                 
 
Makes Me Feel Hungry Now 
Unhealthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Unhealthy  Pro-Healthy 
K D 
Makes Me Feel Hungry Now 
 
Healthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Healthy  Pro-Unhealthy 
K D 
Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now 
Unhealthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Healthy Pro-Unhealthy 
K D 
Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now 
 
Healthy Food 
True False 
Pro-Unhealthy  Pro-Healthy 
K D 
     HUNGRY – Healthy Tasks 
 
  NOT HUNGRY  – Unhealthy Tasks   
 
   NOT HUNGRY  – Healthy Tasks   
 
Figure 4.1. The four IRAP trial-types.  
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independent t-tests that were used for this purpose all proved to be non-significant (all 
ps > .07). 
4.2.1 Implicit Measures 
Data Preparation   
 The data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using the same strategy 
adopted for Study 1. The data for fifty-seven participants were included in the final 
analyses (16 normal-weight 2-hr participants, 16 normal-weight No-Restriction 
participants, 11 obese 2-hr participants and 14 obese No-Restriction participants).  
 Due to the age difference between the normal-weight (M = 21 years, SE = .24) 
and obese groups (M = 41 years, SE = 1.98) it was once again necessary to investigate 
if there was an age by deprivation state and/or weight category interaction. If a non-
significant interaction was found, then subsequent IRAP analyses could ignore age. 
Due to the stark difference in age distribution between normal and obese groups it 
was not possible to perform a single ANCOVA including both groups. For the 
normal-weight groups an ANCOVA was conducted on the D-IRAP score with 
deprivation state (2-hr versus No-Restriction) as the between group variable and age 
as the covariate. The age by deprivation state interaction was non-significant (p = 
.97). After adjusting for age the main effect for deprivation condition was non-
significant, (p = .99). Using the same strategy an ANCOVA was carried out on the D-
IRAP scores for the obese groups yielding a non-significant age by deprivation state 
interaction (p = .07). The main effect for deprivation condition was significant after 
adjusting for age F (1, 22) = 9.21, p = .01, η2 = .30. Given the absence of any 
significant effects for age, this variable was removed from all subsequent IRAP 
analyses.    
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IRAP Analyses  
Figure 4.2 presents the overall mean D-IRAP scores divided by weight 
category and deprivation state. For the normal weight participants the D-IRAP scores 
indicated a healthy bias in both the No-Restriction condition and the 2-hr deprivation 
state. The obese group demonstrated the same effect in the No-Restriction condition 
(healthy bias) but the opposite in the 2-hr deprivation state (unhealthy bias). A 2x2 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the D-IRAP data with weight 
category (normal-weight versus obese) and deprivation state (2-hr versus No-
Restriction) as between groups variables. The ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect for weight category; F (1, 53) = 4.13, p = .031, η2 = .09, and a marginally 
significant effect for deprivation condition F (1, 53) = 3.99, p = .051, η2 = .07. 
Critically, a significant interaction between weight category and deprivation state was 
also recorded; F (1, 53) = 4.13 p = .047, η2 = .07. Planned comparisons were 
conducted using four one-way between-groups ANOVAs. A significant difference 
was found between the weight categories in the 2-hr condition, F (1, 25) = 14.72, p = 
.0008, η2 = .37, but not for the No-Restriction condition, p = .90. A significant 
difference was found between the deprivation states (2-hr versus No-Restriction) for 
the obese individuals, F (1, 23) = 6.92, p = .015, η2 = .23; but not for the normal-
weight individuals, p = .98.   
Four one-sample t-tests were used to determine if the D-IRAP effects for each 
of the deprivation states for both weight-categories differed significantly from zero. 
The effects for the 2-hr normal-weight, t (15) = -2,41, p = .03, and obese group, t (10) 
= 2.91, p = .015, were significant, but the effects for the No-Restriction groups were 
not (ps > .17). Overall, therefore, the normal-weight individuals showed a healthy 
food bias at two hours deprivation but a non-significant healthy food bias when 
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deprivation was not controlled. The obese individuals showed an unhealthy bias at 
two hour deprivation, and a weak and non-significant healthy bias when deprivation 
was uncontrolled. 
 
Figure 4.2. Overall mean D-IRAP scores, with standard errors, for the normal-weight and obese 
groups in the 2-hr and No-Restriction food deprivation conditions. 
 
 
Split-half correlations. The split-half correlation, with a Spearman-Brown 
correction, was moderate and significant, r = .6, n = 57, p = .001. These data thus 
provide a reasonably strong indicator of internal consistency for the IRAP, 
particularly for a response-time measure (see Nosek et al., 2006). 
4.2.2 Explicit Measures 
4.2.3 Hunger-scales  
Similar to the two mean wanting-food scores calculated in the previous study, 
two mean hunger-scores were first calculated from the 9-point Likert scales. Thus, a 
positive score indicated an unhealthy-food/anti-healthy-food bias and a negative score 
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indicated the opposite (healthy/anti-unhealthy bias)3. All four groups produced 
healthy food biases (normal-weight 2-hr group, M = -.54, SE = .36; normal-weight 
No-Restriction, M = -.75, SE = .36; obese 2-hr, M = -.41, SE = .62; obese No-
Restriction, M = -1.03, SE = .53). A 2x2 ANOVA with weight category and 
deprivation state as between-participant variables yielded no significant effects or 
interactions (all ps > .37). Thus, unlike the IRAP the hunger scales failed to 
differentiate among the four different groups even though the same pictorial stimuli 
were used. 
4.2.4 Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) 
Similar to the previous study, Restraint, Shape, Concern, Eating Concern, 
Weight Concern and Global EDE-Q were calculated from the 7-point rating scales for 
each of the subscale items4. Furthermore, mean scores for the behavioural items for 
each of the four groups were calculated as per Study 1. The means and standard 
deviations for the Global EDE-Q score and the subscale scores are reported in Table 
4.1.   
Attitude items. In general, the pattern of differences between the normal-
weight and obese groups on the EDE-Q was broadly similar to the norms reported in 
two previous studies (Fairburn & Beglin, 1994; & Mond, Hay, Rodgers, Owen, & 
                                                 
3
 Given the age difference between the normal-weight and obese groups, separate analyses for the two 
weight categories were again conducted. An ANCOVA for the normal-weight groups yielded a non-
significant age by deprivations effect   (p = .37). After adjusting for age, there was a non-significant 
main effect for deprivation condition (p = .73). The ANCOVA for the obese groups indicated that the 
age by deprivation state interaction was also non-significant (p = .75), as was the main effect for 
deprivation condition after adjusting for age (p = .38). Thus, age was removed from further hunger-
scale analyses. 
4
 The ANCOVA analyses conducted for the hunger--scales were also applied to the Global and EDE-Q 
subscales, behavioural items, Global and BIDR subscales, PFS, and to the MAAS data for the normal-
weight and obese participants (presented subsequently). Only the Self-Deception subscale of the BIDR 
produced a significant age by deprivation state interaction F (1, 28) = 5.05, p = .03, η2 = .15 (all other 
ps > .12). For the obese group only PFS, F (1, 21) = 6.48, p = .02, η2 = .23, and Total Behaviours, F (1, 
21) = 6.86, p = .02, η2 = .25, obtained significant age by deprivation state interactions (all other ps > 
.07). Given that only three significant effects emerged from 24 statistical tests, all at p > .01, and none 
of these effects (for Self-Deception, PFS, Total Behaviours) were replicated in any of the other studies 
reported in the current thesis, it was decided to remove age from subsequent analyses. 
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Beumont, 2004) although the scores for both the normal-weight groups and the obese 
No-Restriction group tended to be lower. For the obese 2-hr condition the scores for 
Eating Concern, were slightly higher in the current study. The mean scores for each of 
the attitude subscales for each of the normal-weight groups were lower than for their 
corresponding obese groups. In comparing within each weight category, the scores for 
the normal-weight and obese participants were lower in the No-Restriction condition 
for each subscale, respectively. Five 2x2 ANOVAs were used to analyze the data for 
each subscale and for the Global EDE-Q, with weight category and deprivation state 
as between group variables. The results of the ANOVAs are presented in Table 4.2. In 
each case, significant main effects were obtained for weight category. All other 
effects and interactions were non-significant (all ps > .06). Thus, overall, the obese 
groups reported higher levels of pathological attitudes to food on each of the EDE-Q 
subscales and on the Global EDEQ relative to the normal-weight individuals.  
Behavioural items. The scores for the normal-weight groups (2-hr, M = .69, SE 
= .22, No-Restriction M = 1.00, SE = .39) were considerably lower than for the obese 
groups (2-hr, M = 17.82, SE = 7.03, No-Restriction, M = 13.86, SE = 4.04). Within 
groups, the normal-weight No-Restriction group had a slightly higher score than the 
2-hr group; for the obese groups the opposite effect was observed. A 2x2 ANOVA, 
with weight category and deprivation state as the between group variables, yielded a 
significant effect for weight category F (1, 53) = 19.64, p = .0001, η2 = .27, with the 
remaining effects being non-significant (all ps > .53). Consistent with the attitudinal 
subscales both obese groups reported significantly higher levels of pathological eating 
behaviours than the normal-weight groups. 
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*P < .001 
 
4.2.4 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
 Similar to the previous study, mean Self-Deception (SDE), Impression 
Management (IM) and Global BIDR scores were calculated for each weight category 
Subscale 
 
Normal- 
Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Normal- 
Weight 
No- 
Restriction 
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
No-
Restriction 
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Fairburn & 
Beglin 
(1994) 
Community 
Based 
Norms 
Mean (SD) 
Elder, 
Grilo,  
Masheb,  
Rothschild,  
Burke- 
Martindale,  
& Brody  
(2006) 
Obese 
Scores 
Mean (SD) 
Restraint  .46 (.71) .41 (.88) 2.53 (.69) 2.21 (.98) 1.25 (1.32) 2.8 (1.30) 
Eating  
Concern 
.24 (.44) .18 (.30) 1.77 (1.43) 1.37 (1.72) .62 (0.86) 1.7 (1.30) 
Shape  
Concern 
.81 (.83) .64 (.83) 3.81 (1.4) 3.73 (1.72) 2.15 (1.60) 4.1 (1.30) 
Weight  
Concern 
.89 (.88) .46 (.71) 4.02 (1.25) 3.31 (1.46) 1.59 (.1.37) 3.3 (1.00) 
Global  
EDE-Q 
.60 (.59) .42 (.58) 3.03 (.95) 2.66 (1.26) 1.55 (1.21) 3.0 (0.90) 
Subscale Effect df F p η2 
Restraint Weight 
Category 
1, 53 79.07 .00* .60 
Eating 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 53 21.56 .00* .29 
Shape 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 53 87.57 .00* .62 
Weight 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 53 106.00 .00* .67 
Global 
EDE-Q 
Weight 
Category 
1, 53 99.58 .00* .65 
Table 4.1. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire  
(EDE-Q5) subscales items (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern), the Global 
EDE-Q score). 
Table 4.2. Results for the Five Two-Way ANOVAs for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire  
(EDE-Q5) subscales (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern) and for the  
Global EDE-Q, with weight category (normal-weight, and obese), deprivation state (2-hr, and  
No-Restriction) as between group variables.  
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and deprivation state using the 7-point Likert scales for each subscale. The means and 
standard deviations for each weight category and deprivation state are presented in 
Table 4.3. A 2x2 ANOVA, with weight category and deprivation state were 
conducted and each produced non-significant main and interaction effects for Self-
Deception, Impression Management, and Global BIDR (all ps >.05). Thus, the 
normal-weight and obese groups reported similar rates of Self-Deception, Impression 
Management and Global BIDR. 
 
 
4.2.5 Power of Food Scale 
 Similar to the previous study, a Power of Food score was calculated for each 
weight category and deprivation state using the 7-point Likert scales. The scores for 
the normal-weight groups (2-hr, M = 41.00, SE = .2.30, No-Restriction M = 39.88, SE 
= 2.64) were noticeably lower than for the obese groups (2-hr, M = 63.82, SE = 7.26, 
No-Restriction, M = 57.71, SE = 6.80).  The 2-hr deprivation states were slightly 
higher than the No-Restriction condition for both weight categories. A 2x2 ANOVA, 
with weight category and deprivation state as independent variables, produced a 
significant main effect for weight category F (1, 53) = 17.76, p = .0001, η2 = .25; all 
other effects were non-significant (all ps > .46). Thus the obese groups reported 
significantly higher levels of Power of Food Scores compared to the normal-weight 
groups. 
Subscale Normal-Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Normal-Weight 
No-Restriction 
Group  
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
No-Restriction  
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Self-Deception  5.25 (2.84) 4.56 (2.94) 4.55 (2.94) 5.64 (2.74) 
Impression 
Management 
5.25 (2.84) 4.50 (2.76) 5.00 (3.46) 7.86 (3.92) 
Global BIDR 10.5 (4.52) 9.19 (4.82) 9.55 (5.68) 13.50 (6.02) 
 
Table 4.3. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)  
subscales items (Self-Deception and Impression Management) and the Overall BIDR score. 
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4.2.6 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
 A total Mindful Attention Awareness Scale score was found for each 
participant by calculating their mean score across the fifteen 6-point Likert items. The 
scores for the normal-weight groups (2-hr, M = 4.20, SE = .24, No-Restriction M = 
.4.20, SE = .17) were very similar to the obese groups (2-hr, M = 3.70, SE = .26, No-
Restriction, M = 4.5, SE = .33).  The scores for the two deprivation states were similar 
for the normal-weight participants but the obese No-Restriction group was slightly 
higher than the 2-hr group. A 2x2 ANOVA found all effects to be non-significant (all 
ps > .12). Thus the normal-weight and obese groups had approximately equal levels 
of mindful attention and awareness. 
4.2.7 Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
A correlation matrix of implicit and explicit measures is presented in Table 
4.4, which explores the relationships between the 12 explicit measures with the D-
IRAP measure. Non-significant correlations were obtained (all rs < .23, all ps >.09), 
except for two weak correlations between the D-IRAP score and Eating Concern (r = 
.29, p = .03), and the D-IRAP score and the MAAS (r = .27, p = .05). Thus, higher D-
IRAP scores (i.e., unhealthy bias) predicted increased concerns over eating and 
increased levels of mindfulness. 
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*P < .05 
 
    4.2.8 Prediction of Group Status 
 Eleven separate hierarchical logistic regression analyses were conducted for 
the 2-hr deprivation condition. For each model the explicit measure was entered as the 
predictor of weight category in the first step and the overall D-IRAP measure was 
entered into the model in the second step (see Table 4.5). Weight category was 
significantly predicted by the following self-report measures; EDE-Q Restraint, EDE-
Q Eating Concern, EDE-Q Shape Concern, and PFS. When the D-IRAP measure was 
added it significantly increased the predictive validity of the hunger-scale (R2 change 
= .34), EDE-Q Eating Concern (R2 change = .20), BIDR Self Deception (R2 change = 
.35), BIDR Impression Management (R2 change = .31), and Global BIDR (R2 change 
= .22), PFS (R2 change = .22), and MAAS (R2 change = .29). 
 Similarly for the No-Restriction deprivation condition, eleven separate 
hierarchical logistic regression analyses were conducted. As before, for each model 
the explicit measure was entered as the predictor of weight category in the first step 
with the overall D-IRAP measure entered as the second step (see Table 4.5). Weight 
category was significantly predicted by; EDE-Q Restraint, Shape Concern and Weight 
 Overall D-IRAP Score 
Food-Hunger .22 
Global EDE-Q  .22 
EDE-Q – Restraint .11 
EDE-Q - Eating Concern .29* 
EDE-Q - Shape Concern .09 
EDE-Q - Weight Concern .23 
Total Behaviours .17 
BIDR -.13 
BIDR – SDE -.05 
BIDR – IM -.16 
PFS .21 
MAAS .27* 
Table 4.4. Correlations between the Overall Mean D-IRAP score and the Self-Report Hunger-Scale,  
the Eating  Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) and its subscales, the Balanced Inventory  
of Desirable Responding (BIDR) and its subscales, the Power of Food Scale, and the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale, 57 observations in total. 
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Concern, Global EDE-Q and PFS. The D-IRAP did not significantly improve the 
predictive validity of any of the explicit measures (all ps >.32). 
 Overall, therefore, the regression analyses indicated that the D-IRAP measure 
accounted for additional variance in the 2-hr deprivation condition when the explicit 
measures targeted issues concerned with reactions to food and also eating concern, but 
not weight concern. The D-IRAP measure also significantly improved upon the 
explicit measures of self-presentation bias and mindful awareness. In the Non-
Restriction condition, however, the D-IRAP measure failed to account for any 
additional variance across all of the explicit measures.  
4.2.9 Summary and Conclusions 
 The IRAP in the current study differentiated between the weight categories in 
the 2-hr food deprivation condition but not in the No-Restriction condition. Unlike the 
IRAP, the pattern of results for the explicit hunger measure did not differentiate 
among the groups (i.e., all four groups produced healthy food biases). Similarly, the 
BIDR and MAAS did not discriminate between the four groups. However, the EDE-Q 
and PFS measures both discriminated between the two weight categories, but no 
effects for deprivation state were observed. Correlations between the implicit and 
explicit measures yielded only two positive and significant correlations between the 
D-IRAP scores and EDE-Q Eating Concern and MAAS respectively. Given that the 
IRAP effects differentiated between the groups, logistic regression analyses were 
conducted to determine if the IRAP measures increased prediction of group status 
over the explicit measures. The D-IRAP measure significantly increased the 
predictive validity of the hunger-scale, EDE-Q Eating Concern, BIDR Self Deception, 
BIDR Impression Management, and Global BIDR, PFS, and MAAS explicit measures 
for the 2-hr food deprivation participants. The D-IRAP measure did not significantly 
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increase the predictive validity of any of the explicit measures for individuals in the 
No-Restriction groups. In short, unlike the Eat it NOW versus Eat it LATER IRAP 
employed in the previous study the Makes Me Feel Hungry Now versus Does Not 
Make Me Feel Hungry Now IRAP appeared to be affected by the weight and 
deprivation states of the participants. 
 
 
Step 1 
2-hr Deprivation State 
Step 2 
2-hr Deprivation State 
Predictor Variables B R² p Predictor Variables B R² p 
Food-Hunger .05 .01 .84 Food-Hunger + D-IRAP 10.65 .35 .02* 
EDE-Q Restraint 3.04 .68 .02* EDE-Q Restraint + D-IRAP 9.07 .79 .11 
EDE-Q  Eating Concern 2.47 .42 .01* EDE-Q Eating Concern + D-IRAP 8.97 .62 .05* 
EDE-Q Shape Concern 1.62 .62 .01* EDE-Q Shape Concern + D-IRAP  4.72 .65 .29 
EDE-Q Weight Concern 2.00 .69 .01 EDE-Q Weight Concern + D-IRAP 4.76 .72 .31 
Global EDE-Q 2.95 .73 .02* Global EDE-Q + D-IRAP 3.86 .75 .41 
BIDR Self Deception -.09 .01 .52 BIDR Self Deception + D-IRAP 10.01 .36 .01* 
BIDR Impression 
Management 
-.03 .01 .83 BIDR Impression Management + D-
IRAP 
8.93 .32 .01* 
Global BIDR -.04 .01 .62 Global BIDR + D-IRAP 8.97 .33 .01* 
PFS .07 .26 01* PFS + D-IRAP 8.08 .48 .02* 
MAAS -.62 .05 .18 MAAS + D-IRAP 8.56 .34 .01* 
Step 1 
No-Restriction Control 
  
 
 Step 2 
No-Restriction Control  
 
 
  
 
Predictor Variables B R² p Predictor Variables B R² p 
Food-Hunger -.11 .01 .64 Food-Hunger + D-IRAP .30 .01 .84 
EDE-Q Restraint 1.77 .45 .01* EDE-Q Restraint + D-IRAP 2.30 .47 .36 
EDE-Q Eating Concern 1.59 .21 .07 EDE-Q Eating Concern + D-IRAP .22 -.94 .58 
EDE-Q Shape Concern 1.34 .53 .01* EDE-Q Shape Concern + D-IRAP 3.19 .56 .32 
EDE-Q Weight Concern 1.82 .61 .01* EDE-Q Weight Concern + D-IRAP 3.24 .64 .33 
Global EDE-Q 2.16 .57 .01* Global EDE-Q + D-IRAP 3.05 .59 .32 
BIDR Self Deception .14 .03 .30 BIDR Self Deception + D-IRAP .27 .03 .86 
BIDR Impression 
Management 
.30 .16 .02 BIDR Impression Management + D-
IRAP 
1.04 .17 .53 
Global BIDR .16 .11 .05 Global BIDR + D-IRAP .66 .12 .67 
PFS .06 .15 .04* PFS + D-IRAP -.36 .15 .82 
MAAS .35 .02 .40 MAAS + D-IRAP .52 .02 .73 
 
Table 4.5. Summary of Hierarchical Logistical Regression analysis for the variables predicting weight- 
category (N = 57). 
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4.3 DISCUSSION 
 When two labels referring to hunger were inserted into the IRAP it 
successfully differentiated between obese and normal-weight groups in the 2-hr food 
deprivation condition, with obese individuals showing a bias for unhealthy foods, 
whereas the normal-weight individuals showed a bias for healthy foods. In the No-
Restriction condition, however, both groups produced weak healthy food biases. The 
results of the current study differ, therefore, from Study 1 of the current thesis and all 
previous implicit food attitude research conducted among obese and normal-weight 
individuals using the IAT, EAST and APP. That is, this is the first study to find a 
difference between obese and normal-weight individuals’ implicit attitudes to healthy 
and unhealthy foods. Note, that an APP study reported by Czyzewska, and Graham 
(2008) did find a difference between the weight categories, but in attitudes to sweet 
versus savoury unhealthy foods, rather than healthy and unhealthy food types. Given 
that Study 1 also employed the IRAP, but not the two hunger labels, this suggests that 
it was the focus on hunger, rather than the IRAP per se, that served to discriminate 
between the two weight-categories. In short, targeting the participants’ immediate 
emotional hunger reactions to food served to differentiate between the groups in a 
manner not observed in previous research using implicit measures. 
Unlike the IRAP, the pattern of results for the explicit hunger-scale did not 
differentiate among the groups (i.e., all four groups produced weak healthy food 
biases). This is consistent with the findings reported for all four groups on the explicit 
wanting-scale in Study 1. This indicates that the IRAP tapped into responses that were 
not captured by the explicit measures. Similarly, the MAAS did not discriminate 
between the four groups. However, the EDE-Q and PFS measures both discriminated 
between the two weight categories, but no effects for deprivation state were observed, 
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which is consistent with Study 1. Correlations between the implicit and explicit 
measures yielded only two positive and significant correlations between the D-IRAP 
scores and EDE-Q Eating Concern and MAAS, respectively. Hence, the higher the 
participants’ concerns over eating, and the higher their level of mindfulness, the larger 
their unhealthy foods bias on the IRAP. Interestingly, the BIDR did not correlate with 
the D-IRAP as in Study 1. The D-IRAP measure significantly increased the predictive 
validity of the hunger-scale, EDE-Q Eating Concern, BIDR Self Deception, BIDR 
Impression Management, and Global BIDR, PFS, and MAAS explicit measures for 
the 2-hr food deprivation participants; no such effects were observed for individuals 
in the No-Restriction groups. Overall, therefore, the findings of the current study 
indicate that implicit food hunger attitudes may be related to eating behaviours among 
obese and normal-weight individuals.  
 The label stimuli employed in the current study separated hunger into two 
dichotomised extremes “Hungry” versus “Not Hungry”. One possible criticism of this 
approach is that pictures of foods will frequently elicit some level of hunger response, 
except, of course, in those situations in which a participant has eaten a large meal 
immediately before arriving at the laboratory. Assuming that few participants would 
have done so, because eating a large meal in Ireland during the working day is 
relatively uncommon, it seems safe to assume that most participants would have 
responded with at least some hunger response to many of the food pictures. If this was 
the case, then the “Not Hungry” label may have reduced the ability of the IRAP to 
assess subtle differences between obese and normal-weight individuals’ implicit 
hunger attitudes. In order to address this possibility a partial replication of Study 2 
was conducted, but using the labels, Makes Me Feel VERY Hungry versus Makes Me 
Feel SLIGHTLY Hungry. Would the subtle hunger relation of “very-versus-slightly” 
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increase the sensitivity of the IRAP to individual differences in body-weight and 
deprivation state, relative to the previous study? 
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Chapter 5: Food Deprivation and Hunger Attitudes to Food along the Dimension 
of “Very” versus “Slightly” among Obese and Normal-Weight Individuals 
 The third study described in the current thesis sought to increase the ability of 
the IRAP employed in Study 2 to differentiate obese from normal-weight individuals’ 
implicit attitudes to food. Specifically, the label stimuli Makes Me Feel VERY Hungry 
Now and Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY Hungry Now were utilized. In addition, in order 
to reduce the work load and time required of participants the current study dropped 
the MAAS and PFS explicit measures. Apart from these changes, the current study 
was similar to the previous study.  
5.1 METHOD 
5.1.1 Participants 
Normal-weight Individuals  
 The same six screening criteria that were employed in Studies 1 and 2 for the 
normal-weight participants were employed in Study 3. Forty-two participants met 
these criteria and completed the study. The sample consisted of 20 females and 22 
males (age M = 21 years, range, 17-34; weight, BMI, M = 21.4 kg/m²) recruited from 
undergraduate students attending the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. No 
financial enticements were offered to the participants and all were naïve to the IRAP. 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of two groups, counterbalancing for 
gender. 
Obese Individuals  
 The same screening criteria utilized in Studies 1 and 2 for recruiting obese 
participants were applied in Study 3. Thirty-two obese participants completed the 
study. Sixteen females and sixteen males recruited from a sample of patients who 
were attending the Diabetes and Weight Management Clinic, St., Columcilles 
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Hospital, Loughlinstown, County Dublin (age M = 36 years; weight M = 51 kg/m²). 
Once again, participants had no previous experience with the IRAP and completed the 
study without financial incentives. The participants were allocated randomly to one of 
two groups, counterbalancing for gender. 
5.1.2 Setting 
  The settings were identical to Studies 1 and 2. 
5.1.3 Apparatus/Materials 
 The apparatus and materials were the same as those employed in Study 1 and 
2 except that the two label stimuli on the IRAP were changed to “Makes Me Feel 
VERY Hungry now” or “Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY Hungry now”. Furthermore, the 
hunger-scale was amended to correspond to the IRAP label stimuli. Specifically, the 
measure comprised of a 12-item questionnaire presented on 9-point Likert scales (i.e., 
“On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry the 12 food items make you feel now? 
“-4 (NOT Hungry),” “0 (SLIGHTLY Hungry),” and “4 (VERY Hungry)”? (See 
Appendix J). 
  Finally, an additional explicit measure was included, the liking-scale. 
Individuals were instructed to “Please mark in the appropriate spaces below your 
answer to the following questions on how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable 
(do NOT like the taste of) you find the 12 food items right now?” “-4 (NOT 
Palatable),” “0 (NEUTRAL),” and “4 (VERY PALATABLE)” (See Appendix K). 
The primary reason for including this scale was to determine if explicit liking food 
attitudes correlated with the implicit and/or explicit measures. 
 In order to reduce the work load on participants and the duration of the study 
the Power of Food Scale and Mindful Attention Awareness Scale included in Studies 
1 and 2 were removed from the current study. 
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5.1.4 Procedure 
 The experimental sequence was identical to that used in Studies 1 and 2, 
except, as noted above, the participants completed an amended hunger-scale after 
completing the IRAP. The IRAP procedure was similar to that utilised in Studies 1 
and 2, except that different label stimuli were used “Makes Me Feel VERY Hungry 
now” versus “Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY Hungry now”; see Figure 5.1). The IRAP 
instructions paralleled those used previously but were amended to accommodate the 
different label stimuli. Consistent with the previous study, the IRAP involved 
alternating between two different blocks of trials. All participants commenced the 
IRAP with a pro-unhealthy/anti-healthy block of trials, which involved the following 
four trial-types: “Makes Me Feel VERY Hungry now – Unhealthy Food – True”; 
“Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY Hungry now – Unhealthy Food – False”; “Makes Me 
Feel VERY Hungry now – Healthy Food – False”; “Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY 
Hungry now – Healthy Food – True”. The next block of trials was defined as pro-
healthy/anti-unhealthy and involved the following four trial-types; “Makes Me Feel 
VERY Hungry now – Unhealthy Food – False”; “Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY 
Hungry now – Unhealthy Food – True”; “Makes Me Feel VERY Hungry now – 
Healthy Food – True”; “Makes Me Feel SLIGHTLY Hungry now – Healthy Food – 
False”. Thus all odd numbered blocks of IRAP trials were pro-unhealthy/anti-healthy 
whereas all even numbered blocks of trials were pro-healthy/anti-unhealthy5.  
                                                 
5
 In the Normal-weight No-Restriction condition the order in which participants completed both the 
IRAP practice and test blocks was counterbalanced. That is, half of the participants completed the 
blocks in the order described above, with the remaining half completing them in a Pro-Healthy-food 
first sequence (i.e., Practice Block 1 = Pro-Healthy-Food; Practice Block 2 = Pro-Unhealthy-Food, and 
so on; Test Block 1 = Pro-Healthy-Food; Test Block 2 = Pro-Unhealthy-Food, and so on). Subsequent 
analyses indicated that IRAP sequence did not have any significant effect in the Normal-Weight No-
Restriction condition. Given that IRAP sequence has not functioned as a significant main or interacting 
variable across a number of previous IRAP studies (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Milne, 
Power, & Stewart, I, 2006; Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008; Cullen, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; 
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After the IRAP, participants completed the self-report measures; hunger-scale, 
the EDE-Q5, and the BIDR alone in their booths. Having completed the 
questionnaires the participants were informed it was the end of the experiment, they 
were thanked, debriefed and any questions they had were answered by the 
experimenter. 
 
 
5.2 RESULTS 
Pre-Analysis Checks 
 Similar to Studies 1 and 2, initial screening checks were used to determine if 
there were significant differences on the explicit measures (Age, BMI, EDE-Q5, 
                                                                                                                                            
Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009),  counterbalancing IRAP sequence was not 
employed with the remaining three conditions in the current study. 
 
Figure 5.1. The four IRAP trial-types. 
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BIDR) between the deprivation states for each weight category. A series of 
independent t-tests performed on each explicit measure with deprivation state as the 
between group variable for each weight category all proved non-significant (all ps > 
.19).  
5.2.1 Implicit Measures 
Data Preparation  
 The data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using the same strategy 
adopted for Studies 1 and 2. The data for all 74 participants were included in the final 
analyses (22 in the normal-weight 2-hr group, 20 in the normal-weight No-Restriction 
group, 16 in the obese 2-hr group and 16 in the obese No-Restriction group). 
 Due to the age difference between the normal-weight (M = 21 years, SE = .37) 
and obese groups (M = 36 years, SE = 1.73) it was necessary to determine if age 
interacted with deprivation state and/or weight category. If no significant interaction 
was obtained, age could be ignored from subsequent IRAP analyses. The distribution 
in ages for the normal and obese groups was dramatically different, and thus it was 
not appropriate to conduct a single ANCOVA including both groups. Furthermore, 
age data for thirteen normal-weight No-Restriction group participants were lost due to 
a software recording problem, and thus it was not possible to conduct an ANCOVA 
with the normal-weight participants. However, a simple correlational analysis 
between age and the D-IRAP score for the normal-weight participants was weak and 
non significant (r = -.17, p = .37). For the obese groups, an ANCOVA was conducted 
on the D-IRAP score with deprivation state (2-hr versus No-Restriction) as the 
between group variable and age as the covariate. The age by deprivation state 
interaction was non-significant (p = .97), and after adjusting for age the main effect 
for deprivation condition proved to be significant, F (1, 29) = 5,70, p = .02, η2 = .17. 
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Given the absence of any significant effects for age, this variable was removed from 
all subsequent IRAP analyses.    
IRAP Analyses  
The overall mean D-IRAP scores divided by weight category and deprivation 
state are presented in Figure 5.2. The D-IRAP effects for the normal weight 
individuals indicated a healthy bias for the 2-hr deprivation state, but an unhealthy 
bias in the No-Restriction condition. The opposite pattern was observed for the obese 
groups (2-hr = unhealthy; No-Restriction = healthy), although the effect for the No-
Restriction group was relatively weak. The D-IRAP data were subjected to a 2x2 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with weight category (normal-weight versus obese), 
and deprivation state (2-hr versus No-Restriction) as between groups variables. The 
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between weight category and deprivation 
state, F (1, 70) = 18.53, p = .0001, η2 = .21, but all other effects were non-significant 
(all ps > .34). Four one-way between-participant ANOVAs were used to conduct 
planned comparisons between weight category and deprivation state. A significant 
difference was found between the normal-weight and obese groups for the 2-hr 
condition, F (1, 34) = 10.66, p = .003, η2 = .24, and for the No-Restriction condition, 
F (1, 36) = 7.72, p = .009, η2 = .18. Comparisons between the deprivation states (2-hr 
versus No-Restriction) for each weight category were also significant; normal-weight, 
F (1, 40) = 13.73, p = .0006, η2 = .26; and obese, F (1, 30) = 6.33, p = .017, η2 = .17.   
Four one-sample t-tests were used to determine if the D-IRAP effects for each 
of the deprivation states for both weight-categories differed significantly from zero. 
The effects for the normal-weight groups were significant; 2-hr, t (19) = -2.20, p = 
.04, No-Restriction, t (21) = 3.12, p = .005. The effect for the obese 2-hr group was 
also significant, t (15) = 2.51, p = .02), but not for the No-Restriction group (p > .41). 
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Overall, therefore, the normal-weight individuals showed a healthy food bias at two 
hours deprivation but an unhealthy food bias when deprivation was not controlled. 
The obese individuals showed the opposite pattern, although the effect was weak and 
non-significant when deprivation was uncontrolled. 
 
Figure 5.2. Overall mean D-IRAP scores, with standard errors, for the normal-weight and obese 
groups in the 2-hr and No-Restriction food deprivation conditions.  
 
Split-half correlations. The split-half correlation, with a Spearman-Brown 
correction, was moderate and significant, r = -.2.2, n = 55, p = .48. These data thus 
provide a reasonably strong indicator of internal consistency for the IRAP. 
     5.2.2 Explicit Measures 
5.2.3 Hunger-scales  
Similar to Studies 1 and 2 two mean hunger-scores were first calculated from 
the 9-point Likert scales. Thus, a positive score indicated an unhealthy-food/anti-
healthy-food bias and a negative score indicated the opposite (healthy/anti-unhealthy 
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bias)6. The normal-weight 2-hr group produced a small unhealthy food bias (M = .46, 
SE = .48) with the remaining three groups all demonstrating the opposite effect 
(normal-weight No-Restriction, M = -.14, SE = .43; obese 2-hr, M = -.20, SE = .50; 
obese No-Restriction, M = -.64, SE = .45). A 2x2 ANOVA with weight category and 
deprivation state as between-participant variables yielded no significant effects (all ps 
> .22). Thus, unlike the IRAP the hunger-scales failed to differentiate among the four 
different groups even though the same pictorial stimuli were used. 
5.2.4 Liking-scales   
Overall mean relative liking-scores were obtained from the 9-point liking-
scales using the same analytic strategy as was employed with the hunger-scales7. The 
normal-weight 2-hr group produced a small unhealthy food bias (M = .48, SE = .50) 
and the normal-weight No-Restriction participants demonstrated a small healthy food 
bias (M = -.16, SE = .53). The obese individuals produced the opposite pattern; 2-hr 
(M = -.04, SE = .49) and No-Restriction (M = .12, SE = .53). A 2x2 ANOVA with 
weight category and deprivation state as independent variables yielded no significant 
effects (all ps > .39). Once again, unlike the IRAP the explicit measure did not 
discriminate between weight class or hunger state using the same pictorial stimuli.  
5.2.5 Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) 
                                                 
6
 Given the age difference between the normal-weight and obese groups, and the missing age data for 
the normal-weight No-Restriction participants, separate analyses for the two weight categories were 
again conducted. A correlational analysis between age and the hunger score for the normal-weight 
groups was significant (r = -.39, p = .03), but the ANCOVA for the obese groups indicated that the age 
by deprivation state interaction was non-significant (p = .56). After adjusting for age, there was a non-
significant main effect for deprivation condition (p = .41). Given that only one other explicit measure 
correlated with age (Liking-scales) from across 20 statistical tests, and that these finding were not 
replicated in two previous studies, it was decided to remove age from the analysis of Hunger- and 
Liking-scales. 
 
7
 Similar to the hunger scales, a correlational analysis between age and the liking score for the normal-
weight groups was significant (r = -.42, p = .02), but for the obese groups, the ANCOVA indicated that 
the age by deprivation state interaction was non-significant (p = .60); after adjusting for age, there was 
a non-significant main effect for deprivation condition (p = .94). Consistent with the strategy adopted 
for the hunger scales (see footnote 1) age was removed from the analysis of the Liking-scales.  
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Similar to the previous study, Restraint, Shape Concern, Eating Concern, 
Weight Concern and Global EDE-Q were calculated from the 7-point rating scales for 
each of the subscale items. Furthermore, mean scores for the behavioural items for 
each of the four groups were calculated as per previous studies8. The means and 
standard deviations for the global EDE-Q score and the subscale scores are reported in 
Table 5.1. 
Attitude items. In general, the pattern of differences between the normal-
weight and obese groups on the EDE-Q was broadly similar to the norms reported in 
two previous studies (Fairburn & Beglin, 1994; Mond, Hay, Rodgers, Owen, & 
Beumont 2004), although the scores tended to be lower for both groups in the current 
study. The mean scores for each of the attitude subscales for each of the normal-
weight groups were lower than for their corresponding obese groups. In comparing 
within each weight category, the scores for the normal-weight group were lower in the 
2-hr condition for each subscale, except for Restraint. For the obese groups, the scores 
were lower in the 2-hr condition for only one subscale, Eating Concern. Five 2x2 
ANOVAs were used to analyze the data for each subscale and for the Global EDE-Q, 
with weight category, and deprivation state as between group variables. In each case, 
only significant effects were obtained for weight category (see Table 5.2; all other ps 
> .17). Thus, overall, the obese groups reported higher levels of pathological attitudes 
to food on each of the EDE-Q5 subscales relative to the normal-weight individuals.  
 Behavioural items. The scores for the normal-weight groups (2-hr, M = 2.85, 
SD = 4.30, No-Restriction M = 5.86, SD = 6.50) were considerably lower than for the 
obese groups (2-hr, M = 17.25, SD = 21.84, No-Restriction, M = 13.44, SD = 13.66). 
                                                 
8
 The correlational and ANCOVA analyses conducted for the Hunger- and Liking-scales were also 
applied to the global and EDE-Q subscales, behavioural items, and to the BIDR data (presented 
subsequently), and in each case non-significant results were obtained for age.  
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Within groups, the normal-weight No-Restriction group had a slightly higher score 
than the 2-hr group; for the obese groups the opposite effect was observed. A 2x2 
ANOVA, with weight category and deprivation state as the between group variables, 
yielded a significant effect for weight category F (1, 70) = 13.70, p = .0004, η2 = .16, 
with all other effects non-significant (all ps > .25). Consistent with the attitudinal 
subscales obese groups reported significantly higher levels of pathological eating 
behaviours than the normal-weight groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subscale Normal-
Weight 
2-hr 
Group 
Mean 
(SD) 
Normal-
Weight 
No-
Restriction 
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
No-
Restriction 
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Fairburn and 
Beglin 
(1994) 
Community 
Based Norms 
Mean (SD) 
Elder, Grilo, 
Masheb, 
Rothschild, 
Burke-
Martindale, 
and Brody 
(2006) 
Obese 
Scores 
Mean (SD) 
Restraint .70 (.82) .66 (.69) 2.90 (1.39) 2.46 (1.44) 1.25 (1.32) 2.8 (1.30) 
Eating 
Concern 
150 (.22) .27 (.35) 1.13 (1.35) 1.59 (1.33) .62 (.0.86) 1.70 (1.30) 
Shape 
Concern 
1.11 (.98) 1.13 (.80) 3.66 (1.25) 3.53 (1.12) 2.15 (1.60) 4.10 (1.30) 
Weight 
Concern 
.71 (.73) .85 (.73) 3.20 (1.18) 2.96 (1.03) 1.59 (.1.37) 3.30 (1.00) 
Global 
EDE-Q 
.69 (.57) .73 (.51) 2.72 (1.11) 2.64 (.77) 1.55 (1.21) 3.00 (0.90) 
Table 5.1. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) 
 subscales items  (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern), the Global EDE-Q score). 
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*P < .001 
 
5.2.5 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
 Similar to the previous study, mean Self-Deception (SDE), Impression 
Management (IM) and Global BIDR scores were calculated for each weight category 
and deprivation state using the 7-point Likert scales for each subscale. The means and 
standard deviations for each weight category and deprivation state are presented in 
Table 5.3. Three separate 2x2 ANOVAs, with weight category and deprivation state 
as variables, were conducted and these each produced a significant main effect for 
weight category on Self-Deception, F (1, 70) = 6.05, p = .016, η2 = .08, Impression 
Management F (1, 70) = 5.46, p = .022, η2 = .07, and Global BIDR, F (1, 70) = 7.91, p 
= .006, η2 = .10; all other effects and interactions were non-significant (all ps > .20). 
Thus the obese groups reported significantly higher levels of Self-Deception, 
Impression Management and Global BIDR relative to the normal-weight groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
Subscale Effect df F p η2 
Restraint Weight 
Category 
1, 70 61.64 .00* .47 
Eating 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 70 28.91 .00* .29 
Shape 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 70 105.29 .00* .60 
Weight 
Concern 
Weight 
Category 
1, 70 115.68 .00* .62 
Global 
EDE-Q 
Weight 
Category 
1, 70 128.30 .00* .65 
 
Table 5.2 Results for the Five Two-Way ANOVAs for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire  
(EDE-Q5) subscales (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern) and for the  
Global EDE-Q, with weight category (normal-weight, and obese), deprivation state (2-hr, and  
No-Restriction) as between group variables.  
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5.2.6 Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
A correlation matrix of implicit and explicit measures is presented in Table 
5.4, which explores the relationships between the 11 explicit measures and the D-
IRAP measure. Non-significant correlations were obtained in all cases (all rs < .13, all 
ps >.26). 
 
 
 Overall D-IRAP Score 
Food-Hunger .02 
Liking-Food .03 
Global EDE-Q  .08 
EDE-Q - Restraint .05 
EDE-Q - Eating Concern -.04 
EDE-Q - Shape Concern .11 
EDE-Q - Weight Concern .12 
Total Behaviours .10 
Global BIDR .10 
BIDR - SDE .02 
BIDR - IM .10 
 
5.2.7 Prediction of Group Status 
 Ten separate hierarchical logistic regression analyses were conducted for the 
2-hr deprivation condition. For each model the explicit measure was entered as the 
predictor of weight category in the first step and the overall D-IRAP measure was 
Subscale Normal-Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Normal-Weight 
No-Restriction 
Group  
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Obese 
No-Restriction  
Group 
Mean (SD) 
Self-Deception  3.05 (2.26) 4.09 (2.83) 4.94 (2.91) 5.75 (4.24) 
Impression 
Management 
5.35 (3.15) 5.18 (3.26) 7.13 (3.98) 7.56 (4.86) 
Global BIDR 8.40 (4.56) 9.27(5.44) 12.06 (5.58) 13.31 (7.74) 
 
Table 5.3. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR) subscales items (Self-Deception and Impression Management) and the Overall BIDR score. 
Table 5.4. Correlations between the Overall Mean D-IRAP score and the Self-Report Food-Hunger and 
Liking-Scales, the Eating  Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) and its subscales,  
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding  (BIDR) and its subscales; 74 observations in total. 
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entered into the model in the second step (see Table 5.5). For the 2-hr deprivation 
condition weight category was significantly predicted by the following self-report 
measures; EDE-Q Restraint, EDE-Q Eating Concern, Global EDE-Q, and Global 
BIDR. When the D-IRAP measure was added it significantly increased the predictive 
validity of hunger-scale (R2 change = .20), liking-scale (R2 change = .21), EDE-Q 
Restraint (R2 change = .12), EDE-Q Eating Concern (R2 change = .14), BIDR Self 
Deception (R2 change = .18), BIDR Impression Management (R2 change = .18), and 
Global BIDR (R2 change = .17). 
 Similarly for the No-Restriction deprivation condition, ten separate 
hierarchical logistic regression analyses were conducted. As before, for each model 
the explicit measure was entered as the predictor of weight category in the first step 
with the overall D-IRAP measure entered as the second step (see Table 5.5). Weight 
category was significantly predicted by; EDE-Q Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape 
Concern, Weight Concern, and the Global EDE-Q measure. The D-IRAP significantly 
improved the predictive validity of hunger-scale (R2 change = .14), liking-scale (R2 
change = .15), EDE-Q Restraint (R2 change = .10), BIDR Self Deception (R2 change = 
.12), BIDR Impression Management (R2 change = .15) and Global BIDR (R2 change = 
.12); the increase in predictive validity was marginally significant for EDE-Q Eating 
Concern (R2 change = .08) and Shape concern (R2 change = .10). 
 Overall, therefore, the regression analyses indicated that the D-IRAP measure 
accounted for additional variance when the explicit measures targeted issues 
concerned with reactions to food, with a trend that also included concern over body 
shape, but not over weight concern. The D-IRAP measure also significantly improved 
upon the explicit measures of self-presentation bias. 
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5.2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 The IRAP in the current study differentiated between the weight categories in 
the 2-hr food deprivation condition and the No-Restriction condition. Unlike the 
IRAP, the pattern of results for the explicit hunger and liking scales did not 
differentiate among the groups. The EDE-Q and BIDR measures discriminated 
between weight categories but not within deprivation states. The obese groups 
produced significantly higher levels of pathological EDE-Q behaviours and attitudes 
to food as well as significantly higher levels of BIDR, Self Presentation and 
Impression Management characteristics than the normal-weight participants. 
Correlations between the implicit and explicit measures revealed no significant 
relationships between the D-IRAP scores and any of the explicit measures. The D-
IRAP measure significantly increased predictive validity for seven of the explicit 
measures for the 2-hr food deprivation participants, and for six of the explicit 
measures for the No-Restriction groups. In short, employing the “very-versus- 
slightly” hunger labels in the IRAP appeared to increase its sensitivity, in that it 
differentiated between the two weight categories for each of the deprivation states (in 
the previous study the IRAP did not show this discriminate between the groups in the 
No-Restriction condition). 
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*P < .05 
**P < .001 
 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
 Employing the relatively subtle relation “very-versus-slightly” in the IRAP 
replicated the effects observed in the 2-hr food deprivation condition in Study 2 for 
Step 1  
2-hr Deprivation State 
Step 2  
2-hr Deprivation State 
Predictor Variables B R² p Predictor Variables B R² p 
Food-Hunger -.16 .02 .34 Food-Hunger + D-IRAP 5.69 .22 .01* 
Liking-Hunger -.12 .01 .45 Liking-Hunger + D-IRAP 6.17 .22 .01* 
EDE-Q Restraint 1.65 .47 .00** EDE-Q Restraint + D-IRAP 6.68 .59 .04* 
EDE-Q  Eating Concern 2.43 .25 .03* EDE-Q Eating Concern + D-IRAP 5.91 .39 .02* 
EDE-Q Shape Concern 2.28 .59 .01* EDE-Q Shape Concern + D-IRAP  5.22 .65 .14 
EDE-Q Weight Concern 8.67 .78 .12 EDE-Q Weight Concern + D-IRAP 3.07 .79 .45 
Global EDE-Q 4.07 .69 .01* Global EDE-Q + D-IRAP 6.08 .75 .13 
BIDR Self Deception .32 .10 .05 BIDR Self Deception + D-IRAP 6.42 .28 .02* 
BIDR Impression 
Management 
.15 .04 .15 BIDR Impression Management + 
D-IRAP 
5.71 .22 .01* 
Global BIDR 15 .09 .05* Global BIDR + D-IRAP 6.14 .26 .02* 
Step 1 No-Restriction 
Control 
   Step 2  
No-Restriction Control  
   
Food-Hunger -.143 .01 .43 Food-Hunger + D-IRAP -5.60 .15 .02* 
Liking-Hunger -5.60 .00 .64 Liking-Hunger + D-IRAP -5.57 .15 .02* 
EDE-Q Restraint 1.82 .40 .00** EDE-Q Restraint + D-IRAP -5.80 .50 .04* 
EDE-Q Eating Concern 3.05 .42 .00** EDE-Q Eating Concern + D-IRAP -5.17 .50 .06 
EDE-Q Shape Concern 2.44 .62 .00** EDE-Q Shape Concern + D-IRAP -7.46 .72 .06 
EDE-Q Weight Concern 2.82 .62 .00** EDE-Q Weight Concern +  
D-IRAP 
-5.31 .67 .12 
Global EDE-Q 4.79 .78 .00** Global EDE-Q + D-IRAP -6.88 .82 .20 
BIDR Self Deception .145 .04 .17 BIDR Self Deception + D-IRAP -5.29 .16 .03* 
BIDR Impression 
Management 
.152 .06 .09 BIDR Impression Management + 
D-IRAP 
-5.80 .21 .02* 
Global BIDR .10 .07 .08 Global BIDR + D-IRAP -5.37 .20 .03* 
 
Table 5.5. Summary of Hierarchical Logistical Regression analysis for the variables predicting weight- 
category (N = 74). 
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the obese individuals (i.e., a pro-unhealthy food bias) and for the normal-weight 
participants (i.e., a healthy food bias). However, these labels also discriminated obese 
from normal-weight participants in the No-Restriction condition, with the normal-
weight individuals demonstrating a pro-unhealthy food bias and the obese a weak 
healthy food bias. This latter effect was not recorded in the previous study. In sum, it 
appears that increasing the subtly of the relational hunger response to food on the 
IRAP served to improve the measure’s ability to differentiate between the weight 
categories and deprivation states. This level of discrimination has not been obtained in 
previously published research using other implicit measures. 
In contrast to the IRAP, the neither the explicit hunger- nor liking-scales 
discriminated among the groups, replicating the findings from Study 1 and 2. Again, 
this demonstrates that the IRAP appears to be capturing responses not being assessed 
by the explicit measures. The results for the EDE-Q measure were similar to Studies 1 
and 2 (i.e., the EDE-Q discriminated between the weight categories but not within 
deprivation states). Unlike the previous two studies, the Global BIDR and BIDR 
subscales, Self-Deception (SD) and Impression Managements (IM), also 
differentiated between the weight categories (no effects were observed within 
deprivation state). At the current time it remains unclear why these differences were 
observed only in the current study.  
Unlike studies 1 and 2, none of the explicit measures correlated with the 
implicit measure. Furthermore, the D-IRAP measure increased the ability of seven of 
the explicit measures to predict weight category in the 2-hr food deprivation condition 
(i.e., the hunger-scale, liking-scale, EDE-Q Restraint, EDE-Q Eating Concern, BIDR 
Self Deception, BIDR Impression Management, and Global BIDR); and for six of the 
explicit measures in the No-Restriction condition (hunger-scale, liking-scale, EDE-Q 
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Restraint, BIDR Self Deception, BIDR Impression Management and Global BIDR 
and marginally significant for EDE-Q Eating Concern and Shape concern). 
Interestingly, with regard to the EDE-Q, the IRAP increased predictive validity for 
those subscales that targeted eating related attitudes (i.e., hunger, liking, restraint and 
eating concern), rather than body and weight related concerns. Given that the IRAP 
labels and target stimuli focused on hunger and food, these findings appear to support 
the precision of the measure. In other words, the current IRAP appeared sensitive to 
specific features of eating disordered psychopathology.  
 The most obvious difference in the pattern of IRAP effects between the 
previous and current study is that the normal-weight No-Restriction group produced a 
pro-unhealthy food bias (in the previous study a weak pro-healthy effect was 
observed). In contrast, the pattern of results for the obese participants remained 
relatively unchanged across the two studies. Given that the only substantive difference 
between the studies was the use of the more subtle labels (very-versus-slightly), it 
appears that they impacted largely on the normal-weight participants. This is an 
interesting result and it will be revisited in Chapter 9. 
Overall, the findings obtained thus far in the research programme highlight the 
potential of the “very versus slightly” hunger-IRAP for future investigations of 
implicit food attitudes among obese and normal-weight individuals. The study 
reported in the next chapter aimed to validate the analytic precision of this particular 
IRAP even further by assessing normal-weight participants’ performances while also 
measuring their neurological responses using electroencephalograms (EEGs). 
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Chapter 6: Food Deprivation Effects on the “Very” versus “Slightly” IRAP while 
Recording Electroencephalograms 
Study 4 aimed to further validate the analytic precision of the IRAP used in 
the previous study by assessing normal-weight participants’ performances while also 
measuring their neurological responses using electroencephalograms (EEGs). 
Specifically, recordings were taken from multiple EEG signals, while participants 
completed the IRAP, and these signals were then transformed into event-related 
potentials (ERPs; e.g., Kutas, 1993; Kutas & Hilliard, 1984). This method of 
recording neural activity is relatively noninvasive and inexpensive, and allows 
researchers to investigate the neurophysiological processes underlying functions such 
as perception, semantic relations, and reasoning (see Barnes-Holmes, Staunton, 
Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, Comins, Walsh et al. 2005; Barnes-Holmes, Regan, Barnes-
Holmes, Commins, Walsh, & Stewart et al. 2005).  
 Generating ERP data involves time-locking the EEG signals to a particular 
series of events and then averaging the signals across trials. The process of averaging 
allows the researcher to distinguish the brain’s normal background activity from the 
activity produced by the stimuli presented in the experiment. In effect, each EEG 
signal for a particular set of stimuli is collated and averaged to produce a single 
waveform for each site, and then these waveforms are averaged across participants to 
provide “grand average” waveforms that provide group-based measures of the effect 
of the targeted stimulus or stimuli. 
 There is a range of waveforms associated with ERP measures. Some ERPs, for 
example, are thought to be correlated with specific cognitive processes, such as 
differentiating different auditory stimuli from one another or understanding words. 
These ERPs commonly occur at around 300 or 400 ms after stimulus onset. The use 
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of ERP measures with the hunger-IRAP in the current study was entirely exploratory, 
and thus no specific predictions were made pertaining to the ERP waveforms that 
might emerge. One 
ERP measure, however, that seemed particularly pertinent to the IRAP is the N400, a 
late negative waveform (see Holcomb & Anderson, 1993; Kounios & Holcomb, 
1992). The N400 is usually produced when participants are required to respond to 
stimuli that are unexpected, unrelated, or wrongly paired in some sense (known as low 
cloze probability). Presenting pairs of words that are semantically unrelated, for 
example, tends to produce an N400, whilst words from the same semantic categories 
do not. 
 Insofar as pro-unhealthy/anti-healthy food trials on the hunger-IRAP require 
“incorrect” responses for normal-weight individuals in a 2-hr food deprivation state, a 
more negative waveform may emerge for these trials relative to pro-healthy/anti-
unhealthy food trials. Indeed, this is the general pattern of results obtained in the only 
study that has measured EEG signals while participants completed an IRAP (Barnes-
Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008). On balance, the previous study 
was conducted using verbal relations that did not pertain to food or hunger (e.g., 
Pleasant – Holiday – Similar). Given that the current study will focus on hunger 
reactions (e.g., Very Hungry -- Unhealthy-food – True) it is quite possible that 
different EEG results will emerge. 
 In Study 4, separate EEG waveforms, recorded across a range of sites, were 
collected while the participants completed the IRAP. A comparison could thus be 
made between the waveforms associated with the two types of blocks presented on the 
hunger-IRAP (i.e., pro-unhealthy versus pro-healthy). 
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6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
 The same six screening criteria that were employed in Studies 1, 2, and 3 were 
applied in the current study for the normal-weight participants. Fourteen participants 
met these criteria and completed the study. The sample consisted of 7 females and 7 
males (age M = 25 years, range, 19-46; weight, BMI, M = 21.49 kg/m²) recruited from 
undergraduate students attending the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. No 
financial enticements were offered to the participants and all were naïve to the IRAP.  
6.1.2 Apparatus/Materials. 
 The IRAP, apparatus, and questionnaire materials were identical to those 
employed in Study 3. Additionally, participants conducted the entire study in an 
electrically shielded room in the human neuroscience laboratory in the Department of 
Psychology at NUI, Maynooth. A Brain Amp MR (Class IIa, Type BF), with 
approved control software (Brain Vision Recorder 1.0), and electrode cap (BrainCap 
MR) were used to record the EEG signals during the IRAP task. Two Dell computers 
(Pentium 4), one controlling the Brain Amp and the other the IRAP, were utilised for 
the experiment. The ERPs data were analysed using approved analysis software 
(Brain Vision Analyser 1.0). Hardware and software were manufactured and supplied 
by Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany.  
6.1.3 Procedure 
 The IRAP procedure and instructions were identical to those utilised in the 2-
hr food-deprivation condition in Study 3. In contrast to the previous studies, however, 
approximately 45 mins were required to complete the electrode placements and 
establish appropriate impedance levels for all of the electrode sites. Evoked potentials 
were recorded and analysed from 128 sintered AG/AG-CI scalp electrodes positioned 
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according to international 10-20 system. The central vertex electrode was used as a 
reference and the Nz as ground. Amplifier resolution was 0.1µV (range +/- 
3.2768mV) and the bandwidth was set at 50Hz. All electrode impedances were at or 
below 10 ohms. The EEG was collected continuously and edited off-line. Data were 
analyzed from the following sites: F3, F4, F5, F6, C1, C2, C3, C4, P3, P4, P5 and P6. 
 When participants had completed the IRAP, the electrode cap was removed 
and they completed the explicit measures. Finally, they were thanked and debriefed.  
6.2 RESULTS 
Implicit Measures 
Data Preparation   
 The data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using the same strategy 
adopted in Studies 1, 2, and 3. The data for two participants were removed due to 
artifacts recorded in the EEG signals (see below), leaving data for twelve (normal-
weight) participants.  
6.2.1 IRAP Analyses  
The overall mean D-IRAP score for the normal-weight participants in a 2-hr 
food deprivation condition was 1.3 (SE = .036), thereby indicating the healthy bias 
observed for this type of participant and condition in the previous study. A one-
sample t-test revealed that the D-IRAP effect differed significantly from zero, t (13) = 
-3.56, p = .004. A post-hoc analysis using an independent t-test were conducted to 
determine if there was a difference between the D-IRAP scores from the current study 
with the D-IRAP scores from the normal-weight 2-hr group from Study 3. No 
significant difference was found (p > .83). Overall, therefore, the current study 
replicated the healthy food bias observed previously with normal-weight participants 
in a 2-hour deprivation condition. 
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Split-half correlations. The split-half correlation, with a Spearman-Brown 
correction, approached significance, r = .47, n = 14, p = .09. 
6.2.2 Explicit Measures 
6.2.3 Hunger-scales  
Two mean hunger scores were calculated using the 9-point Likert scales as per 
Study 3. Thus, a positive score indicated an unhealthy-food/anti-healthy-food bias and 
a negative score indicated the opposite (healthy/anti-unhealthy bias). Participants 
produced a very weak unhealthy food bias (M = .09, SE = .43). Post-hoc analyses 
using an independent t-test on the food-hunger score from the current study versus the 
food-hunger score from the normal-weight participants in the 2-hr condition in Study 
3 revealed a non-significant effect (p > .59). 
6.2.4 Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) 
Similar to Study 3, Restraint, Shape Concern, Eating Concern, Weight 
Concern and Global EDE-Q were calculated from the 7-point rating scales for each of 
the subscale items. The means and standard deviations for the global EDE-Q score 
and the subscale scores are reported in Table 6.1. 
Attitude items. In general, the pattern of scores for the normal-weight 
participants on the EDE-Q was broadly similar to the norms reported by Fairburn and 
Beglin (1994), although the scores were all lower. Post-hoc analyses were conducted 
on the subscales and Global EDEQ score using five independent t-tests comparing the 
participants in the current study with those from Study 3 (normal-weight 2-hr 
deprivation condition). All effects were non-significant (all ps > .29). 
Behavioural items. The participants’ overall mean total score was 3.29 (SD = 
5.20). Post-hoc analyses were conducted using an independent t-test to compare the 
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current behavioural data with that obtained from Study 3 for the normal-weight, 2-hr 
deprivation group. Once again, a non-significant effect was found (p > .13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.5 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
Similar to Study 3, participants mean Self-Deception (SDE), Impression 
Management (IM) and Global BIDR scores were assessed using the 7-point Likert 
scales for each subscale. The means and standard deviations for SDE, IM and Global 
BIDR are presented in Table 6.2. Post-hoc analyses were conducted on the subscales 
and Global score using three independent t-tests to compare the data from the current 
study with that of Study 3 (normal-weight 2-hr group). All effects were non-
significant (all ps > .22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subscale Normal-
Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Experiment 3 
Normal 
Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Fairburn and 
Beglin (1994) 
Community 
Based Norms 
Mean (SD) 
Restraint .41 (.90) .70 (.82) 1.25 (1.32) 
Eating Concern .37 (.89) .15 (.22) .62 (.0.86) 
Shape Concern 1.08 (1.5) 1.11 (.98) 2.15 (1.60) 
Weight Concern .69 (1.05) .71 (.73) 1.59 (.1.37) 
Global EDE-Q .64 (.88) .69 (.57) .1.55 (1.21) 
Subscale Normal-Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Study 3 
Normal-Weight 
2-hr Group 
Mean (SD) 
Self-Deception  4.29 (.3.45) 3.05 (2.26) 
Impression Management 5.57. (4.40) 5.35 (3.15) 
Global BIDR 9.86 (7.00) 8.40 (4.56) 
Table 6.1. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire  
(EDE-Q5) Attitudinal subscales items (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern),  
the Global EDE-Q score). 
 
 
Table 6.2. The Means and Standard Deviations for the Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR) subscales items (Self-Deception and Impression Management) and the Overall BIDR score. 
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6.2.6 Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
A correlation matrix of implicit and explicit measures is presented in Table 
6.3, which explores the relationships between the ten explicit measures and the D-
IRAP score. Non-significant correlations were obtained in all cases (all r = > -.41, ps 
>.15), except for two marginally significant correlations, between the D-IRAP score 
and the hunger-scale (r = .51, p = .06), and the D-IRAP score and the EDE-Q 
Restraint (r = -.46, p = .10). Thus, higher D-IRAP scores (i.e., unhealthy bias) 
marginally predicted higher levels of explicit hunger preferences for unhealthy foods 
and decreased levels of excessively controlled eating.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P < .10 
 
6.2.7 EEG data 
The continuous EEG signals for each of the 12 participants were filtered (0.53 
Hz, time constant = 0.3s, 24dB/Octave roll-off) and then segmented for pro-unhealthy 
and pro-healthy trials. Segments were divided into 1,000ms epochs commencing 
100ms before the onset of the stimuli on each trial (overlapping segments were 
removed). Vertical and horizontal ocular artifacts were corrected and any segments on 
 Overall D-IRAP Score 
Food-Hunger .51* 
Global EDE-Q  -.18 
EDE-Q - Restraint -.46* 
EDE-Q - Eating Concern -.24 
EDE-Q - Shape Concern -.01 
EDE-Q - Weight Concern -.02 
Total Behaviours .08 
Global BIDR -.26 
BIDR - SDE -.41 
BIDR - IM -.01 
Table 6.3. Correlations between the Overall Mean D-IRAP score and the Self-Report Food-Hunger, the  
Eating  Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) and its subscales, the Balanced Inventory of  
Desirable Responding (BIDR) and its subscales, 12 observations in total. 
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which EEG or electro-ocular activity exceeded +/- 75µV were rejected. The EEG data 
for two participants were rejected because the signals were consistently “noisy”. The 
remaining segments were baseline corrected (using the 100ms pre-stimulus interval) 
and subsequently averaged for consistent versus inconsistent IRAP trials. Figure 6.1 
presents the grand average waveforms for each of the 12 electrode sites (F3, F4, F5, 
F6, C1, C2, C3, C4, P3, P4, P5 and P6) for pro-unhealthy (light gray lines) versus 
pro-healthy (dark lines) trials. Visual inspection of the waveforms from the 12 
electrode sites indicated little evidence of differential activity for the two types of 
IRAP trial until approximately 200ms following onset of the stimulus. The pro-
healthy relative to the pro-unhealthy trials produced greater negativity for electrodes 
sites F4, F6, C2, and C4, whereas electrode sites P3 and P5 demonstrated the opposite 
pattern (i.e., the pro-healthy trials were more positive relative to the pro-unhealthy 
trials). There was little evidence of clear differential activity on the remaining six 
electrode sites. 
The area dimension (µV x ms) for each ERP waveform (in the temporal region 
400 to 700ms) for each participant was calculated, yielding either a positive or 
negative value with respect to the 0µV level. A 2x6x2 ANOVA was then conducted 
with laterality (left and right), position (F3-F4, F5-F6, C1-C2, C3-C4, P3-P4, P5-P6), 
and IRAP condition (pro-unhealthy and pro-healthy) as repeated measures variables. 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for position, F (5, 55) = 5.44, p = 
.0004, np² =. 33 and an interaction effect for position by IRAP condition, F (5, 55) = 
4.87, p = .0009, np² = .31. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant 
(all ps > .06). A series of Sheffe post-hoc tests indicated that each of the positions F3-
F4 versus P3-P4 and F5-F6 versus P3-P4 respectively differed significantly from each 
other (all ps < .014). All other comparisons were non-significant (all ps > .15).   
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 Twelve separate paired t-tests were used to conduct comparisons between 
IRAP condition for each electrode site (F3, F4, F5, F6, C1, C2, C3, C4, P3, P4, P5 
and P6). Positions F4, F6, P3 and P5 yielded significant effects for IRAP condition; t 
(11) = -2.28, p = .043); t (11) = -3.33, p = .008); t (11) = 3.25, p = .008); and t (11) = 
3.69, p = .003), respectively. Positions C2 and C4 yielded marginally significant 
effects, t (11) = -1.74, p = .11); and t (11) = -2.18, p = .05), respectively. All other 
electrodes sites yielded non-significant effects (all ps > .19). In short, pro-healthy 
waveforms were significantly more negative than pro-unhealthy waveforms in the 400 
to 700ms interval for the F4 and F6 sites, but the reverse pattern was demonstrated for 
P3 and P5. 
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Figure 6.1 The Grand Average waveform for the Pro-Unhealthy (light grey lines) and Pro-Healthy 
(dark grey lines) trial-types for the twelve electrode sites F3, F4, F5, F6, C1, C2, C3, C4, P3, P4, P5, 
and P6. 
 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
 Study 4 replicated the effects found in Study 3, demonstrating a pro-healthy 
food bias in the 2-hr food deprivation condition. The ERP grandaverage waveforms 
for the pro-healthy trials were more negative than pro-unhealthy waveforms for the F4 
and F6 sites, but the reverse pattern was demonstrated for P3 and P5 (pro-unhealthy 
trials were more negative than pro-healthy waveforms). As noted in the introduction 
to the current study, pro-unhealthy responding for normal-weight participants in a 2-
hr food deprivation state may be considered inconsistent with their dominant response 
bias (i.e., participants typically show a pro-healthy bias, as indicated in the previous 
p = .04 
p = .008 
p = .1 
p = .05 
p = .008 
p = .003 
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and current studies). Based on the results reported by Barnes-Holmes et al. (2008), 
more negative ERPs waveforms would thus be predicted for pro-unhealthy relative to 
pro-healthy IRAP trials. This prediction was upheld for sites P3 and P5, but 
interestingly the opposite pattern was observed for sites F4 and F6. At the current 
time, it is unclear why these differences emerged in the ERPs measures across the two 
studies. As noted earlier, however, the previous study employed stimuli that were 
unrelated to food and hunger. Clearly, therefore, further research will be required to 
determine the variables responsible for the different ERP patterns observed across the 
two studies. Nevertheless, the current findings do indicate that EEG signals may be 
used to discriminate between two different types of IRAP trials, even when hunger-
related stimuli are employed. This finding thus provides further validation of the 
IRAP as a measure of food attitudes. The current findings are also important because 
there are no published studies that have attempted to record brain activity while 
participants complete an implicit measure targeting attitudes to food. As such, the 
current data may provide a useful foundation for future work in the area, and serves to 
highlight the potential of the IRAP in this regard. 
 Thus far, the research reported in the current thesis has involved developing an 
IRAP that may be used to measure implicit food biases. Both response latencies and 
EEG patterns have been shown to be sensitive dependent measures. However, a 
critical issue in the area of food attitudes concerns the development of methods that 
may be used to cope with food urges. The penultimate study reported in the current 
thesis focused on this issue.  
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Chapter 7: The Malleability of Implicit Attitudes: Exploring the Impact of Two 
Response Strategies to Food Urges 
 Socio-cognitive researchers have argued that explicit attitudes are susceptible 
to change via various factors at any given point in time due to an individual’s 
cognitive resources, focus of attention, motivation and goals, and on contextual cues 
(e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Empirical evidence indicates that explicit 
attitudes have been affected by influencing the following factors: (a) social context 
(Lowery, Hardin, Sinclair, 2001); (b) an individual’s current mood (Forgas, 1992); (c) 
an individual’s present thoughts and feelings (Chaiken & Yates, 1985); (d) the 
experience of cognitive dissonance (Senemeaud & Somat, 2009); and (e) the 
provision of normative and informational social influence (Werner, Sansone, & 
Brown, 2008).  
 In contrast to explicit attitudes, in the past researchers assumed that implicit 
attitudes were typically fixed and therefore were difficult to modify because they 
represented well learned patterns that were relatively insensitive to the immediate 
context. However, there is currently a growing body of evidence challenging the 
assumption of the inflexibility of this type of responding. For example, it has been 
shown that implicit attitudes are influenced by various cognitive, motivational and 
situational factors, that is, the same sorts of unwanted influences to which explicit 
measures are susceptible (Blair, 2002). Malleability is the name given to the 
characteristic of implicit responding whereby it is susceptible to modification through 
extraneous variables.  
 Evidence for the malleability of implicit attitudes has typically come from 
research using the IAT. The empirical evidence indicates that IAT-assessed attitudes 
are indeed malleable via the influence of several variables. These variables include (a) 
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contextual factors (Boysen, Vogel, & Maddon, 2006; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Lowery et al., 2001; McCaul & Dasgupta, 2009; 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003); (b) social roles (e.g., Barden, Maddux, Petty, & 
Bewer, 2001); (c) mental strategies (Blair et al., 2001); (d) education (Rudman, 
Ashmore, & Gary, 2001); (e) experience (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001); and (f) mood 
(Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001). Much of this research has focused on the 
malleability of implicit prejudice as measured by the IAT in the domains of; 
homosexuality (e.g., Boysen et al., 2006), race (e.g., Barden et al., 2001; Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2001; Lowery et al., 2001), and gender stereotypes (e.g., Dasgupta & 
Asgari, 2004; McCaul & Dasgupta, 2009).  
 One method, known as exemplar training, has been used by some researchers 
to study the malleability of implicit attitudes. This involves presenting participants 
with a series of specific exemplars which are designed to manipulate their attitudes 
toward a specific target (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Lowery et al., 2001). In 
Experiment 1, reported by Dasgupta and Greenwald, participants were provided with 
exemplars (i.e., pictures of either admired Black and disliked White individuals, or 
vice versa, disliked Black and admired White individuals). Participants subsequently 
completed an IAT, and again after 24 hours (without re-exposure to the exemplars). 
Explicit attitude measures were also administered in each of the phases. The results 
found that exemplar exposure to admired Black and disliked White pictures 
significantly weakened implicit pro-White preferences for 24 hours, but explicit 
attitudes remained unaffected. This basic effect was replicated in a second 
experiment, but with implicit ageism as the focal attitude. 
 More recently, Experiment 2 from Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) was 
partially replicated but using the IRAP instead of the IAT (Cullen et al., 2009). 
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Findings indicated that when participants were presented with positive exemplars of 
old people and negative exemplars of young people, implicit negative bias towards 
old people was significantly reduced. In line with Dasgupta and Greenwald’s study, 
the explicit measures were mostly unaffected. 
 At the time of writing, no published study had demonstrated the malleability 
of implicit attitudes to food. Furthermore, no published study had attempted to 
investigate the impact of any therapeutic analogues on IRAP performance. The fifth 
study in the current thesis reports research that was designed to compare the effects of 
two types of response strategies to food urges/cravings for a favourite snack food; a 
protocol based on acceptance and commitment therapy (Forman, Hoffman, McGrath, 
Herbert, Brandsma, & Lowe, 2007; Wilson & DuFrene, 2008) and an Indulgence of 
Food Urges protocol.  
 Acceptance-based strategies are a feature of several novel cognitive-
behavioral therapies (e.g., Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999). In contrast to control-based interventions, acceptance-based strategies 
do not set out to specifically reduce the number of cravings or relieve discomfort 
caused by cravings; instead, the goal is to promote willingness to experience what 
cannot be controlled (i.e., cravings, thoughts, feelings/emotions) while at the same 
time fostering behavior that is consistent with desired goals and values. This is 
achieved through the combination of several types of strategies: (a) recognizing the 
futility of trying to control internal experiences such as thoughts and feelings; (b) 
mindfulness-based protocols aimed at increasing awareness of internal experiences, 
while accepting them as they are, and; (c) defusion techniques (i.e., stepping 
back/distance from), ones thoughts and other internal experiences.   
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 Paradoxically, acceptance-based interventions have been found to increase 
tolerance of previously avoided or suppressed internal experiences while 
simultaneously relieving distress that they cause (Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 
2004; Twohig & Woods, 2004; Zettle, 2003). Acceptance-based therapies have 
suggested it is as effective, if not more so, than traditional cognitive-behavioural and 
control-based strategies for a myriad of psychological problems, for example, the 
treatment of social anxiety (Block, 2003), depression (Zettle & Hayes, 1986), 
emotional distress (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 2007; Lappalainen, 
Lehtonen, Skarp, Taubert, Ojanen, & Hayes, 2007) and chronic pain (Geiser, 1993). 
Interestingly, an acceptance based protocol for smoking cessation, instructing ways to 
cope with cravings without acting on them, has been found to be more effective than 
the nicotine patch in a randomized controlled trial that compared these two 
interventions (Gifford et al., 2004). Smoking cessation could be a close parallel to 
maintaining weight loss, given the focal feature of abstaining from (smoking) or 
limiting the intake of (for foods) a craved substance. Typically, smoking cessation 
attempts fail because of the difficulty of resisting cravings to smoke (Brown, Lejuez, 
Kahler, Strong, & Zvolensky, 2005); similarly weight reduction efforts generally fail 
due to the difficulties in resisting urges to eat high-fat/unhealthy foods (Alsene, Li, 
Chaverneff, & de Wit, 2003). 
 The effectiveness of an acceptance-based strategy versus a control-based 
strategy for coping with chocolate cravings was tested by Forman et al. (2007). 
Measures included the PFS (employed in Studies 1 and 2 of the current research 
programme), self-report ratings of chocolate cravings and chocolate consumption. The 
findings indicated that the effect of the intervention depended on baseline PFS levels; 
specifically, the acceptance-based strategy was associated with better outcomes 
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(lower cravings and chocolate consumption) among participants reporting the highest 
sensitivity to food cues in the environment (on the PFS), but greater cravings among 
those who scored lowest on the PFS. In contrast, the control-based strategy provided 
the highest outcomes for those who had the lowest PFS scores. In short, this finding 
highlights the potential utility of acceptance based strategies for dealing with food 
cravings for individual’s who are most susceptible to food cues in the environment. 
 The fifth study reported in the current thesis sought to investigate the 
malleability effects of implicit attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods in response to 
an Acceptance versus Indulgence of Food Urges strategy. Participants in the 
Acceptance of Food Urges condition were provided with a powerpoint presentation of 
an acceptance-based strategy for dealing with food urges, which involved an 
experiential exercise using their favourite snack food. Participants in the Indulgence 
of Food Urges condition were presented with a similar presentation and exercise, but 
one that focused on indulging in (i.e., acting on) a craving for their favourite snack 
food. Both groups then completed the “very-versus-slightly” hunger-IRAP and 
explicit measures. A control group also completed the study but did not receive a 
food-urge presentation and exercise; instead they completed the IRAP and explicit 
measures. Given that no previous published study had investigated the effects an 
Acceptance versus Indulgence of Food Urges strategy on implicit food attitudes, no 
specific predictions were made concerning the impact that these two different 
interventions might have. 
7.1 Method 
7.1.1 Participants 
 The same six screening criteria that were employed in all previous studies for 
the normal-weight participants were employed in the current study. Fifty-five 
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participants met these criteria, consisting of 30 females and 25 males (age M = 19.5 
years, range, 17-33; weight, BMI, M = 21.34 kg/m²). All participants were 
undergraduate students attending the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. No 
financial enticements were offered to the participants and all were naïve to the IRAP. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups; Acceptance of Food 
Urges (ACC, n = 18), Indulgence of Food Urges (IND, n = 19), and Control (n =18). 
7.1.2 Setting 
 The setting was identical to that for the normal-weight participants in all 
previous studies.  
7.1.3 Apparatus/Materials 
 The hunger-IRAP and explicit questionnaire materials employed in Study 3 
were used, as well as the PFS and MAAS scales used in Study 2. 
 Craving Questionnaire. The first item of the questionnaire was designed to 
determine the strength of participants’ cravings for their favourite snack food. 
Participants were instructed to “Please rate how strong your cravings are to eat your 
favourite snack right now, circle the appropriate number below?” Responses were 
recorded on an 11-point Likert Scale “0 (No Cravings),” “5 (Slight Cravings),” “10 
(Extremely Strong Cravings)”. The second item measured participants’ “ability to 
resist cravings for their favourite snack right now” on an 11-point Likert Scale “0 (No 
Ability),” “5 (Slight Ability),” “10 (Strong Ability)” (See Appendix L). 
 Acceptance/Indulgence of Food Urges Audio Protocol and Food Exercises. 
The computer-administered procedure was presented on Windows PowerPoint 2002 
using standard Pentium 4 personal computers running Windows XP. The PowerPoint 
software controlled the presentation of all written and audio instructions (VLC Media 
file.wav). 
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 Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. This questionnaire was 
completed by participants in the ACC condition only. It is a five item questionnaire 
employed to assess participants understanding of the ACC Protocol they had been 
exposed to during the Audio clips. The first item asked participants “what does 
acceptance mean”, the second, “what does willingness mean”, the third “what does 
awareness mean”, the fourth, “what does distancing mean?”. The fifth item asked 
participants to “Please write down a summary of the strategy you have been instructed 
to use here today?” Item six asked participants to “list any thoughts you had during 
the exercise”; Item seven asked participants to “list any feelings you had during the 
exercise”; Item eight instructed participants to “Please rate how useful the strategy 
was” on an 11-point Likert Scale “0 (Not Useful),” “5 (Slightly Useful),” “10 (Very 
Useful)”. Finally, item nine requested participants to “rate how difficult it was to use 
the strategy during the task?” on an 11-point Likert Scale “0 (Very Easy),” “5 
(Slightly Difficult),” “10 (Very Difficult)” (see Appendix M). 
 Indulgence of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. This questionnaire 
assessed participants’ thoughts and feeling during the food exercise. Item one asked 
participants to “list any thought you had during the exercise” while item two asked 
participants to “list any feelings you had during the exercise” (See Appendix N).  
7.1.4 Procedure 
 The procedure consisted of seven phases (see Table 7.1). In Phase 1, 
participants in all three groups were asked to complete items one and two of the 
Craving questionnaire and the Hunger-State questionnaire. The Control group read the 
October 2009, NUI, Maynooth student magazine “The Print” for twenty-seven 
minutes and did not complete the subsequent phases 2, 3, 4, and 5. The IND group 
read the same magazine for twenty minutes and did not complete phases 2 and 3. 
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During Phase 2, participants in the ACC group were exposed to their Acceptance of 
Food Urges audio Protocol. During phase 3, the ACC group received items 1 to 5 of 
the Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. During phase 4, the ACC and 
IND groups received their respective audio food exercises. During phase 5 all groups 
received the Craving questionnaire for the second time. The ACC group also received 
the final four items of the Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. The 
IND group received the Craving questionnaire again followed by the Indulgence of 
Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. All participants were exposed to the hunger-
IRAP in phase 6. All participants received the remaining six self-report measures in 
Phase 7; the hunger-scale questionnaires; the EDE-Q5; the BIDR; the PFS and the 
MAAS respectively.  
          Table 7.1. The Experimental Sequence. 
 Group 
Experimental 
Phases 
Control Indulgence of 
Food Urges 
Acceptance of 
Food Urges 
Phase 1 Craving 
Questionnaire 
and Hunger-State 
questionnaire 
Craving 
Questionnaire 
and Hunger-State 
questionnaire 
Craving 
Questionnaire 
and Hunger-State 
questionnaire 
Phase 2 Read Magazine Read Magazine Acceptance 
Protocol 
Phase 3 Read Magazine Read Magazine Acceptance of 
Urges Exercise 
Questionnaire 
(items 1 - 5) 
Phase 4 Read Magazine Indulgence Food 
Exercises 
Acceptance Food 
Exercises 
Phase 5 Craving 
Questionnaire 
Craving 
Questionnaire 
and Indulgence 
of Urges 
Exercise 
Questionnaire 
 
Craving 
Questionnaire 
and Acceptance 
of Urges 
Exercise 
Questionnaire 
(items 6 - 9)  
Phase 6 Hunger IRAP Hunger IRAP Hunger IRAP 
Phase 7 Hunger-scale 
questionnaire, 
EDE-Q5, BIDR, 
PFS and the 
MAAS  
Hunger-scale 
questionnaire, 
EDE-Q5, BIDR, 
PFS and the 
MAAS 
Hunger-scale 
questionnaire, 
EDE-Q5, BIDR, 
PFS and the 
MAAS 
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 Participants were randomly assigned to either the Control, ACC or IND 
groups (counterbalancing for gender). All groups were told the study would involve 
answering questions about food. Only the ACC and IND groups were instructed to 
bring their favourite cold snack with them to the study (e.g. a bar of chocolate or a bag 
of crisps etc.); they were instructed to refrain from eating this snack during the day of 
the study, but otherwise eat as normal. The ACC and IND groups were reimbursed the 
cost of their favourite snacks upon arrival for the study. The Control group did not 
receive any such instructions.  
 At the start of each experimental session the researcher thanked the 
participants for coming and informed them of the brief nature of the study. 
Participants were told that participation was voluntary, that they were completely free 
to with-draw at any stage, and all information they provided during the study was 
fully confidential. All individuals completed a written consent form (see Appendix 
O). 
 Phase 1: Craving questionnaire and hunger-state questionnaires. All 
individuals completed the Craving questionnaire and Hunger-State questionnaire 
sitting alone at a table in the experimental cubicle. Subsequently, participants in the 
Control condition read a student magazine for twenty-seven minutes, while the IND 
group read it for twenty minutes. 
 Phase 2: Acceptance of Food Urges Protocol. Upon starting the Acceptance 
of Food Urges Protocol the researcher instructed the participants to follow the on-
screen instructions carefully (i.e., only press the arrow keys to go to the next slide 
when the PowerPoint programme instructs you to do so). Participants in the ACC 
group were seated in front of the computer which presented a short description of the 
procedure, the instructions for completing the Acceptance of Food Urges Protocol 
 132 
(See Appendix P for full Acceptance of Food Urges Protocol). Participants controlled 
the presentation of the protocol, delivered through headphones, via Powerpoint. The 
idea behind the protocol was to teach participants a strategy that psychologists have 
developed to resist food cravings. Participants were informed that they would have to 
utilize this strategy to help them deal with cravings for their favourite snack foods 
during a subsequent food exercises. Furthermore, participants were informed that 
there will be a quiz at the end of the instruction phase to track how well they 
remember the coping strategies.  
 The protocol covered five core areas (see Appendix P for full protocol). The 
first of these areas, Control, focused on illustrating for participants via a thought 
control exercise that they cannot control their thoughts, feeling, cravings or urges 
even when they have the most intense motivation to do so. In short, if you have a 
craving for food there’s not much you can do about it!  
 The second core area Acceptance, informed participants that instead of trying 
to control their food cravings they can simply choose to accept their cravings, because 
we are going to have food cravings no matter what.  
 The third core area Willingness, informed participants that they have only two 
options if they cannot accept what it feels like to have cravings. Either they can give 
into the cravings and eat the food or they can figure out away to tolerance the 
cravings. Although, they don’t have much control over what they think, feel or crave, 
they do have control over the willingness to think, feel or crave certain things. This 
ability is called Willingness.  
 The fourth core area Awareness, sought to teach participants the concept of 
awareness, (i.e., how to notice and observe their own internal experiences such as, 
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thoughts, feelings, physical sensations, and cravings). This concept was illustrated 
through a thought observation metaphor and exercise. 
 The fifth and final area of the protocol covered Distancing. Participants were 
informed that a very important way to increase willingness and decrease the distress 
of coping with their cravings is to distance themselves from their cravings. When they 
step back from themselves and their cravings they have psychological distance, and 
can experience their thoughts, feeling, and cravings as just feelings that their mind is 
having at that moment. When they have this distance they can choose not to do what 
their thoughts, feelings, cravings are telling them to do. Participants were instructed to 
use the awareness exercise used previously to simply notice their thoughts, feelings, 
physical sensations and food cravings. But this time try and step back, see your mind 
having the experience from a psychological distance. Describe it to yourself and thank 
your mind for whatever it throws up (i.e. “So say to yourself my mind is having a 
craving to eat my favourite snack right now. It’s a really strong craving. But I’m 
going to let that feeling just be there, give it room and choose not to eat it”). The 
participants were also provided with a memory aid to help them remember the 
strategy:  
 AWAD! 
A: Acceptance.   
 Whatever thoughts or feelings or cravings your mind creates 
 are okay.   
W: Willingness.   
 Be willing to have what your mind gives you.  No matter how 
 strong a craving is, you can let it be.  You don’t have to make it 
 go away. 
A: Awareness.   
 Become aware of what it is you are thinking and feeling and 
 craving in any given moment.  
D: Distancing.   
 Step back from your thoughts and feelings and cravings.  See 
 them from a distance.  “I see myself having a craving for 
 chocolate cake right now. 
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The IND and the Control group read the magazine during this phase.  
 Phase 3, Acceptance of Urges Exercise Questionnaire items 1 to 5. 
Participants completed these items which examined their understanding of the various 
components of the Acceptance of Food Urges protocol i.e., acceptance, willingness, 
awareness and distancing, as well as a summary of the strategy participants were 
asked to use. Finally, the researcher also asked participants to verbally explain their 
answers to the questions to ensure they understood the Acceptance protocol fully 
before they could proceed to the next phase (See Appendix M). The IND group and 
the Control continued to read the magazine during this phase 
 Phase 4, Acceptance / Indulgence of Urges Food Exercises. The food exercise 
for the ACC group instructed each participant to hold a piece of his/her favourite 
snack in his/her hand and to bring it to his/her mouth and gently move in tiny 
increments towards eating the snack, but never actually putting it in his/her mouth and 
chewing it. Participants held the food at the cusp between eating and not eating (i.e., 
the snack was held close to an open mouth almost touching the lips for 60 seconds, 
and participants were asked to use the Acceptance of Food Urges Strategy they had 
just learned previously to help them cope with urges to eat their favourite snack. 
Participants completed this exercise two more times (see Appendix Q for the full 
Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise).  
 The Indulgence of Food Exercise was identical to the Acceptance of Food 
Urge Exercise except that participants were instructed to eat the piece of their 
favourite snack food when their cravings to eat it became too strong for them to resist 
anymore. They also completed this exercise three times in total (see Appendix R for 
the full Indulgence of Food Urges Exercise).   
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 Phase 5: Craving questionnaire, Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise 
Questionnaire and Indulgence of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. Participants in 
all groups completed the Cravings questionnaire. The ACC group also completed the 
final four items of the Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. The IND 
group completed the Indulgence of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire. 
  Phase 6: The Hunger-IRAP. The hunger-IRAP procedure and instructions 
were identical to that utilised in the No-Restriction condition in Study 3. All 
participants in the present study completed the pro-unhealthy /anti-healthy block of 
trials first. 
Phase 7:  Self report measures. After the hunger-IRAP, participants completed 
the six self-report measures alone in their booths; the Hunger-Scale, the EDE-Q5, the 
BIDR, PFS, and the MAAS, respectively.  
Having completed the questionnaires the participants were informed it was the 
end of the experiment, they were thanked, debriefed and any questions they had were 
answered by the experimenter (see Appendix R).  
 
7.2 RESULTS AND DICUSSION 
Pre-Analysis Checks 
 Initial screening checks were used to determine if there were significant 
differences on the explicit measures (Age, BMI, EDE-Q5, BIDR, PFS, MAAS, 
Craving-questionnaire-before-the-food exercise) between the groups (ACC, IND, and 
Control). If no differences were found, any subsequent differences on the implicit 
measure between the groups were unlikely due to individual differences. A series of 
one-way between groups ANOVA performed on each explicit measure with group as 
the independent variable, proved non-significant (all ps > .09), except for BMI. A 
follow-up analysis revealed a significant difference between the Control and the ACC 
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groups (F (1, 34) = .35, p = .05, η2 = .11), even though both groups were within the 
normal-weight BMI range (18.5 to 24.9 BMI); no differences were found for BMI 
between the Control and IND (p = .79), or between ACC and IND groups (p = .07). 
Analyses reported subsequently thus determined if BMI interacted with each of the 
implicit and explicit measures. 
 Significant differences were found for the Craving-questionnaire between the 
Control and the ACC groups (F (1, 34) = 11.77, p = .0016, η2 = .26) and between the 
Control and IND groups (F (1, 35) = 12.35, p = .0012, η2 = .26). This was expected 
because both the ACC and IND groups were instructed prior to the study to take their 
favourite snacks with them to the study (and to refrain from eating them during the 
day). The Control group received no such instructions, and thus it was assumed that 
cravings would not be elevated above normal. Importantly, however, no differences 
on the Craving-questionnaire were found between the ACC and IND groups (p = .78).  
7.2.1 Implicit Measures 
Data Preparation   
 The data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using the same strategy 
adopted for all previous studies. The data for all 55 participants were included in the 
final analyses (18 Control participants, 18 Acceptance of Food Urges participants, 19 
Indulgence of Food Urges participants). 
IRAP Analyses   
 Figure 7.1 presents the overall mean D-IRAP scores divided by group. The D-
IRAP scores indicated a strong unhealthy bias for the Control group, with a slightly 
stronger unhealthy bias in the ACC group. The IND had no bias towards either 
unhealthy or healthy foods. Due to the BMI difference between the Control (M = 
20.93 years, SE = .41) and ACC groups (M = 22.04 years, SE = .38) it was necessary 
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to determine if there was a BMI by group interaction. If non-significant interaction 
effects were found, then subsequent IRAP analyses could ignore BMI. An ANCOVA 
was conducted on the D-IRAP scores with group (Control, ACC, and IND groups) as 
the between group variable and BMI as the covariate. The BMI by group interaction 
was non-significant (p = .50). After adjusting for BMI the main effect for group was 
significant F (1, 49) = .70, p = .02, η2 = .19. Given the absence of any significant 
effects for BMI, this variable was removed from all subsequent IRAP analyses.   
Three one-way between-participant ANOVAs were used to conduct planned 
comparisons between groups. A significant difference was found between the Control 
and IND groups; F (1, 35) = 5.87, p = .02, η2 = .14, and between the ACC and IND 
groups, F (1, 35) = 6.56, p = .02, η2 = .16. No significant difference was found 
between the Control and the ACC groups (p > .73)   
Three one-sample t-tests were used to determine if the D-IRAP effects for 
each of the groups differed significantly from zero. The effects for the Control, (p = 
.01) and ACC (p < .01) groups were significant but not for the IND group (p > .94). 
Overall, therefore, the Control and ACC groups showed similarly strong significant 
unhealthy biases but the IND group did not show any bias. 
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Figure 7.1. Overall mean D-IRAP scores, with standard errors, for the Control, IND, and ACC groups. 
 
Split-half correlations. The split-half correlation, with a Spearman-Brown 
correction, was strong and significant, r = .90, n = 55, p < .05. These data thus provide 
a strong indicator of internal consistency for the IRAP. 
7.3.2 Explicit Measures 
7.2.3 Hunger-scale  
 Similar to Studies 3 and 4, two mean hunger-scores were calculated from the 
9-point Likert scales. Thus, a positive score indicated an unhealthy-food/anti-healthy-
food bias and a negative score indicated the opposite (healthy/anti-unhealthy bias)9. 
All three groups produced unhealthy food biases (Control group, M = .29, SE = .46; 
ACC, M = .95, SE = .50; IND, M = 2.07, SE = .39, see Figure 7.2). A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group (ACC, IND, and Control) as the between 
                                                 
9
 The ANCOVA analyses conducted for the D-IRAP scale were also applied to the Hunger-scale, 
Craving-questionnaire, Global EDE-Q and EDE-Q subscales, behavioural items, Global BIDR and 
BIDR subscales PFS and MAAS data. All BMI by group state interactions were non-significant (all ps 
> .11). As a result, BMI was removed from all subsequent analyses of the explicit measures. 
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group variable found a significant main effect for group F (1, 51) = .15.015, p = .03, 
η
2 
= .14. Three follow-up ANOVAs yielded a significant difference between the 
Control and IND; F (1, 35) = 8.62, p = .01, η2 = .20; the other effects were non-
significant (p > .08). Thus, the only significant difference for the hunger scale was 
between the Control and Indulge conditions.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Overall mean Hunger-scores, with standard errors, for the Control, IND, and ACC groups 
 
7.2.4 Craving Questionnaire 
 The first item of the questionnaire was designed to determine the strength of 
participants’ “cravings” for their favourite snack. Participants rated how strong their 
cravings were to eat their favourite snack right now, on an 11-point Likert Scale. The 
second item assessed participants’ “ability to resist cravings” for their favourite snack 
right now on an 11-point Likert Scale. Overall mean craving scores were calculated 
for each group by summing the respective individual cravings scores and dividing by 
the number of individuals in each group. Overall resist scores were calculated for each 
of the groups in a similar manner.    
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 Cravings.  Figure 7.3 presents the overall mean craving scores divided by 
group. All three groups had cravings for their favourite snack. The IND group had the 
largest cravings score, followed closely by the ACC group. The Control group had the 
lowest (i.e., this group did not undertake any food exercise).  A one-way ANOVA 
with groups as the between group variable found a significant difference between the 
groups F (1, 49) = .6.44, p = .01, η2 = .22. Three follow-up ANOVAs revealed 
significant effects between the Control and IND groups; F (1, 35) = 12.78, p = .01, η2 
= .27, and between the Control and ACC groups, F (1, 35) = 8.03, p = .01, η2 = .19, 
but not between the ACC and IND groups (p = .34). Thus, the Control participants 
reported significantly lower cravings compared to the other two. 
 
7.3. Overall mean Cravings scores, on the Craving-Questionnaire, for the Control, IND, and ACC 
groups. 
  
 Resist.  Figure 7.4 presents the overall mean resist scores divided by group. 
All three groups had moderate to strong resist scores for their favourite snack foods. 
The ACC group had the largest resist score, followed by the Control group (i.e., this 
group did not undertake any food exercise) and the IND group had the lowest resist 
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score. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated a significant difference among the groups F 
(1, 51) = .4.53, p = .02, η2 = .151. Three one-way between-participant ANOVAs 
revealed a significant difference between the ACC and IND groups; F (1, 35) = .93, p 
= .01, η2 = .17, a marginally significant effect between the Control and IND groups; F 
(1, 35) = 3.88, p = .06, η2 = .10, and a non-significant difference between the Control 
and ACC groups (p = .47). Thus, the IND group reported substantively lower 
resistance than the other two groups, with Control and ACC showing very little 
difference. 
 
Figure 7.4. Overall mean Resist scores on the Craving-Questionnaire, for the Control, IND, and ACC 
groups. 
 
7.2.5 Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
A correlation matrix of implicit and explicit measures is presented in Table 
7.2, which explores the relationships between the 14 explicit measures and the D-
IRAP measure. Non-significant correlations were obtained in all cases except between 
the D-IRAP score and MAAS (r = .34, p = .01). Thus the higher the D-IRAP score 
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(i.e., the stronger the unhealthy bias) the more participants engaged mindful 
awareness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P < .05 
 
7.2.6 Prediction of Group Status 
 Three separate hierarchical logistic regression analyses were conducted for the 
three groups. For each model the explicit measure was entered as the predictor of 
group status (Control, ACC, and IND) in the first step and the overall D-IRAP 
measure was entered into the model in the second step (see Table 7.3). Group status 
was significantly predicted by the following self-report measures; the hunger-scale for 
the IND group, the cravings item of the Cravings-questionnaire for the IND and the 
ACC groups. Group was marginally significantly predicted by the resist item of the 
Cravings-questionnaire for the IND group. When the D-IRAP measure was added it 
significantly increased the predictive validity for the IND group with respect to the 
 Overall D-IRAP Score 
Hunger-Scale .02 
Cravings item of the 
Cravings-questionnaire 
-.03 
Resist  item of the 
Cravings-questionnaire 
.15 
Global EDE-Q  .19 
EDE-Q - Restraint -.04 
EDE-Q - Eating Concern .19 
EDE-Q - Shape Concern .12 
EDE-Q - Weight Concern .15 
Total Behaviours .11 
Global BIDR .14 
BIDR – SDE .12 
BIDR – IM -.02 
PFS .01 
MAAS .34* 
Table 7.2. Correlations between the Overall Mean D-IRAP score and the Self-Report Hunger-scale,  
the Eating  Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) and its subscales, the Balanced Inventory  
of Desirable Responding (BIDR) and its subscales, the Power of Food, and the Mindful, Attention,  
Awareness Scale, 55 observations in total. 
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hunger-scale (R2 change = .06), and the cravings item of the Cravings-questionnaire 
(R2 change = .07). The increase in predictive validity was marginally significant for 
the resist item of the Cravings-questionnaire for the IND group (R2 change = .04).  
 
 
 
7.2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 The Control and the ACC group produced similar and significant unhealthy 
food biases on the IRAP, whereas the IND group did not discriminate between 
unhealthy and healthy foods. The explicit hunger-scale indicated the opposite pattern 
with the IND group providing the strongest unhealthy food preference; the Control 
and ACC groups’ hunger score did not differ significantly from each other. The ACC 
and IND groups produced similarly high levels of craving for their favourite snack, 
with cravings for both groups significantly higher than the Control group. The ACC 
and Control groups reported similarly high levels of resistance towards their favourite 
snack foods, with both groups having higher resistance compared to the IND group. 
Correlations between the implicit and explicit measures yielded only one positive and 
significant correlation between the D-IRAP score and the MAAS. When logistic 
regression analyses were conducted to determine if the IRAP measure increased 
prediction of group status over the explicit measures, the D-IRAP increased predictive 
Step 1 
Control versus Indulgence/Acceptance of Food 
Urges 
Step 2 
Control versus Indulgence/Acceptance of Food 
Urges 
Predictor Variables R² B p Predictor Variables R² B p 
Hunger-scale .07   Hunger-scale + D-IRAP .13   
Acceptance  .18 .31 Acceptance  .28 .87 
Indulgence  .52 .01* Indulgence  -.42 .03* 
Cravings-After .11   Cravings-After + D-IRAP .18   
Acceptance  .35 .01* Acceptance  .55 .75 
Indulgence  .48 .002* Indulgence  -4.2 .04* 
Resist-After .07   Resist-After + D-IRAP .11   
Acceptance  .14 .46 Acceptance  .15 .46 
Indulgence  -.31 .06 Indulgence  -3.29 .06 
 
Table 7.3. Summary of Hierarchical Logistical Regression analysis for the variables predicting group 
status (N = 55). 
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validity for the IND group for the hunger-scale and the cravings and resist items of the 
Cravings-questionnaire. Of the three groups, the IND group showed the highest 
hunger and craving effects combined with lower resistance. However, on the IRAP 
participants showed almost no discrimination between healthy and unhealthy foods 
(the ACC and Control groups showed strong unhealthy food biases).  
7.4 DISCUSSION 
 The experimental manipulation had a significant effect on the IND group’s 
implicit bias compared to the ACC and Control groups. That is, the Control and the 
ACC group produced similar and significant unhealthy food biases on the IRAP, 
whereas the IND group did not discriminate between unhealthy and healthy foods. 
Thus, it would seem that the Indulgence of Food Urges exercise served to increase 
participants’ implicit bias for both unhealthy and healthy foods (i.e., a lack of 
discrimination between the food categories). The Acceptance of-Food-Urges protocol 
on the other hand did not impact on the ACC group’s implicit food bias. In fact, the 
bias was very similar that of the Control group’s, which is interesting given that the 
ACC group had conducted the food exercise, but the Control group had not. The 
results are in line with the findings of IAT malleability effects (Lowery et al. 2001; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Boysen et al., 2006), and the IRAP malleability results 
reported by Cullen et al. (2009). It is also worth noting that the IRAP effect for the 
Control group in the current study was in line with the No-Restriction condition of 
Study 3 of the present thesis (i.e., an unhealthy food bias). The findings for the 
explicit hunger-scale indicated the opposite pattern from that of the IRAP. The IND 
group demonstrated the most pronounced unhealthy food preference; significantly 
higher that the Control group. The Control and ACC groups’ hunger scores did not 
differ significantly from each other. Thus, it seems that the Indulgence of Food Urges 
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exercise increased the IND groups’ explicit preference for unhealthy food. However, 
the ACC group’s implicit and explicit biases did not differ from the Control group’s 
biases. This suggests that the Acceptance of Food-Urges protocol allowed this group 
to respond to their urges/cravings for their favourite snack foods as if they had not 
been exposed to the food exercise at all (as per the Control group).  
 Interestingly, the ACC and IND groups reported similarly high levels of 
craving for their favourite snack, both significantly higher than the Control group. 
However, the ACC and Control groups reported similarly high levels of resistance 
towards their favourite snack foods, with both groups having higher resistance relative 
to the IND group. This suggests that the Acceptance of Food-Urges protocol resulted 
in the ACC group having similar resistance for their favouite snack foods to the 
Control group who did not conduct any food exercise. This finding again supports the 
potential utility of an acceptance-based intervention for dealing with urges/cravings 
for food.    
 Only one positive and significant correlation was reported between the D-
IRAP score and the explicit measures (i.e., MAAS), indicating that when normal-
weight participants are in an unrestricted food deprivation state they have higher 
levels of mindfulness. This correlation was also recorded in Study 2 of the current 
thesis, but in that earlier study the relationship was only observed for the obese 
participants.  
The D-IRAP measure increased the ability of the explicit measures to predict 
group status for participants in the IND group only (i.e., the hunger-scale, the cravings 
and resist items of the Cravings-questionnaire). The finding that the IRAP increased 
the predictive validity of the explicit hunger measure is consistent with Studies 3 and 
4. 
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Overall, the findings from the current study support the utility of an 
acceptance-based protocol for dealing with urges/cravings for favourite snack foods. 
Importantly, the study indicated that implicit and explicit food attitudes are similarly 
susceptible to malleability variables (but can show contrasting effects) based on the 
type of intervention employed. Finally, a particular feature of the current findings 
raised a specific question, which was addressed in the next and final study of the 
thesis. Specifically, it might have been expected that the IND group would produce 
the largest unhealthy food bias on the IRAP, given that they reported the highest level 
of explicit hunger for unhealthy foods. However, this group actually produced a very 
weak healthy food bias, indicating a lack of discrimination between food types. 
Although this outcome might seem counter-intuitive, on balance perhaps relatively 
high levels of hunger on the IRAP are indicated by lack of discrimination between 
different types of foods. Or more informally, if one is hungry then, at an implicit 
level, any food will do. The final study of the current thesis subjected this argument to 
empirical test.  
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Chapter 8 Food Deprivation and Satiation Effects on “Very” versus “Slightly” 
Implicit Hunger Attitudes  
 As noted above, it is possible that a relatively neutral IRAP effect may be 
observed when participants are hungry. It also follows that a similar effect would be 
recorded if participants were experiencing little or no hunger, because all foods are 
relatively unappealing. The final study in the current thesis used the IRAP to examine 
normal-weight participants’ implicit and explicit hunger attitudes to healthy and 
unhealthy food when very hungry (i.e., in a 4-hr food deprivation condition) and when 
sated (immediately after a large meal). Apart from the changes in food deprivation, 
the current study was similar to Study 3. 
8.1 Method 
8.1.1 Participants 
 The same six screening criteria that were employed in all previous studies 
were used here for the normal-weight participants. Thirty seven participants met these 
criteria and completed the study. The sample consisted of 16 females and 21 males 
(age M = 22 years, range, 17-29; weight, BMI, M = 21.6 kg/m²) recruited from 
undergraduate students attending the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. Once 
again, no financial enticements were offered to the participants and all were naïve to 
the IRAP. Participants were assigned randomly to one of two groups (19 in the 4-hr-
Plus and 18 in the Sated condition), counterbalancing for gender  
8.1.2 Setting 
  The setting was identical to Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
8.1.3 Apparatus/Materials 
 The apparatus and materials were the same as those employed in Study 3. 
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8.1.4 Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to the procedure from Study 3, except that 
participants were randomly assigned to either a 4-hr-Plus versus Sated group (rather 
than 2-hr and No-Restriction groups). Again, gender was balanced within groups. 
Participants in the 4-hr-Plus group were instructed upon recruitment, and reminded 
via SMS message 24 hours before the study, to eat a large meal until full, finishing it 
no less than 4 hours before commencing the experiment. Participants in the Sated 
group received the same instructions except that they were asked to eat a large meal 
immediately before arriving for the study. All participants were exposed to an IRAP 
block sequence that commenced with pro-unhealthy/anti-healthy trials. 
 
8.2 RESULTS 
Pre-Analysis Checks 
 As per Studies 1, 2, 3 and 5 initial screening checks were used to determine if 
there were significant differences on the explicit measures (Age, BMI, EDE-Q5, 
BIDR) between the deprivation states. Independent t-tests conducted on each explicit 
measure were all non-significant (all ps > .20), and thus any differences on the 
implicit measure recorded in subsequent analyses were likely due to the deprivation 
manipulation. 
8.2.1 Implicit Measures   
IRAP Analyses  
The latency data obtained from the IRAP were prepared in the same way as in 
previous studies. Figure 8.1 presents the overall mean D-IRAP scores for both 
deprivation states. For the 4-hr-Plus participants the D-IRAP score indicated a weak 
unhealthy bias whereas the sated participants demonstrated a weak healthy bias. An 
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independent t-test performed on the D-IRAP data with deprivation state (4-hr-Plus 
versus Sated) as between group variable was non-significant (p > .59). 
Two one-sample t-tests were used to determine if the D-IRAP effects for the 
two deprivation states differed significantly from zero, and these were found to be 
non-significant (ps > .61). Overall, therefore, the 4-hr-Plus and Sated individuals 
showed weak and non-significant unhealthy and healthy food biases, respectively, 
with no effect for deprivation condition.  
Split-half correlations. The split-half correlation calculated across all 
participants, with a Spearman-Brown correction, was weak and non-significant, r = 
.03, n = 37, p = .92.  
 
Figure 8.1. Overall mean D-IRAP scores, with standard errors, for the normal-weight groups in the 4-
hr and Sated food deprivation conditions.  
 
8.2.2 Explicit Measures 
8.2.3 Hunger-scales  
Two mean hunger-scores were first calculated from the 9-point Likert scales. 
Thus, a positive score indicated an unhealthy-food/anti-healthy-food bias and a 
negative score indicated the opposite (healthy/anti-unhealthy bias). Both groups 
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produced neutral biases (4-hr-Plus, M = -.001, SE = .49; Sated, M = -.03, SE = .41). 
An independent t-test with deprivation state as the between-participant variable 
yielded non-significant effects (p >.97). Thus, like the IRAP the hunger scales failed 
to differentiate among the two groups even using the same pictorial stimuli. 
Overall mean relative liking-scores were obtained from the 9-point liking-
scales using the same analytic strategy as employed with the hunger-scales. Both 
groups produced weak healthy biases (4-hr-Plus, M = -.69, SE = .48; Sated, M = -.65, 
SE = .43). An independent t-test with deprivation state as a between-participant 
variable found a non-significant effect (p >.95). Once again, like the IRAP the explicit 
measure did not discriminate between hunger states using the same pictorial stimuli.  
8.2.4 Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
A correlation matrix of implicit and explicit measures is presented in Table 
8.1, which explores the relationships between the 10 explicit measures with the D-
IRAP measure. Non-significant correlations were obtained in all cases (all rs < -.22, 
all ps >.19) except between the D-IRAP score and EDE-Q Total Behaviours (r = -.33, 
p = .048). Thus the lower the D-IRAP score (i.e., the stronger the healthy bias) the 
more participants reported they engaged in abnormal eating behaviours.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P < .05 
 Overall D-IRAP Score 
Hunger-scale -.22 
Global EDE-Q  -.06 
EDE-Q - Restraint -.04 
EDE-Q - Eating Concern -.15 
EDE-Q - Shape Concern .02 
EDE-Q - Weight Concern -.06 
Total Behaviours -.33 
Global BIDR .21 
BIDR - SDE .18 
BIDR - IM .17 
Table 8.1. Correlations between the Overall Mean D-IRAP score and the Self-Report Food-Hunger, the 
Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) and its subscales, the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (BIDR) and its subscales, and the Power of Food, 37 observations in total. 
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8.2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Overall, the deprivation state manipulation had no effect on either of the 
groups’ implicit biases. The 4-hr-Plus and Sated groups demonstrated weak and non-
significant unhealthy and healthy food biases, respectively on the IRAP. In other 
words neither of the two groups discriminated between healthy or unhealthy food 
implicitly. Similar to the IRAP, the explicit hunger- and liking-scales did not 
discriminate between the deprivation states using the same pictorial stimuli. Only the 
EDE-Q Total Behaviour explicit measure produced a significant negative correlation 
with the D-IRAP scores; all other correlations were non-significant. In short, these 
results confirm that when individuals are hungry or sated they demonstrate a lack of 
discrimination between healthy and unhealthy foods (i.e., both healthy and unhealthy 
foods make them feel “Very” hungry).  
 
8.3 DISCUSSION 
 As predicted, both of the two deprivation state manipulations appeared to 
reduce the participants’ implicit and explicit discriminations between healthy and 
unhealthy foods to near zero. This finding thus supports the explanation offered at the 
end of the previous chapter for the lack of discrimination recorded for the IND group. 
In effect, the Indulgence of Urges exercise served to increase hunger, and this was 
reflected in the lack of discrimination between food types on the IRAP. Finally, the 
current study yielded a negative correlation between the EDE-Q Total Behaviour 
measure and the IRAP. Thus, the healthier participants’ implicit bias the less 
abnormal eating behaviours they reported engaging in. This result differed form all 
other previous studies, in which this relationship was always non-significant, and 
given the relatively large p value (.48) it seems wise to interpret this result with 
caution. 
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Chapter 9: General Discussion 
 The aim of the current program of research was to develop a food-IRAP that 
was sensitive enough to discriminate obese and normal-weight individual’s implicit 
attitudes to food as a function of food deprivation state manipulations. Having 
achieved this aim, a subsequent objective of the research programme was to determine 
if it was possible to detect reliable differences in neurophysiological activity while 
participants completed the food-IRAP. Finally, the research aimed to examine the 
malleability of the food-IRAP effect. This final chapter will now review the major 
findings of the six empirical investigations presented in the thesis and will consider a 
number of conceptual and theoretical issues arising from the work.  
9.1 Overview of the Current Research Programme 
 As outlined in the introductory chapter, the IRAP is a novel methodology 
developed from an RFT empirical foundation. Other implicit attitude measures, such 
as the IAT, EAST, and APP, on the other hand, have arisen from within the 
mainstream associative socio-cognitive arena. To date, implicit food attitudes among 
obese and normal-weight individuals have typically been measured using these 
mainstream measures. Despite the fact that the IAT is seen as the gold standard 
implicit measure and is also the most widely employed in the domain of implicit food 
attitudes, several salient weaknesses have been highlighted (see Chapter 1). Moreover, 
research using the IAT, and the other mainstream measures, have failed to provide 
any evidence to support the claim that implicit attitudes to healthy and unhealthy 
foods are related in any meaningful way to eating behaviour, at least in terms of 
differentiating between normal-weight and obese individuals. As noted previously, an 
APP study did find a difference between these weight categories, but in their attitudes 
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to sweet versus savoury unhealthy foods, rather than healthy and unhealthy food types 
(Czyzewska, & Graham, 2008). 
 As noted previously, one criticism of mainstream associative measures is that 
they may be sensitive to social or cultural associations, and it is these that are 
reflected in the measures (Wittenbrink, & Schwarz, 2007). As a result, an IAT 
performance pertaining to healthy and unhealthy foods may reflect, in part, social 
conditioning rather than the individual’s actual food preferences. The current research 
programme therefore employed the IRAP because it was designed to assess relations 
rather than “raw” or simple associations. In this way, it was possible to target food-
wanting and food-hunger relations directly with the implicit measure. A review of the 
findings from each of the studies will now be given. 
 Study 1 (Chapter 3) investigated implicit and explicit food-wanting attitudes 
among obese and normal-weight individuals in a 2-hr food deprivation state and in an 
unrestricted food deprivation condition. The wanting-IRAP failed to differentiate 
obese from normal-weight individuals, with all four groups producing relatively weak 
healthy food biases. Similarly, the explicit wanting-scale did not discriminate between 
the four groups with each demonstrating a weak healthy food bias. Only the EDE-Q 
and PFS measures discriminated between the two weight categories, but not between 
the deprivation states. The obese groups reported higher levels of abnormal EDE-Q 
eating attitudes and behaviors and susceptibility to food cues in the environment 
relative to the normal-weight participants. Correlations between the implicit and 
explicit measures yielded only one significant negative correlation, with the BIDR. 
That is, lower D-IRAP scores (i.e., a stronger healthy bias) predicted higher levels of 
Self-Deception and Impression Management. 
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 Given that the wanting-IRAP did not differentiate obese from normal-weight 
participants, the second study (Chapter 4) aimed to partially replicate Study 1 but 
target hunger rather than wanting to eat. The labels Makes Me Feel Hungry Now and 
Does Not Make Me Feel Hungry Now were used instead of the labels I want to eat it 
NOW versus LATER. The hunger-IRAP differentiated between the weight-categories 
in the 2-hr food deprivation condition. The obese participants demonstrated a pro-
unhealthy food bias and the normal-weight group a pro-healthy bias. No group 
differences were found in the No-Restriction condition. The explicit hunger-scale did 
not differentiate among the groups (i.e., all four groups produced weak healthy food 
biases). Only the EDE-Q and PFS explicit measures discriminated between the weight 
categories, but no effects for deprivation state were observed. The obese groups 
reported higher levels of abnormal EDE-Q eating attitudes and behaviors and 
susceptibility to food cues in the environment relative to the normal-weight 
participants.  
 Correlations between the implicit and explicit measures yielded only two 
positive and significant correlations between the D-IRAP scores and EDE-Q Eating 
Concern and a mindfulness measure (MAAS), respectively. Thus, higher levels of 
unhealthy food bias on the IRAP predicted more abnormal concerns about eating and 
higher levels of mindfulness. The IRAP measure increased the predictive ability of the 
hunger-scale, EDE-Q Eating Concern, BIDR Self Deception, BIDR Impression 
Management, and Global BIDR, PFS, and MAAS explicit measures for the 2-hr food 
deprived participants. In contrast, the D-IRAP measure did not significantly increase 
the predictive validity of any of the explicit measures for individuals in the No-
Restriction groups. In sum, an IRAP that targeted eating (now versus later) did not 
discriminate between normal-weight and obese participants, but when the IRAP 
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targeted hunger reactions to food a clear discrimination was observed, but only in the 
two-hour food-deprivation condition. 
 Study 3 (Chapter 5) aimed to increase the ability of the hunger-IRAP to 
discriminate obese from normal-weight participants’ implicit food attitudes (utilizing 
“very” versus slightly” rather than the dichotomous hungry versus not hungry 
relation). Similar to Study 2, the obese participants produced a pro-unhealthy food 
bias and the normal-weight participants a pro-healthy bias in the 2-hr food-deprivation 
condition. In contrast with Study 2, the normal-weight participants also showed a pro-
unhealthy bias in the No-Restriction condition, whereas the obese produced a weak 
pro-healthy bias. Once again, the explicit measures (i.e., the hunger-scale and the 
liking-scales) did not differentiate among the groups. The EDE-Q and BIDR measures 
discriminated between weight categories but not within deprivation states. The obese 
groups produced significantly higher levels of pathological EDE-Q behaviours and 
attitudes to food as well as significantly higher levels of BIDR, Self Presentation and 
Impression Management relative to the normal-weight participants (significant 
differences between the groups for the BIDR were not observed in the previous 
studies). Unlike the previous studies, no correlations between the implicit and explicit 
measures were found. 
 The IRAP measure increased predictive validity for seven of the explicit 
measures for the 2-hr food deprived participants (i.e., the hunger-scale, liking-scale, 
EDE-Q Restraint, EDE-Q Eating Concern, BIDR Self Deception, BIDR Impression 
Management, and Global BIDR), and for six of the explicit measures for the No-
Restriction participants (i.e., the hunger-scale, liking-scale, EDE-Q Restraint, BIDR 
Self Deception, BIDR Impression Management and Global BIDR; marginal 
significance was obtained for EDE-Q Eating and Shape concern). In sum, the very-
 156 
versus-slightly hungry IRAP employed in Study 3 was affected by participants’ 
weight and deprivation state, with the normal-weight group showing an unhealthy 
bias not observed in Study 2. It appears, therefore, that introducing the very-versus-
slightly dimension to the IRAP increased the sensitivity of the measure, relative to the 
dichotomous IRAP used in the previous study.  
 Study 4 (Chapter 6) sought to further test the validity of the very-versus-
slightly IRAP by examining an additional response measure. Specifically, the study 
recorded participants’ EEG signals while they completed the IRAP in a 2-hr 
deprivation state. The findings replicated the effects found in the 2-hr food 
deprivation condition in Study 3, (i.e., a pro-healthy bias). The ERP grandaverage 
waveforms for the pro-healthy trials were more negative than pro-unhealthy 
waveforms in the 400 to 700ms interval for the frontal sites, F4 and F6, but the 
reverse pattern was demonstrated for the parietal areas, P3 and P5 (pro-unhealthy 
trials were more negative than pro-healthy waveforms). No differences were found 
between any of the explicit measures in the current study and in the 2-hr food 
deprivation condition in Study 3 (i.e., hunger-scale, EDE-Q, and BIDR). Similar to 
Study 3, no significant correlations were reported among the explicit measures and D-
IRAP scores. These data this served to replicate (partially) the previous study to 
provide additional evidence for the validity of the measure.  
 Having developed a food-IRAP that appeared sensitive to both body mass and 
food deprivation state, Study 5 (Chapter 7) provided an initial examination of the 
malleability of implicit hunger attitudes on the IRAP. Specifically, participants 
completed the IRAP following an Acceptance versus Indulgence of Food Urges 
manipulation. The results showed that the manipulation affected the IRAP effects. 
Specifically, the Control and the ACC group produced similar pro-unhealthy food 
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biases, whereas the IND group did not discriminate between unhealthy and healthy 
foods. The inverse pattern was indicated on the explicit hunger-scale; the IND group 
provided the strongest unhealthy food preference, but the Control and ACC groups’ 
hunger scores were lower and not significantly different from each other. The ACC 
and IND groups produced similarly high levels of craving for their favourite snack, 
both significantly higher than the Control group. The IND group reported 
significantly lower resistance for their favourite snack foods relative to the ACC 
group (the Control group’s resistance level did not differ from the ACC group). Only 
one positive and significant correlation was found between the D-IRAP scores and the 
explicit measures (i.e., MAAS). Thus, higher unhealthy food biases predicted 
increased levels of mindfulness. The D-IRAP score increased predictive validity for 
the hunger-scale, the cravings and the resist items of the Cravings-questionnaire for 
the IND group. 
 Overall, Study 5 indicated that implicit and explicit food attitudes are 
susceptible to malleability effects based on the type of response strategy used to deal 
with food urges/cravings. Implicitly, the IND group showed almost no discrimination 
between healthy and unhealthy foods (the ACC and Control groups showed strong 
unhealthy food biases), but explicitly the IND group showed the highest hunger and 
craving effects combined with lower resistance. Although the lack of bias on the 
IRAP might be seen as inconsistent with the explicit measures, it was argued that it 
could also be indicative of relatively high levels of hunger (because any food will do 
when one is hungry). 
The final study (Chapter 8) sought to test this interpretation of the lack of bias 
on the IRAP. Specifically, normal-weight participants were exposed to the IRAP in 
either a hungry (4-hr-Plus deprivation) or sated condition. In both conditions, a lack of 
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discrimination between healthy and unhealthy foods was recorded for the implicit and 
explicit measures. This finding supports the conclusion that the lack of discrimination 
recorded on the IRAP for the IND group in the previous study was indicative of 
increased hunger. Note, however, that the participants in the former study reported a 
pro-unhealthy bias on the explicit measures, but no such bias was recorded in the 
current study. No differences were found between the groups on the EDE-Q or BIDR 
explicit measures. Only the EDE-Q Total Behaviour explicit measure produced a 
significant negative correlation with the D-IRAP scores (i.e., healthier implicit bias 
predicted increased reports of abnormal eating behaviours). All other correlations 
were non-significant.  
 Having summarized the findings arising from the current research programme, 
the remaining sections of this final chapter will consider some of the conceptual and 
theoretical issues that are raised by this research.   
9.2 Explicit Measures of Attitudes to Healthy and Unhealthy Foods 
 Neither the explicit wanting-, hunger-, nor liking-scales differentiated obese 
from normal-weight participants’ attitudes towards healthy and unhealthy foods in 
any of the studies that compared these groups (i.e., Studies 1, 2, or 3). These findings 
are consistent with previous studies that employed explicit measures along with the 
IAT, APP or EAST (Reofs & Jansen, 2002; Craeynest et. al., 2007; Craeynest et. al., 
2006; Craeynest et. al., 2005; Czyzewska, & Graham, 2008). This lack of 
discrimination for the explicit measures could be as a result of participants’ 
responding in a socially desirable manner based on the current Western idealization of 
the slim body type (Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999). In other 
words, the stigmatization associated with being obese might make it difficult for 
obese individuals to admit to wanting food, feeling hungry or liking unhealthy foods. 
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Note, however, that in Study 5 the explicit hunger-scale did differentiate normal-
weight individuals in the IND group from those in the control group, which seems 
inconsistent with the previous findings. On balance, the food exercise employed in 
this study focused on the participants’ self-identified favourite snack and not 
unhealthy and healthy foods per se. Thus, the contextual influence of social 
desirability may have been undermined here, given that participants were required to 
identify to the researcher the food they wanted to eat. To conclude, the current thesis 
found that explicit wanting, hunger and liking measures are not particularly sensitive 
for discriminating obese from normal-weight individuals’ attitudes toward healthy and 
unhealthy foods. It remains to be seen if such measures would discriminate between 
these groups in a context in which they must first identify their favourite snack food to 
the researcher.  
 The EDE-Q is an established clinical measure of attitudes and behaviours with 
regard to food, and has been widely used in both research and treatment of obesity 
and other eating disorders. Consequently, significant differences between the two 
weight categories would be expected on this measure. In Studies, 1, 2 and 3 
differences were recorded on the Global EDE-Q, and on the EDE-Q subscales 
(Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern) as well as for EDE-
Q Total Behaviours. These findings are in line with other EDE-Q research with 
normal-weight and obese samples (e.g., Elder, Grilo, Masheb, Rothschild, Burke-
Martindale, & Brody 2006; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994). 
 The recently developed PFS scale measured participants’ susceptibility to food 
cues in the environment. Differences between obese and normal-weight individuals 
were predicted for this measure. The findings from Study 1 and 2 were in line with 
these predictions and other PFS research (e.g., Lowe and Butryn, 2007).  
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 The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding is a well established 
measure of self-presentation biases. The BIDR differentiated between obese and 
normal-weight participants in Study 3 but not in Studies 1 and 2. The lack of BIDR 
differences reported in the latter two studies is in line with Andreson, Rieger and 
Caterson (2006). At the current time it remains unclear why a difference was found in 
only one study. 
 The Cravings-Questionnaire measure used in Study 5 was designed to assess 
normal-weight participants’ cravings for their favourite snack food. The carvings 
measure discriminated normal-weight controls from both the Acceptance and 
Indulgence groups. Thus, these finding highlight the ability of the explicit cravings 
measure to detect malleability effects as a result of food-urge response strategy 
manipulations on normal-weight individuals. The resistance item of Cravings-
Questionnaire also discriminated between normal-weight groups; the indulgence 
group differed from the Acceptance group and marginally from the Control group. 
These results highlight the utility of the explicit resistance measure to detect the 
malleability effects observed in the study.  
 Overall, therefore, as expected the explicit clinical assessment measures (i.e., 
the EDE-Q and PFS), but not wanting-, hunger-, or liking-scales, discriminated 
between obese and normal-weight individuals. These results thus support the 
conclusion that the obese and normal-weight populations employed in the current 
research were broadly similar to those employed in previous studies. The findings for 
the BIDR were also similar to previous research, except for one study. Finally, the 
cravings and resistance items of the Cravings-Questionnaire, which was developed for 
the current research, successfully differentiated between the normal-weight groups 
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responses to their favourite snack foods. The findings thus support the possible future 
use of this measure in subsequent research on food urges. 
9.3 The IRAP as a Measure of Implicit Attitudes to Healthy and Unhealthy Foods 
 The IRAP did not differentiate obese from normal-weight individuals’ implicit 
attitudes to food when it targeted wanting to eat now versus later. However, the IRAP 
did differentiate between these groups when it targeted hunger. Specifically, a 
consistent trend emerged on the IRAP with normal-weight individuals demonstrating 
a pro-healthy food bias in a 2-hr food deprivation state in Studies 2, 3 and 4, and 
obese individuals demonstrating a pro-unhealthy bias in Studies 2 and 3. This finding 
is both theoretically and practically interesting.  
 It is theoretically interesting because these are the first studies to discriminate 
between obese and normal weight individuals in terms of their implicit attitudes to 
healthy and unhealthy foods (as noted previously, an APP study did find a difference 
between these weight categories, but only in their attitudes to unhealthy foods, sweet 
versus savoury, rather than between healthy and unhealthy foods; Czyzewska, & 
Graham, 2008). Furthermore, these are the first studies to target implicit hunger 
responses specifically, rather than associative valence. Thus, the current research 
indicates that implicit hunger responses to food (i.e., an immediate emotive response) 
is a more useful discriminator of obese and normal-weight individuals’ food attitudes 
than both implicit wanting (i.e., a more cognitive property of food attitudes) and 
implicit food valance (a less direct food attitude as used within the socio-cognitive 
literature). These findings serve to highlight the advantage of the IRAP over the IAT, 
EAST and APP.  
 The current findings are practically interesting insofar as they could be used to 
inform interventions in the treatment and management of obesity. For example, it 
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remains to be determined if the obese individuals in the current study were aware of 
their unhealthy food biases (in the 2-hr food deprivation conditions), but failed to 
report them on the explicit measures. If they were aware, then perhaps therapeutic 
interventions could focus on achieving greater openness and honesty with regard to 
food preferences. Alternatively, if the obese participants were unaware of their 
implicit food biases, then it may be useful to focus on increasing their awareness of 
difficulties to discriminate food preferences. For example, even informing obese 
individuals that they are more likely to experience an unconscious bias towards 
unhealthy foods around 2 hours after eating a meal could help them to be more 
mindfully aware of the ebb and flow of their food preferences (Baer, Fisher, Huss, 
2005; Baer, Fisher, Huss, 2006; Forman et al., 2007; Kristeller, 2003; Kristeller & 
Hallet, 1999; Telch, 1997: Telch, Agras, & Linehan, 2000; Safer, Telch, & Agras, 
2001). 
 Another pattern of findings from the IRAP should also be noted. The normal-
weight individuals in the No-Restriction condition in Study 3 produced a pro-
unhealthy food bias, whereas in the previous study a neutral bias was recorded. Thus, 
the switch from dichotomous (hungry versus not hungry) to relative hunger labels 
(very verses slightly) across these two studies appeared to impact on the normal-
weight participants. Interestingly, the obese groups failed to show similar sensitivity, 
producing neutral biases in both studies. This finding suggests that normal-weight but 
not obese individuals are capable of relatively fine self-discriminations of their private 
hunger states, at least at an implicit level. This finding seems to accord with previous 
research that has shown that the sight and/or smell of food elicits appetitive responses 
from obese individuals regardless of their self-reported hunger state (e.g., Faith, 
Berkowitz, Stallings, Kerns, Storey, & Stunkard, 2006; Fisher & Birch, 2002; Lowe, 
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2007; Mela, 2006); normal-weight individuals only show such responses when they 
are hungry. Thus, when the obese participants were shown pictures of food on the 
IRAP in the No-Restriction condition the stimuli elicited a relatively strong hunger 
response, which was not shared by the normal-weight groups. Insofar as this was the 
case, only the normal-weight participants would be able to show an effect for the 
relatively subtle “very versus slightly hungry” labels. 
 Given these are the first studies to employ a hunger-IRAP, future research 
needs to explore whether the effects demonstrated by Irish obese and normal-weight 
individuals would also emerge with participants from other countries. There is no 
reason to suspect that only Irish obese and normal-weight individuals would reveal a 
pro-unhealthy and pro-healthy food bias, respectively, in a 2-hr food deprivation state, 
and that only normal-weight individuals would show a pro-unhealthy bias in a No-
Restriction food deprivation condition. Nevertheless, a replication of these findings in 
populations of similar weight in a different country would further bolster confidence 
in the general pattern of results arising from the first implicit measure to clearly 
discriminate between obese and normal-weight groups in their reactions to healthy 
and unhealthy foods. 
 Another finding arising from the current work that provided additional 
evidence for the validity of the IRAP as a measure of implicit hunger responses was 
obtained in Study 4. That is, participants once again produced a pro-healthy bias in a 
2-hr food deprivation condition, and EEG recordings also clearly discriminated 
between responding on pro-healthy versus pro-unhealthy trials. Specifically, the ERP 
grandaverage waveforms for the parietal area were more negative for the pro-
unhealthy trials than for the pro-healthy trials, but the reverse pattern was found for 
two frontal sites (i.e., pro-unhealthy waveforms more positive than pro-healthy). The 
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results for the two parietal sites are consistent with the findings from the only other 
IRAP/EEG study (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2008). That is, waveforms associated with 
relational responding that was deemed inconsistent with the participants’ response 
biases were more negative than those waveforms associated with responding in 
accordance with those biases. In contrast, the pattern from the frontal sites was 
completely opposite. Currently, it is unclear why these differences emerged in the 
EEG measures across the two studies. Future research will need to explore this matter 
further. Nevertheless, these findings replicate (partially) the previous study and 
provide additional support for the validity of the IRAP. 
 Additional evidence for the validity of the hunger-IRAP was provided in 
Study 5, in that a malleability effect was observed using an Acceptance versus 
Indulgence of Food Urges manipulation. Specifically, the Indulgence group 
demonstrated a lack of implicit discrimination between healthy and unhealthy food 
categories, whereas the Acceptance and Control groups showed unhealthy food 
biases. The lack of discrimination on the IRAP was interpreted as evidence for an 
increased hunger response produced by the indulgence exercise, and supportive 
results for this view were obtained in the final study of the thesis (i.e., in the 4-hr-Plus 
deprivation condition). The findings thus showed that an acceptance strategy to food 
urges produced implicit responses that were broadly similar to a control group who 
had been presented with any food. Thus, at least at an implicit level, the acceptance 
strategy appeared to undermine the psychological functions of the food exercise. This 
finding is of course consistent with a growing body of evidence that supports the 
effectiveness of acceptance-based interventions in dealing with psychological 
discomfort (Block, 2003; Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 2007; 
Forman, Hoffman, McGrath, Herbert, Brandsma, & Lowe, 2007; Geiser, 1993; 
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Lappalainen, Lehtonen, Skarp, Taubert, Ojanen, & Hayes, 2007; Levitt, Brown, 
Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Twohig & Woods, 2004; Zettle, 2003; Zettle & Hayes, 
1986). 
9.4 Predictive Validity 
9.4.1 Prediction of Weight Category by Explicit and Implicit Hunger Attitudes 
 No correlations were reported among the explicit food attitude measures (i.e., 
the wanting-, hunger-, and liking-scales) and the D-IRAP scores for obese and 
normal-weight individuals in Studies, 1, 2 and 3. Overall, therefore, it would seem 
that the explicit measures were not tapping into the same food attitude responses as 
those captured by the IRAP. This general finding is consistent with a now large body 
of evidence indicating that implicit and explicit measures reflect different types of 
behaviours (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, 
Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009; Nock, & Banaji, 2007). 
 A small number of correlations were recorded between the IRAP and the 
explicit measures across the studies; that is with MAAS in Studies 2 and 5, with 
BIDR in Study 1, with EDE-Q Eating Concern in Study 2, with EDE-Q Total 
Behaviors in Study 6, and marginally with EDE-Q Restraint and the Hunger-scale in 
Study 4. Given the relatively large number of correlational analyses conducted within 
and across studies, and the resultant possibility of Type-2 error, it would be unwise to 
read too much into these findings. Nonetheless, a relationship between the IRAP and 
the MAAS was recorded in two separate studies, and thus it warrants comment here. 
Specifically, increased unhealthy food bias on the IRAP predicted increased 
mindfulness. Although this result might appear counterintuitive, in that mindfulness 
has been linked with positive psychological health (Brown & Ryan, 2003), the MAAS 
questionnaire focuses on participants’ attention and awareness to present experience. 
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Thus it could be that individuals with an unhealthy food bias have an acute sensitivity 
to current internal and external experiences.  It is also worth noting that the MAAS is 
a relatively old mindfulness scale. In addition, according to Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy research, mindfulness not only specifies contact with the 
present moment but also includes; acceptance of current experience, defusion from 
the literally of thoughts; as well as a transcendent sense of self (Fletcher & Hayes, 
2007). Thus, the MAAS scores in Study 2 and 5 do not reflect these other important 
mindfulness properties. Perhaps, utilizing a more recent mindfulness scale that also 
includes the other mindfulness properties may have yielded different effects from 
those reported in both Studies 2 and 5 (i.e., the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; 
FFMQ, Baer, Smith, Lykins, Button, Krietemeyer, Sauer et al., 2008)  
 The general lack of correlations between the implicit and explicit measures 
noted above does not of course speak to the predictive validity of the measures. To 
address this issue, logistic regression analyses were conducted in Studies 2 and 3 to 
determine if the IRAP increased the validity of the explicit measures in predicting the 
weight category of the participants. The hunger-scale did not significantly predict 
weight category for either deprivation condition in Study 2, but when the IRAP was 
added it significantly increased predictive validity in the 2-hr deprivation condition. In 
Study 3, neither the explicit hunger nor liking measures predicted participants’ weight 
category, but once again when the IRAP measure was added to the models, it 
significantly increased prediction of weight category for both the 2-hr and No-
Restriction deprivation conditions. Critically, these findings are in stark contrast to 
previous studies that have employed implicit measures in the study of food attitudes. 
Specifically, the IAT, APP and the EAST have all failed to predict weight category. 
The current findings thus point to the utility of employing the hunger-IRAP in future 
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studies investigating obese and normal-weight individuals’ attitudes to healthy and 
unhealthy foods. 
 9.4.2 The Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire and the IRAP. As an 
established clinical measure, the EDE-Q would be expected to predict weight-
category, and indeed this was found to be the case. Specifically, when the Global 
score or a subscale (Restraint, Eating Concern, Shape Concern and Weight Concern) 
were entered into the first step of a hierarchical logistic regression model they 
predicted weight category in Study 2 (except for Weight Concern in the 2-hr 
deprivation condition and Eating Concern in the No-Restriction condition) and Study 
3 (except for Shape Concern and Weight Concern in the 2-hr condition). Critically, 
however, when the IRAP measure was entered into the model in the second step it 
significantly increased predictive validity for one of the subscale measures in Study 2 
(i.e., Eating Concern), but only for the 2-hr deprivation condition. In Study 3, 
however, the IRAP measure increased predictive validity for two of the subscales 
(i.e., Restraint and Eating Concern) for the 2-hr condition and for one of the subscales 
(Restraint) in the No-Restriction condition. It is worth noting, that in Study 3 the 
IRAP increased the predictive validity of those subscales that targeted eating-related 
issues rather than concerns over body-shape and weight, which might be expected 
given that the implicit measure was targeting hunger rather than concerns over body 
image.  In any case, the fact that the IRAP increased the predictive validity of a well-
established clinical measure in a relatively precise manner provides compelling 
evidence in support of the potential utility of the IRAP in the study of food attitudes 
and eating behaviour. Indeed, this finding is particularly noteworthy given that at the 
time of writing no published study had reported similar predictive validity with any 
other implicit measure. 
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 9.4.3 Power of Food Scale and the IRAP. The ability of the PFS to predict 
weight category was in line with expectations for the clinical measure. That is, when 
the PFS was entered into the regression model in the first step it significantly 
predicted weight category for participants in both the 2-hr and No-Restriction 
deprivation conditions in Study 2. The inclusion of the IRAP in the model increased 
predictive validity in the 2-hr condition. Once again, these findings provide additional 
support for the validity of the IRAP. 
 9.4.4 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding and the IRAP. The Global 
BIDR measure only predicted weight category for participants in the 2-hr condition in 
Study 3. Adding the IRAP to the model increased the predictive validity of the Global 
BIDR and its subscales (i.e., IM and SDE) in the 2-hr condition of Study 2 and both 
the 2-hr and No-Restriction conditions of Study 3. In each case, therefore, the IRAP 
either improved significant predictive validity or provided a significant effect that was 
absent with the BIDR alone. Again, this finding supports the utility of the IRAP. 
 The IRAP also increased the predictive validly of other explicit measure that 
were not central to the current thesis. That is, the IRAP demonstrated significant 
prediction effects that were not found using the MAAS on its own in Studies 2 and 5. 
Additionally, the IRAP significantly increased the predictive validity for the cravings 
item and marginally for the resist item on the Craving-Questionnaire in Study 5.   
 Overall, therefore, the IRAP repeatedly increased the predictive validity of 
explicit measures that targeted food and clinically relevant eating attitudes (i.e., 
hunger, cravings, resistance, restraint, eating concern and the PFS, but not measures 
targeting body image). In addition, the IRAP also increased the predictive validity of 
measures of Mindfulness, and of Social Desirability Responding. In sum these 
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findings further support the inclusion of the IRAP in future research on pro-healthy 
and pro-unhealthy food attitudes in obese and normal-weight populations. 
 9.5 Why did the IRAP Increase Predictive Validity? 
 At this point, it seems important to ask the IRAP was a better predictor of 
weight category than some of the explicit measures? In the second chapter of the 
current thesis the REC model was outlined as a possible behavioural account of 
implicit cognition (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010), and an explanation based on this 
model might be as follows. According to the REC model, when an individual is 
required to express an attitude on a standard self-report measure, it is likely that the 
person will produce a relational response that coheres with one or more other 
relational responses in their behavioural repertoire. If these relational responses also 
cohere with their initial relational response then implicit attitudes (measured by the 
IRAP) and explicit attitudes (reported on self-reports measures) will converge; 
however, if there is a lack of coherence in this respect then there will be a divergence 
between them. This latter trend is particularly common with respect to 
psychologically sensitive attitudes, in which an individual might be judged negatively 
for expressing a particular attitude.  
 Imagine, for example, when an obese participant is asked to rate a pictures of 
unhealthy and healthy foods as “making them feel very” or “slightly hungry”, and the 
two pictures are rated equally on these rating scales. A participant’s initial ratings of 
these pictures might indicate that the unhealthy food is higher on the “very hungry” 
dimension and the healthy food is higher on the “slightly hungry” dimension. 
However, other relevant features of an extended relational network may be involved, 
such as, “I might seem weak for wanting to eat the unhealthy food.” Thus, this 
statement would not cohere with the initial response to the pictures, and in the context 
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of an explicit measure the person’s initial response might be rejected in favour of the 
more elaborated relational responding. On the IRAP, however, the influence of a 
participant’s elaborated relational responding would be absent or significantly 
reduced, because there is insufficient time on each trial to engage in the elaborate 
relational activity that can serve to generate a relationally coherent response. As a 
result, there would be a divergence between responding as measured by the IRAP and 
the elaborated responding provided on the questionnaire.  
 The lack of discrimination on the explicit hunger measures seen in Studies 2 
and 3 could well have been the result of pressure to respond in a socially desirable 
manner (due to the western idealization of “slim as beautiful”). As a result, the 
explicit measures were limited in their ability to predict participants’ weight category. 
From an RFT perspective, human cognition is relational in nature (Hayes, Barnes, & 
Roche, 2001), and hence any instrument that approaches human responding in that 
fashion may provide a better predictor of behaviour in certain contexts.  
9.6 Conclusion 
 The aim of the current program of research was to develop an IRAP that was 
sensitive enough to discriminate obese and normal-weight individual’s implicit 
attitudes to food as a function of food deprivation state manipulations. Having 
achieved this aim, a subsequent objective of the research programme was to determine 
if it was possible to detect reliable differences in neurophysiological activity while 
participants completed the IRAP. Finally, the research aimed to examine the 
malleability of the IRAP effect.  
 The advantages of the IRAP were several fold: (a) unlike any other implicit 
measure, it differentiated between the implicit responses of obese and normal-weight 
individuals to healthy and unhealthy foods, accounting for variance beyond that 
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provided by a range of explicit measures; (b) the IRAP effects were relatively robust 
across studies; (c) a measure of neurological processing (EEGs) was successfully 
obtained while participants completed the IRAP, and the data yielded some effects 
that appear consistent with previous research; and (d) it revealed the malleability of 
implicit responses using an acceptance-based intervention, an effect that has not yet 
been reported in the literature on psychological acceptance or implicit attitudes.  
 Overall, these findings support the utility of the IRAP in future investigations 
of food biases in obese and normal-weight individuals. Finally, the current research 
programme adds to previously published IRAP studies showing the efficacy of the 
IRAP as a measure of implicit bias across a range of domains. 
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Appendix A: Summary of Implicit Food Studies 
 
Study Author Adults Children Normal-
Weight 
Obese Restrained Unrestrained Words 
Stimuli 
Picture 
Stimuli 
Unhealthy 
Bias 
Healthy 
Bias 
Other Implicit 
Explicit 
Correlation 
Implicit 
Predicts 
Behaviour 
IAT 
Fruit Juice  
vs. Sodas 
 
Maison, 
Greenwald, and 
Bruin (2001) 
Experiments 1 
& 2 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes   Yes  Yes Not reported 
IAT 
High vs. Low 
Calorie Foods 
among 
Females 
Maison, 
Greenwald, and 
Bruin (2001) 
Experiments 2 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes   Yes  Yes Not reported 
IAT 
Apple vs.  
Candy bar 
Karpinski and 
Hilton (2001) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes   Yes  No No 
IAT 
Apple vs. 
Candy bar 
Olzon and 
Fazio (2004) 
Study 1 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes   Yes  No No 
Personalized 
IAT 
Apple vs.  
Candy bar 
Olzon and 
Fazio (2004) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes      Neutral 
  Bias 
Yes Not reported 
IAT 
Images of two 
Yoghurt 
Brands 
Maison, 
Greenwald, and 
Bruin (2004) 
Experiments 1 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
    Yes   Bias toward 
preferred brand. 
Yes Marginal 
 
IAT 
McDonald’s 
vs. Milk Bar 
Restaurants 
Maison, 
Greenwald, and 
Bruin (2004) 
Experiments 2 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes    Bias toward 
preferred 
restaurant and 
observed 
behaviour. 
 
Yes No 
IAT 
Coca-Cola vs. 
 Pepsi 
Maison, 
Greenwald, and 
Bruin (2004) 
Experiments 3 
 Secondary 
School 
Children 
Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
    Yes   Bias toward 
preferred brand, 
only for those 
who used the 
product most 
Not 
Reported 
Yes 
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frequently and 
also those who 
could 
discriminate 
Coca-Cola from 
Pepsi based on 
blind tasting. 
IAT 
Four studies 
With Fruits  
vs. snacks 
Perugini and 
Pretwich 
(2007) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes   Yes Bias for fruit 
over snacks in 
all studies. 
Only in 
one study,  
conducted in 
summer 
Yes 
IAT 
Foods vs.  
Furniture 
Stafford and 
Scheffler 
(2008) 
Yes  Marginally 
over-
weight 
    
Yes 
   Bias for food 
over furniture. 
Not 
Reported 
Not reported 
SC-IAT 
M&MS-
pleasant vs. 
M&MS-
unpleasant 
Hofmann, 
Gschwender, 
Friese, Wiers, 
and Schmitt 
(2008) 
Yes  Not 
reported as 
otherwise 
   Yes Yes   Differentiated 
between 
individuals with 
high and low 
bias towards 
M&Ms. 
Yes Moderated 
by Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
SC-IAT 
M&MS- 
pleasant  
vs. M&MS-
unpleasant 
Hofmann and 
Friese (2008) 
Yes  Normal 
and 
slightly 
overweight 
   Yes Yes   Differentiated 
between 
individuals with 
high and low 
bias for M&Ms. 
No Moderated 
by alcohol. 
IAT 
High fat vs.  
low fat food 
Reofs and 
Jansen (2002) 
Yes  Yes Yes   Yes    More negative 
bias towards 
high-fat food for 
the obese. 
No Not reported 
Self-Concept  
IAT, self vs. 
 others, for  
non-fat vs.  
fat foods  
. 
Craeynest, 
Crombez, De 
Houwer, 
Deforche, and 
De 
Bourdeaudhuij 
(2006) 
 Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes Normal-weight 
individuals 
associated 
themselves more 
strongly with 
non-fat foods. 
Obese 
individuals 
associated 
themselves with 
fat and non-fat 
food equally. 
Not 
Reported 
Not reported 
Personalized 
IAT, Study 1; 
palatable 
Craeynest, 
Crombez, 
Haerens, and 
 Yes Yes Yes 
 
  Yes   Yes In study 1, both 
groups liked 
food and 
Yes Not reported 
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foods vs. 
hobbies and 
Study 2; 
palatable 
healthy foods 
vs. palatable 
unhealthy 
foods. 
De 
Bourdeaudhuij 
(2007) 
hobbies to the 
equally. In 
Study 2, both 
groups produced 
a significant 
positive implicit 
attitude towards 
palatable 
healthy over 
palatable 
unhealthy foods. 
Arousal IATs, 
fat vs. lean-
food and 
positive v.s 
negative 
arousal among 
normal-weight 
vs. overweight 
individuals in 
study 1 and 
among 
normal-weight 
vs. obese 
individuals in 
Study 2. 
Craeynest, 
Crombez, 
Koster, 
Haerens and De 
Boudeaudhuij 
(2008) 
 Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  All groups 
produced pro-
fat-food-high-
positive-arousal 
and pro-fat-
food-high-
negative-arousal 
effects 
respectively on 
the food-
positive and 
food-negative 
arousal IATs 
with no 
difference for 
weight category 
in Study or 
Study 2. 
Only for the 
obese group. 
Not reported 
APP, Strong 
versus 
Moderately 
like foods 
Lamote, 
Hermans, 
Baeyens, and 
Eelen (2004) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes Yes   Bias towards 
liked over 
disliked foods 
Not 
Reported 
Not reported 
APP, recently 
acquired food 
odours 
Hermans, 
Baeyens, 
Lamote, 
Spruyt, and 
Eelen (2005) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Yes Yes   Bias towards 
pleasant over 
unpleasant 
yoghurt. 
Not 
Reported 
Not reported 
Food Priming 
Picture 
Naming APP, 
Sensory and 
expected 
consequence   
Verhurlst, 
Hermans, 
Baeyens, 
Spruyt, and 
Eelen (2006) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
    Yes   Bias towards 
positive over 
negative 
conditioned 
cookies. 
Not 
Reported 
For the 
sensory-
liking group 
but not the 
expected 
consequence 
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group. 
APP Oral 
Flavour 
Priming  
Veldhuizen, 
Oosterhoof, 
and Kroeze 
(2009) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
   Words 
and 
Oral 
Flavour 
Primes 
   Bias towards 
positive over 
negative 
conditioned 
flavour. 
Only Non-
parametric  
Correlation 
between 
strawberry 
lemonade 
and explicit 
pleasantness 
rating 
Not reported 
APP, 
Lean 
unrestainted 
vs. anorexic 
vs. obese 
individuals 
Roefs, Stapert, 
Isabella, 
Wolters, 
Wojciechowski
, and Jansen 
(2005) 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Study 1; 
Marginal bias 
for palatable 
over unpalatable 
food for lean 
controls vs. 
anorexics. Study 
2; both obese 
and unrestrained 
had a marginally 
significant bias 
for low-fat 
palatable over 
unpalatable 
foods, no group 
differences. 
Not reported Not reported 
APP, high-fat 
vs. low-fat and 
palatable vs. 
unpalatable 
foods, 
restaurant and 
hospital 
context 
manipulation 
and after food 
craving 
induction. 
Roefs, 
Quaedackers, 
Werrij, 
Wolters, 
Havermans, 
Nederkoorn, 
van Breukelen 
and Jansen 
(2006) 
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Study 1; error 
data showed. 
palatable over 
unpalatable food 
bias for both 
groups in  the 
restaurant 
condition and 
opposite effect 
in  the health 
condition. Study 
2; both groups 
had a significant 
bias for low-fat 
foods after 
cravings 
induction. 
No significant 
Only in 
Study 2, for 
the obese 
group with 
high initial 
food 
cravings. 
Not reported 
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differences due 
among the 
weight 
categories in 
Study 1 or Study 
2. 
New picture-
symbol variant 
of the APP 
Papies, 
Wolfgang and 
Aarts (2009) 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes   Two Studies 
found 
unrestrained 
eaters had a 
significantly 
more positive 
bias towards 
palatable foods 
over unpalatable 
and neutral 
foods but 
restrained eaters 
did not. 
Not reported. Restraints 
Scale and 
palatable 
food 
negative 
ambivalence 
score predict 
APP score. 
APP, high 
calorie savory 
vs, high 
calorie sweet 
foods between 
obese, 
overweight 
and normal-
weight 
individuals. 
Czyzewska, 
and Graham, 
(2008) 
Yes   Yes 
and 
over- 
weight 
  Yes Yes   Obese group 
only had 
significant bias 
for high-calorie 
non-savoury 
foods and 
negative bias for 
high-calorie 
sweet. Normal-
weigh (NW) and 
overweight 
(OW) had 
significant 
reverse pattern. 
NW and OW 
had significant 
negative bias 
toward low 
calorie foods 
compared to 
high-calorie 
sweet foods,  
obese did not. 
Not reported Not reported 
APP and 
EAST, 
Roefs, Herman, 
MacLeod, 
Yes  Yes   Yes Yes    Restrained and 
unrestrained 
Not reported Not reported 
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palatable vs. 
unpalatable 
foods. 
Smulders, and 
Jansen (2005) 
eaters have a 
significant bias 
towards 
palatable 
compared to 
unpalatable 
foods. 
EAST with 
healthy vs. 
unhealthy 
foods  
Craeynest, 
Crombez, De 
Houwer, 
Deforche, 
Tanghe, and De 
Bourdeaudhuij 
(2005) 
 Yes Yes Yes  Yes     Biases for 
healthy and 
unhealthy foods 
for obese, 
normal-weight 
youngsters were 
neutral towards 
both. 
Not reported Not reported 
IAT and 
EAST, meat 
vs. vegetables 
for vegetarians 
and 
nonvegetarians 
De Houwer and 
De Bruycker 
(2007) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
    Yes   Vegetarians had 
a pro-vegetable 
over meat bias 
on both 
measures 
Both IAT 
and EAST 
correlated 
with explicit 
rating 
measures. 
Explicit but 
not implicit 
measures 
were 
significant 
predictors of 
group status. 
IAT, EAST 
and 
Behavioural 
AST for food 
attitudes 
among normal 
and eating 
disorder 
individuals 
(anorexics and 
bulimics) 
Seibt, Häfner 
and Deutsch, 
(2007) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
as 
otherwise 
 Yes  Yes Yes   Study 1; 
normal-weight 
had bias for 
food over sport 
on the IAT. 
Study 2: bias for 
food over 
flowers and 
non-words on 
the EAST. All 
groups all had 
stronger 
approach 
tendencies 
toward food 
when food 
deprived than 
sated. 
Correlation 
between IAT 
and EAST 
and food 
deprivation 
time. 
Not reported 
EAST and 
explicit food 
and exercise 
attitudes 
Creaynest, 
Crombez, 
Deforche, 
Tanghe, & De 
 Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes Yes Bias towards 
both healthy and 
unhealthy foods. 
Similar to 
Not reported Implicit 
healthy food 
bias 
predicted 
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assess during 
an obesity 
treatment 
program and at 
follow up. 
Bourdeaudhuil, 
(2008) 
Craeynest et al. 
(2005) 
weight loss 
at end of 
treatment but 
not a follow-
up. Explicit 
measures did 
not. 
EAST High 
calorie food 
related word 
vs. low 
calories food 
related words  
Hoefling and 
Strack (2008) 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes    Both restrained 
and unrestrained 
has had positive 
high- and lo w 
calorie food bias 
when deprived. 
But the 
restrained group 
also had a 
marginally 
stronger positive 
bias for high-
calorie food 
related words 
compared to the 
unrestrained 
eaters when 
food deprived 
and sated. 
No Not reported 
GNAT 
assessing 
attitudes to 
Genetically 
Modified 
(GM) food in 
three contexts, 
context free, 
compared to 
ordinary food 
context and 
organic food 
context. 
Spence and 
Townsend 
(2006) 
Yes  Not 
reported 
   Yes    Pro GM food 
bias in context 
free condition, 
neutral bias in 
other two 
conditions. 
No Not reported 
SPP assessing 
the 
associations 
between high-
fat palatable 
Weriji, Roefs, 
Janssen, 
Stapert, 
Wolters, 
Mulkens, 
Yes  Yes Yes   Yes    High-fat 
palatable foods 
primed restraint 
related words 
faster than 
Not reported Not reported 
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foods and 
disinhibition 
and restraint 
related words  
Hospers, and 
Jansen  
(2009) 
neutral words. 
No difference 
based on weight 
category. There 
was no 
association for 
disinhibition 
related words 
Forced choose 
behavioural 
measure 
assessed 
implicit 
wanting food 
attitudes when 
hungry and 
satiated. 
Finlayson, 
King, and 
Blundell (2008) 
Yes  Yes Yes    Yes   Significant 
implicit bias 
towards sweet 
over savoury 
foods when 
sated compared 
to hungry. 
None Significant 
correlations 
between 
implicit 
measure and 
behavioural 
food 
preferences 
for high-fat 
sweet, low-
fat- sweet 
and savoury. 
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Appendix B: Hunger-State-Questionnaire 
 
Subject Number:________________________ 
 
Please answer all of the following questions as honestly as possible. 
 
 
1. How long is it since you ate your last meal, please specify the amount of 
time?________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. Was your last meal                           Small □ Medium □ Large □  
 
 
3. Please indicate below how you feel right now?  
 
Very Hungry         Slightly Hungry       Neither   Slightly Full   Very Full 
      □      □       □         □       □ 
 
 
4. Have you suffered from any gastrointestinal problems in the last 48 hours that have 
impacted on your eating habits (e.g., nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting, over-eating, binge-
eating or hung-over). If yes, please describe problem; otherwise, state no.   
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
5. How well do you feel now?   Unwell □ Well □ Very well□   
 
 
6. Please specify your age? __________ 
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Appendix C: Wanting-Scale 
 
Subject Number:________________________ 
 
Please mark in the appropriate spaces below your answers to the following questions on how 
much you want to eat the particular foods below “NOW” or “LATER”? 
    
LATER             NEUTRAL     NOW 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
1. Hamburger and Chips  ______________ 
 
2. Chocolate    ______________ 
 
3. Ice-Cream   ______________ 
 
3. Steak   ______________ 
 
3. Crisps   ______________ 
 
3. Donuts   ______________ 
 
3. Chicken Salad  ______________ 
 
3. Nuts    ______________ 
 
3. Fruit   ______________ 
 
3. Soup    ______________ 
 
3. Salad   ______________ 
 
3. Fish    ______________ 
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1.  
                                    
 
 
2.  
 
 
                                   
 
 
3.  
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4. 
 
                                    
 
 
5.  
 
                                   
 
 
6.  
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7.  
                                   
 
 
8.  
 
                                  
 
 
9.  
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10.  
 
                                 
 
 
 
 
11.  
                                 
 
 
 
12.  
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Appendix D: Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q5) 
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Appendix E: Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much 
you agree with it. 
 
NOT                  SOMEWHAT                       VERY  
TRUE            TRUE                                                         TRUE 
     1 __________ 2 __________ 3 __________ 4 _________ 5 __________ 6 __________ 7 
 
____ 1     My first impression of people usually turn out to be right. 
____ 2     It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
____ 3     I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
____ 4     I have not always been honest with myself. 
____ 5     I always know why I like things. 
____ 6     When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
____ 7     Once I’ve made up my mind other people can seldom change my opinion. 
____ 8     I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
____ 9     I am full in control of my own fate. 
____ 10   It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
____ 11   I never regret my decisions. 
____ 12   I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 
____ 13   The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
____ 14   My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
____ 15   I am a completely rational person. 
____ 16   I rarely appreciate criticism. 
____ 17   I am very confident of my own judgements. 
____ 18   I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
____ 19   It’s alright with me if some people dislike me. 
____ 20   I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
____ 21   I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
____ 22   I never cover up my mistakes. 
____ 23   There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
____ 24   I never swear. 
____ 25   I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
____ 26   I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
____ 27   I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
____ 28   When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
____ 29    I have received too much change from a sales person without telling him or   
                 her. 
____ 30   I always declare everything at customs. 
____ 31   When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
____ 32   I have never dropped litter on the street. 
____ 33   I sometimes drive faster that the speed limit. 
____ 34   I never read sexy books or magazines. 
____ 35   I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
____ 36   I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
____ 37   I have taken sick leave from work even though I wasn’t really sick. 
____ 38   I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting  
                it. 
____ 39   I have some pretty awful habits. 
____ 40   I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
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Appendix F: Power of Food Scale 
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Appendix G: CONSENT FORM 
 
PARTICIPANT: 
 
I …………………………… consent to participate in an experimental psychology 
study being run by Ian M McKenna and supervised by Professor Dermot Barnes-
Holmes in the Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
(Tel: +353 1 708 4765).  
I understand and consent to the following: 
 
o The experiment will not last longer than 3 hours on any given day.  
o All data from the study will be treated confidentially. 
o The data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the Department of Psychology 
o The data will be retained for a minimum of five years. 
o An alphanumeric code will be entered into the IRAP program to protect your 
identity. This alphanumeric code will also be used on all explicit measures to 
protect your identity.  
o Your data is available to you at your discretion 
o The data collected as part of this study will be collated and form part of Ian M 
McKenna’s doctoral thesis and the results may be included in other 
publications.  
o I am free to terminate my participation in the study at any time and may 
withdraw the data obtained from my participation, if I so wish, up to the time 
of publication. 
o I understand that this experiment cannot be considered a form of treatment for 
any disorder. 
o I have also been informed that my attitudes may change or remain the same 
following the experiment. 
o Results from this research work will not be used deceptively or without your 
consent. 
o If during my participation in the study I feel the information and guidelines I 
have been given are neglected or disregarded in anyway, or if I am unhappy 
about the process I may contact the Secretary of the National University of 
Ireland Maynooth Ethics Committee at pgdean@nuim.ie or 01 708 6018.  
o I have been assured that my concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner. 
o I have received this information in an understandable way.  
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o I was given at least 24 hours before agreeing to volunteer for this study. 
o All my questions at this stage have been answered. 
 
Please print and sign your name below if you are willing to abide fully by the 
conditions stated above. 
Name:   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
(Please print in block capitals) 
 
Signature:  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Date:   _________________________________________________ 
 
 
EXPERIMENTER: 
I, Ian M McKenna, as primary experimenter, accept full responsibility for the care of 
all experimental participants and I confirm that all the necessary safety precautions 
have been taken.  
 
Signature of experimenter: _______________________________ Date:   ________ 
 
Ian M McKenna 
c/o Department of Psychology 
     NUI Maynooth 
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Appendix H: Hunger-Scale 
 
Please mark in the appropriate spaces below your answers to the following questions 
on how hungry or not hungry the following foods makes you feel now?  
  
 
NOT HUNGRY            NEUTRAL    HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
1. Hamburger and Chips  ______________ 
 
2. Chocolate    ______________ 
 
3. Ice-Cream   ______________ 
 
4. Steak   ______________ 
 
5. Crisps   ______________ 
 
6. Donuts   ______________ 
 
7. Chicken Salad  ______________ 
 
8. Nuts    ______________ 
 
9. Fruit   ______________ 
 
10. Soup   ______________ 
 
11. Salad   ______________ 
 
12. Fish   ______________ 
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Appendix I: Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
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Appendix J: VERY/SLIGHTLY Hunger-Scale 
 
Please answer all of the following questions as honestly as possible. 
1. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Hamburger and Chips” makes 
you? 
                                    
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
2. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Chocolate” makes you? 
 
                                   
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
3. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Ice-Cream” makes you? 
                                                                                                                     
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
  228
 
4. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Steak” makes you? 
 
                                    
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
5. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Crisps” makes you? 
 
                                   
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY-
4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
6. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Donuts” makes you? 
 
                                   
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
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7. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Chicken Salad” makes you? 
 
                                   
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
8. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Nuts” makes you? 
 
                                  
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
9. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Fruit” makes you? 
 
                                  
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
10. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Soup” makes you? 
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NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
 
11. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Salad” makes you? 
 
                                 
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
12. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how hungry or not hungry “Fish” makes you? 
 
                                
 
NOT HUNGRY        SLIGHTLY HUNGRY   VERY HUNGRY 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
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Appendix K: Liking-Scale 
 
Please answer all of the following questions as honestly as possible. 
1. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Hamburger and Chips”now? 
 
                                   
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
2. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Chocolate” now? 
 
                                
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
3. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Ice-Cream”now? 
                                   
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
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4. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Steak” now? 
 
                                   
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
5. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Crisps” now? 
 
                                
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
6. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Donuts” now? 
 
                                  
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
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7. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Chicken Salad” now? 
 
                                   
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
8. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Nuts” now? 
 
                                  
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
9. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Fruit” now? 
 
                                  
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
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10. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Soup” now? 
 
                                   
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
11. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Salad” now? 
 
                                   
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4 
 
 
12. On the scale below –4 to 4, rate how palatable (like the taste of) or unpalatable (do NOT 
like the taste of) you find “Fish” now? 
 
                                  
 
VERY UNPALATABLE    NEUTRAL         VERY PALATABLE 
-4_______-3_______-2_______-1_______0_______ 1_______ 2_______ 3_______4
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Appendix L: Cravings Questionnaire 
 
1. Please rate how strong your cravings are to eat your favourite snack right 
now (circle the appropriate number below)?  
 
 
            
 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
2. Please rate your ability is to resist your cravings for your favourite snack 
right now (circle the appropriate number below)?  
 
 
            
 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Cravings Slight  
Cravings 
Extremely 
Strong  
Cravings   
   
No Ability Slight  
Ability 
Strong  
Ability  
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Appendix M: Acceptance of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire 
 
1. What does acceptance mean? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
2 What does willingness mean? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
3. What does awareness mean? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
4. What does distancing mean? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
5. Please write down a summary of the strategy you have been instructed to use here 
today? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
 
6. List any thoughts you had during the exercise? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
7. List any feeling you had during the exercise? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Please rate how useful the strategy was (circle the appropriate number 
below)? 
 
 
Not                    Very  
Useful                    Useful 
  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Please rate how difficult it was to use the strategy during the task (circle the 
appropriate number below)? 
 
 
Very          Very   
Easy          Difficult 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slightly  
Useful 
 
Slightly  
Difficult 
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Appendix N: Indulgence of Food Urges Exercise Questionnaire 
 
1. List any thoughts you had during the exercise? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
2. List any feeling you had during the exercise? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix O: Consent Form for Participants in Chapter 7 
 
PARTICIPANT: 
 
I …………………………… consent to participate in an experimental psychology 
study being run by Mr. Ian M McKenna and supervised by Professor Dermot Barnes-
Holmes, in the Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
(Tel: +353 1 708 4765).  
I understand and consent to the following: 
 
o There are no known risks associated with participation in this workshop and 
any issues that may arise will be addressed by Professor Barnes-Holmes. 
o The workshop will not last longer than 3 hours.  
o Any issues discussed during the workshop will be treated confidentially. 
o To protect your identity an alphanumeric code will be used in all public 
dissemination of the research findings.  
o The data collected as part of this study will be collated and form part of Ian 
McKenna’s doctoral thesis and the results may be included in other 
publications.  
o I am free to terminate my participation in the study at any time and may 
withdraw the data obtained from my participation, if I so wish, up to the time 
of publication. 
o I understand that this study cannot be considered a form of treatment for any 
disorder. 
o I have also been informed that my attitudes and behaviour with respect to food 
and eating may change or remain the same following the study. 
o Results from this research work will not be used deceptively or without my 
consent. 
 
o If during my participation in the study I feel the information and guidelines I 
have been given are neglected or disregarded in anyway, or if I am unhappy 
about the process I may contact the Secretary of the National University of 
Ireland Maynooth Ethics Committee at pgdean@nuim.ie or 01 708 6018.  
o I have been assured that my concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner. 
o I have received this information in an understandable way.  
o I was given at least 24 hours before agreeing to volunteer for this study. 
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o All my questions at this stage have been answered. 
 
Please print and sign your name below if you are willing to abide fully by the 
conditions stated above. 
Name:   
_____________________________________________________________________
___ 
(Please print in block capitals) 
 
Signature:  
_____________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
Date:   _________________________________________________ 
 
 
Researchers: 
I, Mr. Ian M McKenna, as primary researchers, accept full responsibility for the care 
of all research participants and we confirm that all the necessary safety precautions 
have been taken.  
 
Signature of researchers: _______________________________ Date:   ________ 
 
Mr. Ian M McKenna 
c/o Department of Psychology 
NUI Maynooth 
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Appendix P: Acceptance of Food Urges Protocol 
 
• Control is the Problem 
o We are taught from a young age that we can control our mind, 
including our cravings.  However, psychologists have begun to realize 
that attempts to control our craving are most likely not going to be 
successful and may even make the cravings worse.   
o Can you think of an example where an attempt to control a thought, 
feeling or craving made it even worse?  (10 seconds) 
 
o Maybe I can give you an example right here.  Try this: for the next 60 
seconds do not let your mind think about or imagine yourself eating a 
warm chocolate cake covered in ice-cream. Don’t think about what it 
looks like, tastes, smells, or feels like to eat. Suppose I offered a 1 
million euro reward if you can do it, but you will be wired you up to a 
mind-reading machine to verify if you did it or not. 
   
o Ok so try it now for the next 60 seconds, do not let your mind think 
about or imagine yourself eating a warm chocolate cake covered in ice-
cream. I will keep time! 
 
o Hello again, what happen during the task?   
 One of two things happened;       
   
1. either you found it particularly difficult or even impossible not to 
think about eating warm chocolate cake or, 
2. you’re attempts to not think about eating warm chocolate cake “by 
thinking about something else” actually required you to think about 
eating chocolate cake (otherwise how would your mind know that 
you had not thought about it).  
 
So this example shows that we cannot control our thoughts even when 
we have the most intense motivation to do so.  It works the same for 
cravings: In the same way that we can’t control what we think about, 
we can’t control how we feel or our cravings. In short, If you have 
cravings to eat chocolate, then you have them and there’s not much 
you can do about having them.  
 
•   Acceptance 
o “If we don’t try to control or suppress our cravings what can we do?  
Perhaps it could help us to accept that we are going to have food 
cravings no matter what and we can’t do anything to stop our mind 
from wanting something that tastes good. After all it’s natural!” 
 
• Willingness 
 
o “If we can’t accept what it feels like to have a craving, where does that 
leave us?  What must we do if we don’t have a control to turn down a 
craving, but we can’t stand what it feels like to have craving? … That’s 
right.  We have to give in to the craving and eat the food!  But, is there 
another option?  … Yes, we could figure out a way to tolerate the 
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craving feeling.  The ability to tolerate a feeling or thought is called 
Willingness.  Although we don’t have much control over what we feel 
or think, is it possible that we do have control of our “willingness” to 
feel and think certain things?  Can you imagine saying to yourself: No 
matter how strong this craving to eat chocolate gets, I’m just going to 
let it be in my head, give it room. I don’t need to make it go away? 
 
• Awareness 
 
o Psychologists have discovered that it is incredibly useful to be able to 
notice and observe your own internal experiences.  What do I mean by 
internal experiences?  Things like your thoughts: such as, “I must 
check my email.”  “I’m looking forward to going to the cinema this 
evening.”  Another type of internal experience are feelings, such as 
emotions like sadness, anxiety and excitement.  Cravings and urges to 
do things (like eat) are also internal experiences. So are physical 
feelings like an itch and sensations like smells and sounds. 
 
o Closes your eyes and just sit back, try to notice whatever internal 
experiences you are having right this second.  What do you see, hear, 
smell, feel?  What are you thinking? (10 seconds) 
 
o Was that possible? 
 
o Sometimes it is easier to get this awareness concept using a metaphor. 
 
o Close your eyes and imagine that you are standing on a railway bridge 
gazing down at long freight train, rumbling along, it has many, many 
train cars that stretch far into the distance.  The train-cars are open-
topped, so you can see the freight inside each one.  The freight is 
labeled and is, in fact, the content of your mind: some of the cars have 
your thoughts, some have your emotions, some have cravings, and 
some have the noises, sights and sounds that you are sensing.  So one 
car might have “smell of perfume” another might have the thought “I 
forgot to call my friend back”, another, the feeling of being very hot, 
and one might have a craving to eat chocolate. 
 
 
• Distancing 
 
o “A very important way to increase willingness and decrease the 
distress you have about cravings is to distance yourself from the 
cravings.  When we distance from a craving, we ‘step back from’ 
ourselves and our cravings and see ourselves having the cravings from 
a psychological distance.  When we are distanced we can experience 
cravings (or any thought or feeling) as just a feeling our mind is having 
at that moment.  Maybe we can even realize this craving feeling is 
nothing more than chemical and electrical activity in our brain.  When 
we have this kind of distance from our thoughts and feelings we can 
choose “not to do” what those thoughts and feelings are ‘telling’ us to 
do.  In other words, we can say: ‘I can see myself having a craving to 
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eat chocolate right now.  It’s a really strong craving.  But I’m going to 
let that feeling just be there, give it room and choose not to eat 
chocolate.’ 
o Again, conjure up the image of looking down at the train from the 
railway bridge above.  In your mind’s eye can you get perspective so 
that you can see each thought, feeling or craving you have, from a 
distance?  Now can you imagine being inside a particular train-car 
where the only thing you can see is a huge sign that says “Craving to 
eat chocolate!”  That difference between being inside the train-car 
engaging with your thoughts and seeing your thoughts in a train-car 
from a distance (like standing above on a railway bridge just watching 
your thoughts go by without engaging with them) is what I mean by 
distancing.   
 
o You are now going to do a distancing exercise for the next minute, I 
will keep time: Once again, close your eyes and imagine that you are 
standing on a railway bridge gazing down at long freight train carrying 
you thoughts in the train-cars below, Notice each thought, feeling and 
craving that you are experiencing right now.  But this time, try to step 
back, see your mind having the experience. Describe it to yourself and 
thank your mind for whatever it throws up in the train-cars below.  So 
say things to yourself like “I see my mind is having the thought that 
this is unusual experience” or “I see my mind is having the thought 
that I need to go to the shop to get milk later” or “I see my mind is 
having a craving for some chewing-gum.”. 
 
o Ok keep noticing and practicing distancing for then next minute until I 
ask you to stop! 
 
60 second pause. 
 
o Hello again, what was that like?  Were you able to achieve distance? 
  
 
Strategy Memory Aid: 
• A: Acceptance.  Whatever thoughts or feelings or cravings your mind 
creates are okay.   
• W: Willingness.  Be willing to have what your mind gives you.  No matter 
how strong a craving is, you can let it be.  You don’t have to make it go 
away. 
• A: Awareness.  Become aware of what it is you are thinking and feeling 
and craving in any given moment.  
• D: Distancing.  Step back from your thoughts and feelings and cravings.  
See them from a distance.  “I see myself having a craving for chocolate 
cake right now. 
 
 
Thank you for listening, please contact the experimenter. 
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Appendix Q: Acceptance of Urges Food Exercises 
 
You are now going to do an exercise with your favourite snack. 
 
o Take a piece of your favourite snack and pick it up with your hand. Then just 
stop. (5 seconds)  
o Smell the food until I ask you to stop (10 seconds) 
o Now, raise it towards your mouth and gently move in tiny increments towards 
eating, but do not eat, stop at the cusp right between eating and not eating. 
Linger right there at the cusp. Find that place right at the tipping point between 
eating and not eating, but do not eat. Your mind will not like this but practice 
the craving coping strategy you learned earlier.  
o Accept whatever your mind to throws up,  
o Be willing to experience it,  
o Be aware of what you are thinking, and feeling, your internal experiences.  
o Distance yourself from your internal experiences by watching you’re thoughts, 
feeling and physical experiences go by you as if they were freight on a train, 
while you simply observe the freight go by from the railway bridge above. Do 
this until I ask you to stop (60 secs) 
 
o Thank you, please put the snack down. (10 seconds) 
 
o We will repeat this process another times  
 
o Once again, take a piece of your favourite snack and pick it up with your hand. 
Then just stop. (5 seconds)  
o Smell the food until I ask you to stop (10 seconds) 
o Now, raise it towards your mouth and gently move in tiny increments towards 
eating, but do not eat, stop at the cusp right between eating and not eating. 
Linger right there at the cusp. Find that place right at the tipping point between 
eating and not eating, but do not eat. Your mind will not like this but practice 
the craving coping strategy you learned earlier.  
o Accept whatever your mind to throws up,  
o Be willing to experience it,  
o Be aware of what you are thinking, and feeling, your internal experiences.  
o Distance yourself from your internal experiences by watching you’re thoughts, 
feeling and physical experiences go by you as if they were freight on a train, 
while you simply observe the freight go by from the railway bridge above. Do 
this until I ask you to stop (60 secs) 
 
o Thank you, please put the snack down. (10 seconds) 
 
o We will repeat this process once more.  
 
o Once again, take a piece of your favourite snack and pick it up with your hand. 
Then just stop. (5 seconds)  
o Smell the food until I ask you to stop (10 seconds) 
o Now, raise it towards your mouth and gently move in tiny increments towards 
eating, but do not eat, stop at the cusp right between eating and not eating. 
Linger right there at the cusp. Find that place right at the tipping point between 
eating and not eating, but do not eat. Your mind will not like this but practice 
the craving coping strategy you learned earlier.  
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o Accept whatever your mind to throws up,  
o Be willing to experience it,  
o Be aware of what you are thinking, and feeling, your internal experiences.  
o Distance yourself from your internal experiences by watching you’re thoughts, 
feeling and physical experiences go by you as if they were freight on a train, 
while you simply observe the freight go by from the railway bridge above. Do 
this until I ask you to stop (60 secs) 
 
o Put the snack down. (10 seconds) 
 
Thank you for listening, please contact the experimenter. 
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Appendix R: Indulgence of Urges Food Exercises 
 
Open your favourite snack but not to touch it afterwards 
 
You are now going to do an exercise with your favourite snack. 
 
• For the next 60 seconds let your mind think about or imagine yourself eating 
your favourite snack.  Think about what it looks like, tastes, smells, or feels 
like to eat.    
 
• (60 seconds) 
 
o Hello again,  
o Take a piece of your favourite snack and pick it up with you hand. Then just 
stop again. (5 seconds). 
o Smell the food until I ask you to stop (10 seconds) 
o Now, raise it towards your mouth and gently move in tiny increments towards 
eating, but do not eat, stop at the cusp right between eating and not eating. 
Linger right there at the cusp. Find that place right at the tipping point between 
eating and not eating. Think about what it would feel like to eat this food right 
now. Your mind will not like this but, try and notice whatever thoughts 
feeling, urges and sensations your mind throws up. When the cravings get so 
strong that you can’t resist them anymore take a bite of your snack and then, 
put the snack down. 
 (30 seconds) 
 
o We will repeat this process another two times  
 
o Hello once again, take a piece of your favourite snack and pick it up with you 
hand. Then just stop. (5 seconds). 
o Smell the food until I ask you to stop (10 seconds) 
o Now, raise it towards your mouth and gently move in tiny increments towards 
eating, but do not eat, stop at the cusp right between eating and not eating. 
Linger right there at the cusp. Find that place right at the tipping point between 
eating and not eating. Think about what it would feel like to eat this food right 
now. Your mind will not like this but, try and notice whatever thoughts 
feeling, urges and sensations your mind throws up. When the cravings get so 
strong that you can’t resist them anymore take a bite of your snack and then, 
put the snack down. 
 (30 seconds) 
 
o We will repeat this process one more time  
 
o Hello once again, take a piece of your favourite snack and pick it up with you 
hand. Then just stop. (5 seconds). 
o Smell the food until I ask you to stop (10 seconds) 
o Now, raise it towards your mouth and gently move in tiny increments towards 
eating, but do not eat, stop at the cusp right between eating and not eating. 
Linger right there at the cusp. Find that place right at the tipping point between 
eating and not eating. Think about what it would feel like to eat this food right 
now. Your mind will not like this but, try and notice whatever thoughts 
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feeling, urges and sensations your mind throws up. When the cravings get so 
strong that you can’t resist them anymore take a bite of your snack and then, 
put the snack down. 
 (10 seconds) 
 
Thank you please contact the experimenter 
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Appendix S: Debriefing Form for Participants in Chapter 7 
 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. I really appreciate you giving your time.  
 
I am happy to answer any questions you might have about this study. The frequently 
asked questions debriefing form (over) should address any concerns you may have. If 
you still have further concerns you can contact Professor Dermot Barnes-Holmes on 
Tel: +353 1 708 4765, who will arrange an appointment to discuss the research 
project and its implications in detail. 
 
Any information given to Professor Barnes-Holmes would be entirely confidential 
and will not be made available to any one else.  
 
Any information given to Dr Barnes-Holmes would be entirely confidential and will 
not be made available to any one else. It will be completely separate from my 
research. 
 
If during your participation in the study you felt the information and guidelines that 
were given to you were neglected or disregarded in anyway, or if you are unhappy 
about the process you may contact the Secretary of the National University of Ireland 
Maynooth Ethics Committee at pgdean@nuim.ie or 01 708 6018.  
 
There would be no charge for this service. 
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 Frequently Asked Questions 
 
1. Could the result be a function of the order in which I did the two parts? I had to 
group one category (i.e. ‘Healthy Foods or ‘Unhealthy Foods) together with the 
term “VERY Hungry” first. Later, when I had to group the other category with 
the term “SLIGHTLY Hungry”, I found it difficult.  
Answer: The order in which tests are administered does make a small 
difference in some tests to the overall result. This effect has been referred to as 
an order effect. In order to circumvent this problem, the orders used to present 
words/terms in the IRAP are random. For any stimuli we present, we are careful 
to be sure that half the test-takers got the A then B order and the other half got 
the B then A order.  
2. How does the IRAP measure implicit attitudes?  
Answer: The IRAP asks you to respond more rapidly to relational tasks that 
reflect your current beliefs (e.g., pro-healthy trials) than to tasks that do not 
(e.g., pro-unhealthy trials). So, if you found it easier to respond faster on IRAP 
trials that involved categorising healthy foods with “VERY Hungry” and 
unhealthy foods with “SLIGHTLY Hungry” relative to trials that involved the 
opposite categorisations, this suggests a healthy bias towards food. 
3. What does it mean if I get a test result that I don't believe describes me or, if 
I take the same test twice, I get different results each time.  
Answer: The IRAP is not 100% accurate. As is often the case, if you repeat the 
test you may find that your outcome will change slightly. If you repeat the test 
and the outcome does not change, the result is definitely more trustworthy than 
is the first result alone. It would be unusual to observe a large difference in 
outcome from one sitting to the next. In this case we suggest that you regard the 
results as ‘inconclusive’.  
Interestingly, several recent studies have suggested that implicit attitudes may 
be malleable (see Blair, 2001). This study specifically sought to investigate the 
effects of two different food urge response strategies on implicit food-related 
attitudes using the IRAP. You were presented with either an acceptance or 
indulgence of food urges response strategy designed to impact upon your 
implicit food attitudes (depending upon which group you were assigned to). 
Therefore, the strategy to which you were exposed to may have made it more 
difficult for you to respond in a manner consistent with your own beliefs.  
4. The red Xs forced me to give responses I did not consider proper. Does that 
mean the test is no good for me?  
 
Answer: No – it is likely that you would find one way of responding to the 
tasks more difficult than the other.  This is completely normal and what the test 
was designed to do. 
5. Where can I find technical discussion of implicit social cognition and the 
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IRAP?  
Answer: Papers on the IRAP are available at 
http://psychology.nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAP_1.shtml and at 
http://www.contextualpsychology.org. An overview of the IRAP is also 
available in an article by Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006) in the Irish Psychologist. 
For an overview of the topic of 'implicit social cognition' refer to articles by 
Greenwald and Banaji in the Psychological Review, (1995; 2002).  
6. If I consistently score 75% or less, does this mean I have no implicit preference? 
Answer: The test requires a certain number of correct responses in order to 
generate an interpretable result. If you consistently scored 80% or less, then 
there were too many errors to determine a result. This means that the data 
produced in your test were ones that cannot be interpreted confidently with 
regard to implicit preferences. This is not the same as a result that shows little or 
no implicit preferences.  
7. When will implicit attitudes agree with explicit attitudes?  
Answer: Two explanations have been offered to account for why direct 
(explicit) and indirect (implicit) attitudes may not be the same. The simplest 
explanation is that an individual may be unwilling to report their attitude for 
reasons of embarrassment or social desirability. A second explanation which has 
been offered to account for the difference between implicit and explicit attitudes 
is that an individual may be unable to accurately report their attitudes. For 
example, research has shown that individuals who claim not to hold prejudiced 
attitudes towards old people have nevertheless demonstrated such prejudice in 
their IRAP performances. Often such individuals are unaware of their implicit 
prejudice and are therefore unable to report it explicitly.  
8. What can I do about an implicit preference that I would rather not have?  
Answer: Remember that the IRAP test is not 100% accurate. You may wish to 
repeat the test to see whether your outcome changes before drawing a 
conclusion. If you repeat the test and the outcome does not change, the result is 
more trustworthy than is the first result alone. However, it is possible to possess 
an undesirable implicit preference. One solution is to seek experiences that will 
alter the patterns of experience that may have created the unwanted preference. 
Such experiences could include reading material that opposes the implicit 
preference, or interacting with people that provide experiences to counter your 
preference. A more practical alternative may be to notice the existence of the 
undesired preference, and remain alert to the possibility that it may intrude in 
unwanted fashion into your judgments and actions. This may lead you to act in 
ways that you may not normally act – for example, fully expecting and 
embracing very strong urges to eat without giving in to those urges. 
Additionally, you may decide to consciously undertake planned behaviours to 
compensate for known unconscious preferences. Identifying effective 
interventions for managing and changing unwanted implicit preferences is an 
active research question in psychological science. The good news is that implicit 
preferences, implicit as they are, appear to be malleable. This study was 
designed to determine if an acceptance or psych-education intervention for 
unhealthy eating can impact upon implicit preferences.  
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9. What is an 'implicit' attitude?  
Answer: An attitude is a positive or negative evaluation of some object.  
Implicit attitudes as defined by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) are 
“introspectively unidentified or inaccurately identified traces of past experience 
that mediate favourable or unfavourable feeling, thought, or action toward 
social objects” (p.8). The core argument is that implicit attitudes are often 
unconscious and thus their influence on subsequent behaviours may go 
unnoticed. Insofar as implicit attitudes are unconscious, traditional explicit 
measures, such as questionnaires and open-ended interviews, will likely fail to 
capture these psychological states.  
10. What are 'explicit' attitudes or beliefs?  
Answer: Explicit attitudes and beliefs are ones that are directly expressed or 
publicly stated. For example, the question asking for your liking for particular 
groups before you take the IRAP is an example of your explicit or consciously 
accessible attitude. The standard procedure for obtaining such direct expressions 
is known as ‘self-report’, which involves asking people to report or describe 
their attitudes. For example, the responses typically given in opinion surveys are 
considered explicit attitudes or beliefs. 
11. What is the difference between 'implicit' and 'automatic'?  
Answer: The terms "unconscious" "automatic" and "implicit" are closely 
related. They all refer to thought processes that are so well-established as to 
operate without awareness, intention, or control.  
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